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SURVEY

2011 ANNUAL SURVEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW
INTRODUCTION
This survey covers sports-related cases that were decided between January
1 and December 31, 2011. It does not include every sports-related decision.
Instead, it includes brief summaries of a wide range of cases that impact the
industry so as to provide insight into the growth of the field thus far and to
highlight recent sports law developments. To help the reader navigate, the
survey is divided into sections based on specific areas of sports law addressed
in each case.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law concerns the various activities engaged in by federal,
state, and local government agencies. These actions include everything from
rulemaking to the enforcement of various regulatory schemes. Although
administrative law touches on relatively few sports law cases, the following
case illustrates administrative law concerns that result directly from the
increased media coverage of major sports events.
CBS Corp. v. FCC1
The petitioner television broadcasting company sought review of orders of
the respondent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposing a
monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C.S. § 503(b) for the broadcast of indecent
material in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999. The
sanctions stemmed from the petitioner’s live broadcast of a Super Bowl
Halftime Show, which resulted in the exposure of a bare female breast on
camera, an act that lasted nine-sixteenths of one second. The petitioner
transmitted the image over public airwaves, resulting in punitive action by the
FCC. The petitioner challenged the FCC orders on constitutional, statutory,
and public policy grounds.

1. 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2011).
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At the time of the incident, the FCC’s policy was to exempt fleeting or
isolated material from the scope of actionable indecency. However, the FCC
sanctioned the petitioner under its new policy, which was implemented after
the Super Bowl incident. The court noted that the FCC, like any agency, could
change its policies without judicial second-guessing; however, it could not
change a well-established course of action without supplying notice of and a
reasoned explanation for its policy departure. Because the FCC failed to
satisfy this requirement, its new policy was arbitrary and capricious as applied
to the petitioner. Therefore, the court vacated the FCC’s orders.
ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust laws serve to protect consumers from conduct deemed to be
anticompetitive and play a significant role in regulating the sports industry. At
the federal level, such conduct is controlled through the Sherman Antitrust
Act, which prohibits monopolistic behavior and conspiracies to restrain trade.
Courts have recognized that the sports context presents unique antitrust issues
that are not present in any other industry. That is, sports leagues and related
organizations need a certain degree of cooperation in order to function; thus, to
balance the unique context with the need to protect consumers, antitrust issues
in the sports context are typically analyzed under a rule of reason analysis,
where the courts will consider certain procompetitive justifications for alleged
anticompetitive conduct.
Agnew v. NCAA2
The defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) filed a
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs, former college
athletes, challenged two NCAA bylaws as being anticompetitive and a form of
price fixing. The plaintiffs argued that the restriction to one-year scholarships
and the cap on the number of athletic-based discounts a school can offer a
sport each year were anticompetitive. On their motion to dismiss, the NCAA
argued that the plaintiffs failed to plead that the restrictions had any effect on a
relevant market. The court determined the NCAA was subject to the rule of
reason analysis, as opposed to per se violations of the Sherman Act, and
therefore, the plaintiffs had to allege anticompetitive effects on a discernible
market. The plaintiffs argued that they alleged sufficient geographic and
product markets that are affected by the restraints on trade. The court found
the pleading to be insufficient. Furthermore, the plaintiffs submitted two
2. No. 1:11-cv-0293, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
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previous complaints, and the NCAA requested that the immediate complaint
be dismissed with prejudice, as the plaintiffs made repeated attempts to
properly plead, and had previously failed. Therefore, the court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.3
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ suit. The plaintiffs
brought suit against EA Sports, as well as the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), alleging that EA Sports participated in price fixing, and
that EA Sports participated in a group boycott against the plaintiffs for failing
to compensate for use of the athletes’ images, names, or likenesses. The
plaintiffs alleged that EA Sports agreed to abide by NCAA rules, which
included not offering any compensation to current or former student-athletes.
The court found that refusing to compensate former student-athletes, who no
longer need to retain amateur status, could constitute price-fixing under the
pleadings. Further, the court found that the NCAA rules contained no
provision that prohibited compensation former student-athletes, and EA Sports
refusal to do so could constitute a group boycott. For these reasons, the court
found that the allegations were well plead, and denied defendant EA Sports
motion to dismiss.
BANKRUPTCY LAW
Bankruptcy law has been at the forefront of many major sports issues this
past year. Generally, these laws serve to aid debtors struggling to pay their
creditors, through business reorganization plans and liquidation. As the
following cases illustrate, bankruptcy laws have recently played a large role in
the sports context, affecting even some of the most well-known sports teams in
the country.
Fox Sports Net West 2, LLC v. L.A. Dodgers LLC
(In re L.A. Dodgers LLC)4
The appellants Fox Sports Net West filed an Emergency Motion for Stay.
The appellees, the Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, filed for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11. The appellees have a licensing agreement with the
appellants that extends through the end of the 2013 Major League Baseball

3. No. C 09-01967, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82682 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2011).
4. 465 B.R. 18 (D. Del. 2011).
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season. Pursuant to their bankruptcy filings, the appellees filed a Motion for
an Order Approving Market Procedures for the License of Telecast Rights,
which seeks to end its current contract with appellants. The bankruptcy court
granted the appellees’ motion. The appellants opposed the motion and filed an
Emergency Motion for Stay in the district court, appealing the bankruptcy
court’s grant of the appellees’ motion. The court found that the appellants are
likely to succeed on the merits because there is a substantial chance the
appellants can prove the bankruptcy court’s findings were clearly erroneous.
The court further found that the appellants would likely suffer irreparable
harm and that all other parties will likely be unaffected if the court grants the
stay. Finally, the court found that was in the public’s interest to grant the stay.
Therefore, the court granted the appellants’ Emergency Motion for Stay
pending the appeal of the bankruptcy court’s findings.
Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA
(In re Adelphia Recovery Trust)5
This case arises out of various bankruptcy proceedings involving the
National Hockey League’s (NHL) Buffalo Sabres (Sabres), and other various
ownership entities, regarding certain fraudulent conveyance claims brought
against the appellees, three banks. The central issues in this case was
“whether a debtor-in-possession is barred from bringing
fraudulent conveyance claims against three banks because it
actively participated in and facilitated a sale of the assets of a
different debtor-in-possession, to which it was a creditor,
while remaining silent about the possibility that it would bring
fraudulent conveyance claims with respect to its prior takeouts of loans secured by those assets.”6
The three banks had granted loans related to the Sabres and their stadium,
the HSBC Arena. Adelphia Recovery Trust, a trust created pursuant to
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, appealed the district court’s decision
barring its fraudulent conveyance claims against the banks. The Second
Circuit affirmed.

5. 634 F.3d 678 (2d Cir. 2011).
6. Id. at 682.
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In re Dallas Stars, L.P.7
The debtors, a professional ice hockey club, sought to have the bankruptcy
court approve its reorganization plan after it declared bankruptcy. The debtors
filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and were allowed to
operate their businesses as debtors in possession pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. §§
1107(a) and 1108. The debtors filed a disclosure statement and a joint
prepackaged plan of reorganization and asked the court to approve their
disclosure statement and confirm their plan. The court confirmed the debtors’
plan. The court stated that the plan met all requirements imposed by 11
U.S.C.S. §§ 1123 and 1129 and was in the best interests of the debtors and
their bankruptcy estates. The debtors and the Stalking Horse Bidder had
negotiated the asset purchase agreement in good faith and had acted in good
faith in connection with the development of the debtor’s prepackaged plan.
The debtors gave creditors and other interested parties timely and adequate
notice of their motion seeking confirmation of their plan and a reasonable
opportunity to object. Finally, the debtors had addressed and resolved all
objections to the plan.
In re L.A. Dodgers LLC8
The debtors, Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, filed a motion to obtain postpetition financing. The debtors wanted to work with Highbridge Senior Loan
Fund II (Highbridge), whom the debtors previously entered into a Credit and
Security Agreement with. Major League Baseball (MLB) objected to this
financing, and offered an unsecured loan on more favorable terms. The
debtors disputed that MLB’s loan offer was an unsecured loan. Further, MLB
alleged that the debtors refused to negotiate terms in good faith. The debtors
argued that the court should defer to the debtors’ business judgment and allow
them to obtain the Highbridge financing. The court rejected this argument and
further found that MLB’s loan offer was more favorable and constituted an
alternative. The court held that as long as MLB could prove that the loan offer
was unsecured and independent of MLB’s oversight and governance of the
debtors, the loan offer was sufficient. Further, the court ordered the debtors to
negotiate with MLB in good faith. Therefore, the court denied the debtors’
emergency motion to obtain post-petition financing.

7. 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4444 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 18, 2011).
8. 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
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In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners9
At issue in this proceeding was the Application of Perella Weinberg
Partners, LP (Perella) for “Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of
Expenses” in connection with its financial advising services related to the
Texas Rangers’ Chapter 11 Bankruptcy case. Perella argued that it was
entitled to certain fees for performing its financial advising services in the
case. The court, although agreeing to a certain extent, concluded that the facts
of the case warranted an award of fees less than those sought by Perella.
Specifically, regarding the higher transaction fee sought by Perella, the court
stated that this case differed from a normal financial advising situation, as the
risk “that the Rangers would not be bought . . . was so small as to be
insignificant.”10 This fact, in addition to other circumstances regarding
Perella’s involvement in the Rangers’ sale, resulted in the court granting the
Application in the amount of $912,450 with provisions related to further
expenses and reductions. Additionally, the court declined to decide whether
Perella was entitled to any reimbursement for legal fees.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions protect individuals from
certain acts of the government. Constitutional claims are prevalent in the
sports context because the state action requirement is likely met in many
sports-related situations, such as issues involving public schools, cities and
government agencies, and some athletic associations that are intertwined with
the government. Longstanding judicial precedent has established that
participation in sports is not a constitutionally protected right. This concept is
addressed in some of the following cases—cases that range in coverage from
the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and other
related claims.
Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance11
During the championship game of the 2008 Gay Softball World Series in
which the plaintiffs’ team lost, a protest was filed under Rule 7.05 of the North
American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA) Softball Code against
six players on the plaintiffs’ team. The rule limited the number of

9. No. 10-43400, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1247 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011).
10. Id. at *12.
11. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
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heterosexual players that a team could carry. Following a hearing, the protest
committee determined that the plaintiffs were not gay, and as a result, the
committee disqualified their team from the tournament, annulled its victories
and second-place finish, and recommended the one-year suspension of the
plaintiffs from NAGAAA softball. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that
NAGAAA is a public accommodation under Washington law and it
unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiffs based on sexual orientation. At
issue before this court was the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment
as to the unlawful discrimination claim and the defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Although
the court concluded that the defendant is a public accommodation under
Washington law, it determined that issues of material fact remained regarding
whether the NAGAAA rule is protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of
association. Similarly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate clear harm and imminent danger. As such, the defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s requested
injunctive relief was granted, and the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment was denied.
Awrey v. Gilbertson12
The plaintiff Anthony Awrey sued defendants Saginaw Valley State
University (SVSU) and the university’s president and athletic director in their
official capacities, alleging violations of his right to Due Process under the
Fourteenth Amendment when he was informed he would no longer be eligible
to play football at SVSU as a result of the defendants’ determination that the
plaintiff had violated National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules.
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that SVSU deprived him of his property
interest in continued eligibility to play college football and his liberty interest
in his good name and reputation. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
The court noted that the plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected
property interest in his continued eligibility to play football and concluded that
even if the plaintiff had a protected property or liberty interest, the claim
would still fail due to the applicable statute of limitations, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and qualified immunity. Thus, the court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.

12. No. 10-14738-BC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70613 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2011).
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Blasi v. Pen Argyl Area Sch. Dist.13
The plaintiff’s children participated in basketball for their respective 7th
and 8th grade teams. The plaintiff alleged that his children were discriminated
against because they are one-half Chinese. The plaintiff claimed that the
coaches encouraged discrimination against his sons, and furthermore, that his
sons received lesser playing time, despite being more skilled. The plaintiff
confronted the coaches via email and other means, which was a violation of
the Athletic Code Guidelines. As a result, the plaintiff’s sons were suspended
for one game for violating the guidelines. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit
against the defendant, challenging the Athletic Code Guidelines, as well as the
Parental/Spectator guidelines, and challenging the suspensions as retaliation
for exercising his constitutional rights. The court found that both guidelines
were narrowly tailored, and served a legitimate purpose, such that they did not
interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The court also found that the
plaintiff and his sons were properly sanctioned pursuant to the guidelines, after
agreeing to uphold the rules. Therefore, court found that the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were not violated, and accordingly dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
Clayton v. Walton14
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for
violations of her constitutional rights. The plaintiff attempted to enter a
Georgia Tech football game at Georgia Tech’s Bobby Dodd Stadium and was
turned away because she had food in her purse. The plaintiff threw the food
away; however, when she attempted to re-enter, stadium workers asked to
search her because they said they observed her putting something in the crotch
of her pants. The defendants, two Georgia Tech police officers, were called to
the scene. The plaintiff was searched and nothing was found. The plaintiff
filed suit against multiple parties, alleging her civil rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments were violated as a result of an unlawful arrest,
imprisonment, strip search, and conspiracy to cover up the conduct by an
inadequate investigation and seeking money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments when the defendants held her for the purposes of a
search because there was no probable cause that she violated the law.
The court stated that the plaintiff did not state a claim under the
13. No. 10-6814, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112412 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 30, 2011).
14. No. 1: 11-CV-2437-TWT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145387 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2011).
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Fourteenth Amendment because based on the facts, the Due Process Clause
does not provide a remedy for the plaintiff. The court also stated that the
plaintiff did not sufficiently state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, noting
that a search did not occur because a reasonable person would realize she was
free to decline the officers’ requests to be searched so long as she did not
attempt to enter the stadium. The court also stated that a reasonable person
would know that smuggling food into a stadium was in violation only of
stadium rules, and not state or federal law, and thus at worst could result in
expulsion from the stadium. Finally, the court stated that the defendants were
protected from all of the plaintiff’s claims under qualified immunity. For
these reasons, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist.15
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees
to the defendants. The plaintiff, who was a member of the cheerleading squad,
alleged that two basketball players sexually assaulted her. After a grand jury
declined to indict the two players, they were permitted to return to classes, and
one was permitted to rejoin the basketball team. During a basketball game, the
plaintiff refused to cheer for the player when he performed alone. As a result,
the plaintiff was removed from the cheerleading squad. The plaintiff then
filed this civil rights action against the defendant school district and other
school officials. She alleged that the defendants violated her equal protection
rights; deprived her of her liberty interests in freedom from psychological
harm and stigmatization without due process; deprived her of her property
right in participating in the cheerleading squad without due process; and
violated her First Amendment rights. The defendants subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and awarded the
defendants attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the
district court erred in awarding the defendants the attorney’s fees. On appeal,
the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the
plaintiff’s equal protection claim and due process claims were frivolous.
However, the court held that the plaintiff’s First Amendment argument had
some arguable merit and that the district court clearly erred in finding that the
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim frivolous. Therefore, the court reversed the
district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and remanded the order for
further proceedings.

15. 440 Fed. Appx. 421 (5th Cir. Tex. 2011).
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Florida State University Bd. of Trustees v. Monk16
Florida State University (FSU) petitioned for writ of certiorari. FSU
conducted an investigation after learning about possible academic violations
within FSU’s Office of Athletic Academic Support Services.
The
investigation revealed substantial evidence purporting that Brenda Monk
(Monk) perpetuated academic dishonesty. FSU issued a public report on the
investigation, although Monk’s name was not included. However, it was
easily discoverable from the report that Monk was the person referenced. As a
result, Monk resigned from her position and filed a defamation suit against
FSU. FSU filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that it enjoys absolute immunity
from defamation suits. The trial court denied the motion, and FSU asked for
writ of certiorari.
The court of appeals granted the writ of certiorari because the trial court
departed from essential requirements of law by refusing to dismiss the case on
FSU’s absolute immunity grounds. The court noted that FSU acted within its
official duties when it conducted the investigation and released the report to
the public, as required by the NCAA. Therefore, the court of appeals granted
FSU’s writ of certiorari and quashed the trial court’s order that denied FSU’s
motion to dismiss.
Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp.17
The plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction on behalf of their minor
son to prevent enforcement of the defendant school district’s haircut policy for
male, middle-school athletes. The plaintiff’s son played middle-school
basketball and was subject to the haircut policy. Upon suing the defendant,
the plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s policy violated their son’s equal
protection rights and his rights to procedural and substantive due process. The
court found that it did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the defendant because the
case was moot, as the basketball season was over, and any case brought for the
upcoming season was not yet ripe. Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff’s
request for a preliminary injunction.

16. 68 So. 3d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
17. No. 1:10-cv-1709-RLY-DML, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78799 (S.D. Ind. July 19, 2011).
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Immaculate Heart Cent. Sch. v.
N.Y. State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n18
The plaintiff brought this declaratory action against the defendants,
seeking to enjoin them from classifying private and public schools differently.
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and § 1983
of the United States Code after the defendants’ reclassified Plaintiff’s private
school from Class D to Class C based on their overall winning record.
Reclassification determinations for private schools were made based on
analysis of various factors such as win and loss records, championships, and
postseason appearances; public schools were reclassified based purely on
enrollment figures. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Although
noting that the defendants have a legitimate interest in maintaining
competitive balance—their asserted interest—the court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause claim. However, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the remaining claims.
J.K. v. Minneapolis Public Schs.19
J.K. filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant
school district from transferring him to another school in the same district.
J.K. attended Southwest High School (Southwest) in Minneapolis for three
years until the defendant Minneapolis Public Schools (the District) barred him
from further attending Southwest because of misconduct that he allegedly
committed near the end of his junior year. The District tried to transfer J.K. to
another high school within the District. As a result, J.K. filed a motion for
preliminary injunction, ordering the District to permit him to attend Southwest
for the upcoming year. J.K. alleged that the District’s actions violated his
right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Specifically, J.K. asserted that the proposed
transfer would deprive him of three distinct interests: (1) his property interest
in his education; (2) his property interest in participating in interscholastic
sports; and (3) his liberty interest in his reputation. The court, however, did
not agree. First, the court held that J.K.’s transfer to a different high school
would not impair his state-created property interest in a public education.
Therefore, the court held J.K was not likely to prevail on the merits of this
18. 797 F. Supp. 2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
19. No. 11-CV-1322, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84195 (D. Minn. July 29, 2011).
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claim. Second, the court held that J.K. was unlikely to show that the District,
by transferring him, would impair his property interest in participating in
interscholastic sports as part of his education. As such, the court would not
enjoin the transfer on this basis. Finally, the court held that J.K. was unlikely
to prove that his transfer deprived him of due process interest in his reputation.
Because J.K. was not likely to prevail on the merits of any of his due process
claims, the court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction.
Kirby v. Loyalsock Twp. Sch. Dist.20
The plaintiff was bullied by her high school basketball teammates, which
led to the plaintiff quitting the basketball team during her senior year. After a
rumor went around school that the plaintiff was pregnant, she made a formal
complaint with the school against one of her teammates. The high school’s
assistant principal, Dr. Reitz, investigated the rumor, but could not find
conclusive evidence as to who started it. Another complaint was filed after an
incident occurred between the plaintiff and other students at school. The
plaintiff filed this action and alleged that defendants violated her constitutional
rights to freedom of association, substantive and procedural due process, and
equal protection. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court
dismissed all claims against two defendants, the high school principal and
District superintendent in their official capacity, because they were protected
by the qualified immunity statute.
First, the court addressed her freedom of association claim. Intimate
association and expressive association are the only types of protected
association. The court ruled that even if the defendants’ conduct was the
cause of the plaintiff quitting the basketball team, the plaintiff failed to prove
that the Constitution recognizes a right of social association. Therefore, the
court granted the defendants’ motion as to this claim.
Next, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiff’s equal protection claim. The court found that the plaintiff failed
to identify any similarly situated student who had their complaint investigated
by Dr. Reitz as opposed to the principal.
Lastly, the plaintiff argued that both her rights to procedural due process
and substantive due process were violated. As endless case law suggests, a
student has a legitimate claim only to public education, but no protected
property interest in participating in extracurricular activities. Therefore,
because she was not prohibited from receiving a public education, the court

20. No. 4:09-cv-01695, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99669 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2011).
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granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to procedural due
process. Similarly, for the substantive due process claim, the defendants
argued that the plaintiff failed to establish that any fundamental right existed
as to which she was being deprived of by the defendants. Because the United
States Constitution does not grant a fundamental right to public education, the
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Lanier v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist.21
The plaintiff, James Lanier (Lanier), brought a civil action lawsuit against
the Fresno Unified School District (FUSD) for alleged discrimination in
relation to Lanier’s bid on a sports officiating services contract. Evidence was
presented that Lanier, an African-American, bid against others who were both
black and white. In preparing his bid, Lanier inquired about the independent
contractor status of the sports officials’ pool, and whether he could use the
entire pool. Lanier was informed by the purchasing department that only the
current roster of officials could be used by Lanier. However, numerous white
contractors bidding for the same job were permitted to use the entire pool of
officials in his bid proposal and in performance of the contract. One of the
white contractors was granted the contract.
First, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 because FUSD was an arm of the state,
and therefore, is protected from such claims due to sovereign immunity
granted by the Eleventh Amendment.
Next, the court denied FUSD’s motion to dismiss Lanier’s Title VI claim,
because the alleged discrimination was conducted by those “high enough in
FUSD’s managerial hierarchy to constitute an allegation of discrimination
against the entity receiving federal funds.”22 Lanier met his burden for
establishing a Title VI claim by offering enough evidence to overcome the
motion to dismiss, showing that FUSD may have engaged in racial
discrimination and that FUSD did receive federal financial assistance. FUSD
argued that the court should dismiss the claim because Lanier failed to offer
proof that FUSD itself was discriminatory, and offered evidence showing that
only individual employees were discriminatory. This led the court to
determine whether Lanier’s discriminatory conduct allegation was completed
by managers high enough to institute corrective measures on Lanier’s behalf.

21. No. CIV F 09-1779, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111736 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 29, 2011).
22. Lanier v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111736, 15–16 (D.C.E.D. Cal.,
Sept. 29, 2011).
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Lanier offered evidence that FUSD’s athletic director told the AfricanAmerican contract bidders that they would not be considered for the opening
unless they partnered with the white contractor who had no staff or
certification to officiate (both of which Lanier did have). There was also proof
that Lanier sent a letter notifying FUSD’s board, which had necessary
decision-making power, of the discriminatory conduct. Therefore, the court
ruled that the alleged facts directly stated that FUSD was aware of Lanier’s
racial bias allegations, but failed to remedy the situation. The court also held
that Lanier adequately alleged discriminatory conduct as required under Title
VI.
Luzzi v. ATP Tour, Inc.23
ESPN filed a motion to unseal certain documents. The Association of
Tennis Professionals (ATP) charged the plaintiffs, professional tennis players,
with violating the ATP Official Rulebook for wagering on tennis matches.
Following arbitration proceedings, each plaintiff was fined and suspended.
The plaintiffs later filed suit in Florida District Court, alleging that they were
not bound by the ATP Rulebook’s antiwagering provisions, their arbitration
proceedings were not binding, and ATP’s targeting of the plaintiffs violated a
fiduciary duty. During discovery in this suit, the parties entered into a
Confidentiality Agreement and Stipulated Order in which the parties could
designate certain documents as confidential and thus seal them as confidential.
On Intervenor, ESPN filed a motion to unseal certain documents, arguing (1)
that a right of public access attaches to documents submitted with a dispositive
motion because they form the basis of a formal act of the court; and (2) ATP
did not show an interest in the continued sealing of the documents sufficient to
outweigh the public’s and media’s right of access. Without deciding the issue,
the court first assumed that at least a limited presumption of public access
applied to the sealed documents. Second, the court noted that legitimate
privacy interests are an important factor to be considered, particularly the
privacy interests of tennis players not involved in this dispute. As such, the
court held that good cause existed for the records to remain sealed and denied
ESPN’s motion to unseal the documents.
Marcavage v. City of Chicago24
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s decision to grant summary
23. No. 3:09-cv-1155-J-32MCR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74796 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2011).
24. 659 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2011).
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judgment in favor of the defendants in the plaintiffs’ action asserting
violations of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs, members of a religious
organization, were demonstrating at two stadiums during outreach activities
during homosexual athletic and cultural events. Police officers ordered the
demonstrators to change the locations of their activities and the plaintiffs
refused to comply. As a result, two demonstrators were arrested. The
plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendants, the city, police officers, and a
municipal corporation, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
city and the police officers, and granted a motion for judgment on the
pleadings in favor of the municipal corporation. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city
and the police officers with respect to the claims involving the stadiums
because they were not permitted to use the main pedestrian thoroughfares at
each of the venues because (1) under the First Amendment the restrictions
were content-neutral, not overly broad, and sufficiently narrowly tailored to
the significant goal of avoiding congestion and maintaining an orderly flow of
traffic; (2) regarding equal protection, a reasonable fact-finder could not in
good conscience find that the demonstrators were similarly-situated to other
users of the sidewalks; and (3) officers had probable cause to arrest a
demonstrator for disorderly conduct. However, the court remanded the First
Amendment claim dealing with the park.
McGee v. Va. High Sch. League25
The plaintiffs filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin defendant from
applying one of its athletic eligibility rules. Six public high schools were
consolidated into three schools, which resulted in the end of the St. Paul
Fighting Deacons (St. Paul). St. Paul served students residing in two counties,
and the students, regardless of their county, were able to choose between the
two remaining high schools in the two counties. The defendant’s transfer rules
applied whenever a student enrolled in one school then transferred to another
school without a corresponding change in parental residence. Under the rule,
if a student transferred to another high school and did not fall under one of the
exceptions, the student was ineligible from participating in interscholastic
competitions for one year. One of the exceptions addressed school closure and
stated that the rule did not apply if the student transferred to the school serving
the district in which the parent resided. The Mayor of the City of St. Paul

25. 801 F. Supp. 2d 526 (W.D. Va. 2011).
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requested that St. Paul students be granted an eligibility exception should they
choose to transfer to a high school not in their county. The request was
denied. The plaintiffs, parents of the students that went to noncounty schools,
sought a permanent injunction against the defendant’s application of the
transfer rule and sought a preliminary injunction allowing the students
temporary eligibility while the lawsuit pended. The trial court addressed the
preliminary injunction and held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of their lawsuit and failed to show
irreparable harm. Therefore, the court denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction.
Quintero v. Mariposa Cnty. Sch. Dist.26
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant school district, alleging that
school officials’ racially discriminatory attitudes and conduct prevented him
from equal access to sports officiating contracts. However, the court held that
the plaintiff’s complaint could not succeed because the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits actions for damages against the state. As a public school district in
the state of California, the defendant is an arm of the state, and is therefore
shielded from suit in federal court. The court also held that the plaintiff’s state
law claims were barred for similar reasons. However, the court did grant the
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the school board
members in their individual capacities.
Seger v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n27
The plaintiffs, parents of nonpublic school students, appealed a district
court decision to dismiss their claims against the Kentucky High School
Athletic Association (KHSAA), alleging that a KHSAA rule violated their
constitutional rights. The contested bylaw concerned the eligibility of student
athletes at nonpublic schools who received financial aid. The KHSAA
enacted the bylaw to prevent and deter member schools from recruiting
student athletes by restricting the amount and form of financial aid nonpublic
school students can accept and remain eligible to play KHSAA-sanctioned
sports. After the plaintiffs’ children lost their eligibility through the
application of this bylaw, the plaintiffs filed this action against the KHSAA,
arguing that the bylaw was unfair, discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious,
and violated their constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
26. No. 1: 11-cv-00839, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124532 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).
27. 453 Fed. Appx. 630 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Amendment. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the bylaw
was not discriminatory on its face because it did not discriminate against on a
suspect or quasi-suspect class; therefore, the bylaw was subject to review
under the rational basis standard. Furthermore, the court found the bylaw was
rationally related to furthering the KHSAA’s interest in deterring the use of
financial aid as an improper athletic recruitment tool, an the bylaw did not
violate any of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. As such, the court affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims. The court noted,
however, that this decision did not affect any claims that the plaintiffs might
wish to pursue under state law.
Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co.28
Gannett Company newspaper appealed the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association
(WIAA), holding that the WIAA had the right to grant exclusive licenses to
broadcast WIAA games. In 2005, the WIAA contracted with the video
production company, American-HiFi, giving American-HiFi exclusive rights
to broadcast WIAA tournament events. The agreement did not prohibit media
coverage, photography, or interviews before or after games. Believing that the
exclusive license agreement violated the media’s First Amendment right to
report on events, Gannett streamed four WIAA tournament games without
WIAA consent and without paying the required licensing fees. In response,
the WIAA filed a declaratory judgment action against Gannet, asserting its
right to grant exclusive licenses. The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of the WIAA. Gannett appealed arguing that the WIAA’s contract
granting American-HiFi the exclusive right to stream tournament games and
requiring consent and payment for third-party broadcasts of entire games
violated the First Amendment. On appeal, the court determined that an
exclusive contract for the transmission of an event does not interfere with the
media’s right to report or comment on events. Instead, the agreement
prohibits the media only from appropriating the product without paying for it.
Furthermore, because nothing in the First Amendment grants the media
affirmative rights to broadcast entire performances, the WIAA had the right to
package and distribute its performances. For these reasons, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the WIAA.

28. 658 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011).
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CONTRACT LAW
Whether a contract involves certain product and sponsorship agreements,
employment issues, major league, minor league, or collegiate sports, there is
no doubt that contractual agreements touch on nearly every aspect of the
sports industry. The following cases represent some of the plethora of
contractual issues that arose in 2011 and highlight the significance of this
particular area of sports law.
Action Grp. Int’l, LLC v. AboutGolf, Ltd.29
The plaintiff, Action Group International (AGI), entered into a series of
three, one-year distribution agreements with the defendant, AboutGolf,
whereby the plaintiff was entitled to serve as AboutGolf’s sole distributor for
AboutGolf’s 3Trak golf products in South Korea. The third contract was the
same as the previous two in most material terms; however, the third contract
contained a new liability clause that served to limit the defendant’s liability
regarding a host of issues such as defective products. Although the agreement
required the defendant to provide the plaintiff with future product
development information, among other things, most of these supposed
developments never materialized.
Additionally, the plaintiff allegedly
repaired numerous defects following complaints regarding the defendant’s
products, and the defendant allegedly violated the exclusivity portion of the
agreement by communicating with other potential distributors in South Korea.
Eventually, the defendant notified the plaintiff it was terminating the
agreement.
This suit followed, with the plaintiff asserting eight separate causes of
action seeking damages and injunctive relief for the defendant’s alleged
breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and other related claims. At issue
before the court was the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Analyzing each claim
in turn, the court granted the defendant’s motion as to the plaintiff’s claims for
improper termination, breach of territorial exclusivity, unjust enrichment, and
tortious interference with business relations. However, the defendant’s motion
was denied as to the plaintiff’s claims for breach of warranty, fraud,
promissory estoppel, and for violations of Ohio’s Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.

29. No. 3:10CV2132, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46133 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29. 2011).
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Advanced Fluid Solutions, LLC v. Nat’l Assoc. for
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.30
The plaintiff Advanced Fluid Solutions (AFS) and NASCAR entered into
an agreement in July 2009 where NASCAR granted AFS the license to
manufacture the official NASCAR high-performance additive. The agreement
granted NASCAR the ability to terminate for AFS’s failure to make a payment
if, after proper written notice, AFS failed to cure such a default within thirty
days. NASCAR delivered notice improperly by email in late October 2009.
On December 1, 2009, NASCAR terminated the agreement with AFS.
However, after sending the email in October, NASCAR assured AFS that it
would perform the contract upon receiving the funding from AFS. After the
termination letter was sent, NASCAR continued to deal with AFS, and later
that month, AFS notified NASCAR that it obtained alternative financing and
was able to perform the contract. However, NASCAR had already entered
into an agreement with a different manufacturer.
NASCAR’s conduct led to AFS filing its three claims, which NASCAR
responded with a motion to dismiss. The district court held that specific
performance is an inappropriate remedy because AFS is not clearly entitled to
it and monetary damages would be an adequate remedy. Therefore, the
district court dismissed AFS’s claim for specific performance. The district
court also dismissed AFS’s claim for breach of contract. The court ignored
AFS’s argument that NASCAR continued discussions that gave the impression
that AFS could continue the agreement upon payment. The court also found it
unpersuasive that AFS suffered any damages because of NASCAR’s improper
notice. Finally, the district court dismissed AFS’s declaratory judgment
action. AFS argued that latent or patent ambiguities in the agreement led to
doubting its rights under the contract. However, AFS failed to cite any
specific provisions in the agreement that would demand declaratory relief.
Therefore, because AFS failed to allege plausible facts that indicated some
actual doubt as to a specific right under the agreement, the district court
dismissed AFS’s claim for declaratory judgment.
Bell v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc.31
The plaintiff, a professional horse racing jockey, sued the defendants for
tortious interference after being accused of fixing races and being banned from
racing at a certain race. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants violated
30. No. 6:11-cv-16-Orl-22KRS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98165 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2011).
31. No. 8:10-cv-2835-T-30TBM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146931 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011).
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the ban was issued without a hearing or any due
process. In the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the defendants first claimed
that the plaintiff could not bring a tortious interference claim because the
plaintiff had no existing contractual right to employment, or the hope of future
employment. The court rejected this claim and held that the plaintiff had
existing and prospective contractual rights. The court also noted that although
the defendants have a qualified privilege to interfere with the business
relationship of jockeys, a plaintiff can recover if malice is shown. The court
found that the plaintiff alleged malice because the defendants issued the ban
without reason. With respect to the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the
court held that the plaintiff did not state a claim because § 1983 does not cover
private conduct, and thus as a private enterprise, the defendants had the right
to exclude anyone they chose from their property.
Big East Conference v. W. Va. Univ.32
The defendant, West Virginia University, filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff, Big East Conference’s, complaint. The defendant announced that it
planned to leave the plaintiff’s conference for another conference and then
sued the plaintiff for breach of contractual and fiduciary duties for allegedly
failing to maintain the Big East as a viable collegiate football conference. The
defendant sued the plaintiff in West Virginia. The plaintiff claimed the
defendant breached bylaws of the conference and sued the defendant for
breach of contract. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.
First, after interpreting the state’s long arm statute, the Rhode Island
Superior Court held that the court did have personal jurisdiction over the
plaintiff. Second, the court held that there was sufficient service of process
because the defendant served the plaintiff in compliance with the rules of Civil
Procedure. Third, the court refused to apply West Virginia’s sovereign
immunity law on the basis of comity because it would deprive the plaintiff of
its ability to fully pursue a claim. Fourth, the court refused to dismiss the
action under the first-to-file rule because the facts indicated that the
defendant’s first-filed lawsuit qualified as an anticipatory action. Finally, the
court refused to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds because
the plaintiff would not get adequate relief in the defendant’s suit because the
defendant could claim sovereign immunity and the plaintiff may have no
judicial remedy in West Virginia. Additionally, the court noted that private
and public interest factors did not warrant dismissal. Therefore, the

32. No. PB 11-6391, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 164 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2011).
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defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied.
Can. Am. Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball, Ltd. v. Ottawa Rapidz33
The Ottawa Rapidz (Rapidz) appealed from the trial court’s judgment
granting a motion filed by the Canadian American Association of Professional
Baseball (the League) to confirm an arbitration award. Rapidz had entered
into a “League Affiliation Agreement” with the League, which entitled Rapidz
to operate a professional baseball team for play in the League during the 2008
and 2009 seasons. Rapidz did not actually field a team for the 2009 season. A
hearing was held before the League’s Board of Directors, acting as an
arbitration panel, to determine if grounds existed for the involuntary automatic
termination of Rapidz’ membership. The board determined that Rapidz had
committed an unsanctioned withdrawal from its membership, subjecting it to
automatic and immediate termination as a League member. The arbitration
panel also decided that the League was entitled to draw down in full the
$200,000 (Canadian) letter of credit Rapidz had posted with the League to be
eligible for membership, and to the extent that Rapidz’s stadium lease was
assignable, also to assign the lease to the League.
Rapidz contested the arbitration and filed a motion to dismiss at the trial
level, but the trial court confirmed the arbitration. Rapidz appealed,
contending that the motion to dismiss should have been granted because there
was no arbitration to confirm in the first place, the arbitrator did not sign the
arbitration, and personal jurisdiction was lacking. However, the various
documents comprising the League agreements are replete with evidence that
the Board is authorized to arbitrate disputes involving the League members
and that Rapidz agreed to submit any membership disputes to arbitration.
Rapidz voluntarily and willingly agreed to have the Board act as arbitrator
when it joined the League. Rapidz did not move to vacate or modify the
award based on the alleged irregularity in the form of the award. The court of
appeals affirmed.
Estate of Haselwood v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.34
The defendant, Chicago Title Insurance Company (CTIC), filed a motion
to dismiss plaintiff Haselwood’s claim for insurance coverage. The plaintiffs
loaned money to an ice arena for construction. This loan was secured by a
deed of trust. The plaintiffs financed the loan by purchasing title insurance
33. 711 S.E.2d 834 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
34. No. 10-5464-RBL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77648 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 2011).
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from CTIC. A year later, the ice arena stopped paying its lenders back.
Haselwood filed a lawsuit against the ice arena to foreclose its deed of trust.
Four years later, Haselwood sent CTIC a letter related to the foreclosure.
However, CTIC responded two years later by denying it had any duty to
defend Haselwood.
Haselwood brought this suit against CTIC, claiming it had wrongfully
denied them coverage. CTIC’s only argument was that Haselwood’s claims
accrued in 2003, and therefore, was barred by the six-year statute of
limitations for contract disputes. However, Haselwood argued that the claim
did not accrue until 2009, when CTIC refused coverage. Previous case law
supported the plaintiffs’ argument because an insurance claim accrues only
once the insurer breaches the insurance policy contract. Therefore, because
CTIC breached the contract in 2009 when it refused coverage to Haselwood,
the claims did not expire, and the court denied CTIC’s motion to dismiss.
Estate of Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc.35
The issue before the court was a joint motion for summary judgment on
behalf of the defendants, representing the New York Giants’ and New York
Jets’ collective interests arising out of a dispute regarding season tickets. The
defendants announced that season ticket holders would be required to enter
into a personal seat license contract requiring a designated payment for each
seat assigned to the season ticket holder in order to retain their season tickets.
The plaintiff challenged this policy, arguing that it constituted a breach of the
parties’ longstanding contract that allegedly entitled him to automatic renewal
rights. However, the defendants maintained that season tickets are revocable
licenses. Finding that no automatic renewal rights to season ticket holders
existed, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Fan Action, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc.36
The plaintiff created a website dedicated to coverage of the University of
Notre Dame sports teams. After the website was created, the defendant
offered to enter into a partnership agreement with the plaintiff. During the
term of the second partnership agreement, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant created a similar website and hired the plaintiff’s employees and
directed subscribers to the new website. The plaintiff subsequently sued the
defendant for breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith, and
35. No. 09-cv-01186, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11331 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2011).
36. No. 3:10CV75-PPS/CAN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134355 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 18, 2011).
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unfair competition. The defendant moved to dismiss, stating that the plaintiff
did not allege sufficient facts to be granted relief. The court found that the
complaint was well plead under the facts, and therefore denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
Gilbert v. Tulane Univ. of La.37
The plaintiff entered into an employment agreement with the defendants to
serve as the Defensive Line Coach for the Tulane University football team.
The plaintiff was subsequently fired for routinely engaging in unprofessional
behavior and divisive conduct. As a result of these allegations, the plaintiff
was not able to get another job with the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, alleging
six claims; however, the plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed all but two of his
claims—his breach of contract and abuse of rights claims. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s abuse of rights claim. The defendants
also urged the court to award attorney’s fees incurred in connection with their
motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff’s voluntarily dismissed claims
had no evidentiary support or were not warranted by existing law, and that the
plaintiff did not dismiss the claims until after the defendants filed their motion
to dismiss. The defendants also asked the court to order that the plaintiff’s
voluntarily dismissed claims be dismissed “with prejudice” so that the plaintiff
could not later attempt to litigate them.
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s abuse
of rights claim because the plaintiff did not file this claim in time. However,
the court denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees, because the
defendants did not satisfy the “separate motion” requirement established by
Rule 11(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the plaintiff’s
amendment and dismissal appeared to be in compliance with Rules 15(a) and
41(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relative to
voluntary dismissals being without prejudice; and the defendants did not
describe any less costly or time consuming efforts that they had undertaken in
an attempt to bring about a voluntary dismissal of certain claims without the
necessity of filing a formal adversarial motion.
Harmon v. Gordon38
The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contact.
37. No. 10-2920, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111801 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2011).
38. No. 10 C 1823, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95320 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011).

Ben Gordon
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(Gordon) was drafted by the Chicago Bulls in 2004 and signed a three-year
contract with the option to extend for a fourth year. Larry Harmon (Harmon)
and Gordon entered into a consulting agreement after Gordon was drafted, the
term of which was to cover the duration of Gordon’s playing career. Gordon
terminated the contract after his third year with the Chicago Bulls.
After Harmon sued Gordon for breach of contract, both parties moved for
summary judgment. Harmon argued that the contract was valid to extend for
the entirety of Gordon’s playing career, whereas Gordon argued it could
extend only for the length of his initial contract. The court found that the
contract must have a term that was definite and certain, which Harmon’s
interpretation would not provide. Gordon also argued that he was entitled to
terminate the contract for dissatisfaction in services. The court found that
Gordon was entitled to terminate his contract after his playing contract with
the Chicago Bulls expired, which he did, and therefore, the court granted
Gordon summary judgment and accordingly denied Harmon’s motion for
summary judgment.
Haught v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.39
Haught appealed the trial court’s decision to enter summary judgment in
favor of the defendant insurance company after the insurance company denied
coverage under his policy. Haught was an amateur youth baseball coach.
During a team meeting following a game, a dispute over how much the
school’s booster club was charging for parking became physical. Haught left
the meeting in an attempt to diffuse the fight. However, during the fight, one
of the booster members, Mr. Abrams, was fatally injured. In connection with
his death, Haught was found guilty of assaulting Mr. Abrams, and the
executrix of his estate filed a wrongful death action against multiple parties,
including Haught. Haught filed a motion seeking declaratory judgment,
claiming that the defendants, his insurers, owed him a defense with respect to
an incident leading to Mr. Abrams’s death and indemnification with respect to
the same incident. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment. The
trial court granted summary judgment, and Haught appealed.
Haught asserted that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to
the insurer because he was entitled to coverage under the policy, that the
incident that led to Mr. Abrams’s death occurred within the scope of the
policy, and that no exclusions were applicable. Because the fight occurred
approximately eighty feet from where Haught was conducting a team meeting,

39. 2011 Ohio 4994 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
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and because the argument grew heated and became violent causing the coach
to leave the team meeting and run towards the fight, the court held that Haught
was acting within his capacity as a coach when he ran into the crowd. Thus,
the court held that trial court erred in its interpretation of the insurance policy.
However, the court remanded the issue because the trial court denied coverage
solely upon this basis, and had not yet considered the remaining issues.
HBCU Pro Football, LLC v.
New Vision Sports Props., LLC40
The plaintiff, HBCU Pro Football, LLC (HBCU), produces television
broadcasts of athletic contests involving historically black colleges and
universities. In this capacity, the plaintiff met with the defendant Victor Pelt
(Pelt) and executed an agreement whereby the plaintiff would provide
broadcasts of three football games to the defendant New Vision Sports
Properties (NVSP), an official broadcast agent of College Sports Television
(CSTV), to be aired on CSTV and pay NVSP a broadcast fee for each game.
In return, the plaintiff was guaranteed a certain minimum gross revenue
payment for each game. A similar deal was reached regarding three other
college football games. Although the plaintiff followed through with its
portion of the agreement by providing the games and the broadcast fees, no
revenue was received and none of the games aired on CSTV. Eventually,
HSBC was notified that Pelt was making false representations and that NVSP
was not an authorized agent of CSTV. After settling with CSTV, HBCU filed
a motion for default judgment against the defendants NVSP and Pelt regarding
its breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment
claims. In this report and recommendation, U.S. Magistrate Judge Beth P.
Gesner recommended that the court grant the plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment against these remaining defendants. The report also included
recommendations regarding the amount of damages to be awarded.
Kan. City Brigade, Inc. v. DTG Operations, Inc.41
Kansas City Brigade, Inc., an arena football team, appealed from the trial
court’s denial of its contract claims against the defendant rental car company,
DTG Operations, Inc. (Dollar). Kansas City Brigade alleged that two valid
sponsorship agreements existed between the two parties. However, the trial
court held that Dollar was not liable under either contract, and the Kansas
40. No. WDQ-10-0467, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55976 (D. Md. May 24, 2011).
41. 251 P.3d 112 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
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Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Regarding the first
contract, the court held that the Dollar counter agent who signed the agreement
did not have actual or apparent authority to do so and that the Kansas City
Brigade director of corporate sponsorships should have known this fact. The
court stated that “[a]n $80,000 marketing contract with a professional sports
team would probably be an unusual or extraordinary transaction for the branch
manager of a car rental company,”42 and given this fact and other
circumstances such as the sponsorship director’s experience, it was not
reasonable for the director to believe the counter agent had such authority. As
to the second contract, the court held that Dollar could not be liable because
the signature was forged.
Laffin v. NFL43
This decision arises out of the highly publicized Super Bowl XLV ticket
incident in which the defendants allegedly “denied, relocated, or delayed the
seating of over 2000 ticket holders.”44 The plaintiffs, ticket holders on behalf
of themselves and other similarly situated people, sued the defendants,
alleging fraud; breach of contract; fraudulent inducement; negligence; and
negligent misrepresentation, in addition to seeking attorney’s fees. Although
the plaintiffs brought suit in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, the
defendants successfully removed the class action to this court, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, on the ground that the
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. At issue here is the plaintiffs’
motion to remand the case back to the original court. To establish that the
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, the defendants relied on such
information as the face value for a Super Bowl ticket and the approximate
number of plaintiffs.
Finding that the defendants established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy would be over
$5 million and that the plaintiffs arguments to the contrary were purely
speculative, the court denied the plaintiffs motion to remand.
N.H. Speedway, Inc. v. Motor Racing Network, Inc.45
New Hampshire Speedway, Inc. (NHS) filed a motion for summary
judgment on a claim for promissory estoppel. NHS operated an auto
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at *15.
No. 3:11-CV-0345-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39688 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2011).
Id. at *2.
No. 217-2008-EQ-099, 2011 N.H. Super. LEXIS 43 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011).
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speedway track. Motor Racing Network, Inc. (MRN) was engaged in the
business of radio broadcasting NASCAR events and racing-related programs.
NHS and MRN executed a document entitled “Agreement Between Network
and Promoter” in which NHS granted to MRN exclusive worldwide radio
rights to broadcast and rebroadcast by AM, FM, shortwave radio or other
nonvisual technology, all events that took place at the speedway. Speedway
Motor Sports, Inc. (SMI) purchased NHS’s stock and subsequently owned the
Speedway. Consequently, SMI owned its own radio network, Speedway
Properties Company, LLC d/b/a Performance Racing Network (PRN). After
the purchase, NHS declared the agreement between it and MRN void and
unenforceable and NHS refused to allow MRN to broadcast events from the
Speedway. As a result, NHS and PRN brought a declaratory judgment claim
against MRN. MRN filed a counterclaim, alleging, among other claims,
promissory estoppel against NHS. NHS moved for summary judgment on the
promissory estoppel counterclaim. The court held that MRN’s promissory
estoppel counterclaim raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to the
issues of whether it acted on reasonable reliance on NHS’s representations to
its detriment. Therefore, the court denied NHS’s motion for summary
judgment.
Original Pizza Pan v. CWC Sports Grp., Inc.46
Original Pizza Pan, an Ohio corporation, entered into an endorsement
agreement with The Sports Link, Inc., a California corporation, for the
exclusive right to use Cleveland Browns’ Brian Robinskie’s name and likeness
for advertising purposes. Four months after it entered into the agreement,
another pizza company began offering a collector’s cup with Robinskie’s
photo on it. Pizza Pan sued Sports Link and Robinskie’s agent for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation. The defendants moved to dismiss, stating that the
endorsement agreement contained a valid forum selection clause, prohibiting
suit against the defendants in Ohio. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion and dismissed the complaints with prejudice because it found the
forum selection clause to be valid. The appellate court affirmed stating that
there was nothing in the record to establish that California would be so gravely
difficult and inconvenient for Pizza Pan.

46. 194 Ohio App. 3d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
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Rosen v. Univ. of S.C.47
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s order granting summary for the
University of South Carolina (the University) on claims of breach of contract
and constitutional taking.
The Rosens became Lifetime Silver Spur
Scholarship members in the Gamecock Club after donating about $140,000 in
money and property to the school. They executed contracts to memorialize the
terms. After twenty years of receiving free parking benefits, the University
initiated a fee for the assigned reserved parking at the football stadium for the
Gamecock Club donors. The Rosens filed suit, alleging breach of contract,
conversion, and constitutional taking. The trial court found the contract was
not ambiguous and contained no language that the benefits would be free;
lifetime donors only received the benefit of maintaining their donor level in
the Gamecock Club. On appeal, the Rosens argued that the trial court erred in
finding the language of the contracts to be unambiguous. The appellate court
found that the contract made no distinction in the language used describing the
tickets and parking spaces; it neither stated additional charges would apply or
that the benefits would be free. This created ambiguity. The court also found
that the contracts did not specifically prohibit or allow a change of the
designated beneficiary and made it impossible from the language of the
contract to determine if the parties intended to allow a change. Finding the
contract to be ambiguous, the court reversed and remanded.
Ruffu v. Haney48
The appellant Ruffu, a horse trainer, brought an action against the
respondents for breach of a contract regarding a racehorse named Urgent
Envoy. In 2003, Ruffu entered an agreement with the respondents regarding
the purchase and training of Urgent Envoy, whereby Ruffu and the four other
respondents each held a 20% ownership interest in the horse. In December
2004, the California Horse Racing Board filed a complaint against Ruffu,
alleging that she had improperly taken the horse from another trainer, and the
Board of Stewards ordered Ruffu to return the horse to the trainer. In
November 2005, the California Horse Racing Board adopted the Board of
Stewards’ findings, but Ruffu never returned the horse. In July 2008, Ruffu
initiated the action against the respondents; she filed a second amended
complaint in December 2008 asserting claims for breach of the agreement.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss Ruffu’s action on the basis of
47. No. 2011-UP-331, 2011 S.C. App. Unpub. LEXIS 401 (S.C. Ct. App. June 27, 2011).
48. No. B218864, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 933 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2011).
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collateral estoppel. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a final decision in
an administrative adjudication may be given collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent judicial proceeding if the agency was acting in a judicial capacity
and the threshold requirements are satisfied. The trial court dismissed the
action, stating that an administrative proceeding before the California Horse
Racing Board collaterally estopped Ruffu’s claims. The appellate court
affirmed.
Simms v. Jones49
The defendants—Jerry Jones, owner of the Dallas Cowboys football club
and stadium, and the National Football League (NFL)—filed a motion to
dismiss the plaintiff ticketholders’ breach of contract claims, which the
plaintiffs filed after the defendants failed to ensure that there was proper
seating for each ticketholder to Super Bowl XLV. Cowboys Stadium hosted
Super Bowl XLV. To accommodate more spectators for the event, the
defendants planned to add 13,000 additional temporary seats to the stadium.
However, the NFL did not completely install the seats prior to the game. As a
result, some ticketholders were placed in seats that had an obstructed view of
the field, some were delayed in gaining access to their seats, and some never
got a seat and were able to watch the game only on television monitors in the
Miller Lite Club. Shortly after the game, the plaintiff ticketholders whom the
failure to ensure proper seating affected filed this consolidated class action,
alleging breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants moved to
dismiss all of these claims. The Super Bowl game ticket is a contract between
the NFL and the ticket purchaser because the game in question was the Super
Bowl. Therefore, the Texas district court held that Jerry Jones and the Dallas
Cowboys were not parties to that contract, and therefore, were not liable for
breach of contract and the court dismissed the breach of contract claims
against Jerry Jones, the Dallas Cowboys, and Cowboys Stadium. However,
the court did not dismiss the breach of contract claims against the NFL
because taking the facts pleaded in plaintiffs’ complaint as true, the NFL could
be liable for breach of contract. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining
claims for failure to plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

49. No. 3:11-CV-0248-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137783 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011).

SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE)

724

5/10/2012 10:31 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Crown Corr, Inc.50
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s contract and
negligence claims to recover damages following a rainstorm, which caused
significant damage to the University of Phoenix Stadium (Stadium). At the
time of this incident, the plaintiff had an insurance contract with Tourism and
Sports Authority (the insured), the owner of the Stadium. Following a
rainstorm in 2010, the Stadium suffered significant damage to its facade, roof,
and sound system. The plaintiff alleged that the damage was a direct result of
the defendant’s negligent design of the Stadium’s exterior enclosure system,
which the defendant promised would be able to withstand wind speeds in
excess of those that occurred during the storm. Consequently, the plaintiff
brought this action on behalf of the insured owner of the Stadium to recover
the damages that it had incurred as a result of the defendant’s negligent
performance under its contract to design the Stadium’s exterior enclosure
system. In its action, the plaintiff alleged breach of contract, breach of
contractual indemnity, and negligence. However, because the insured had
waived its subrogation rights in the design and build agreement, the waiver
bound the plaintiff, and it could not recover any contract or indemnity
damages. As for the plaintiff’s negligence claim, the court determined that the
economic loss doctrine barred the claim. As a result, the court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims.
Wasserman Media Group, LLC v. Bender51
Wasserman Media Group, LLC (WMG) petitioned the court pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm an arbitration award issued against
Jonathan Bender, a former NBA player, and to be awarded attorneys’ fees
incurred in this action. WMG and Bender entered into an NBPA Standard
Player Contract pursuant to NBPA Regulations; the parties signed an
agreement whereby WMG would represent Bender throughout his NBA
career, and Bender would pay WMG $396,766.60 at scheduled intervals.
Bender failed to meet the payment schedule, and WMG filed for arbitration
pursuant to the NBPA Regulations. Bender was notified of the arbitration
hearing, but he failed to respond or appear. The arbitrator found in favor of
WMG and ordered payment of the scheduled amount within ten days; Bender
did not pay any portion. The court confirmed the arbitration award for multiple
reasons: (1) the Regulations’ arbitration agreement expressly stated that any
50. No. CV 11-0965-PHX-JAT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148529 (D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 2011).
51. No. 10 Civ. 8783 (SAS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52825 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2011).
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award would be final and binding upon the parties; (2) the arbitrator’s decision
was justified given that Bender and WMG both signed an agreement
acknowledging the payment and Bender failed to adhere to the agreement or
even show up to the arbitration hearing; and (3) Bender’s right to vacate the
award was waived by virtue of his failure to challenge the award within three
months of its issuance. The court also awarded WMG attorney’s fees of
$2,500 due to Bender’s bad faith throughout the proceedings.
White v. NFL52
The NFL Players’ Association (the Players) alleged that the National
Football League (NFL) violated the White Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement (SSA)—Article X § 1(a)(i) and XIX § 6 specifically—by ignoring
the obligation to act in good faith and use best efforts to maximize total
revenues for both the NFL and the players for each SSA playing season. In
May 2008, the NFL opted out of the final two years of the CBA and SSA,
leaving the CBA and SSA to expire in March 2011.
After opting out of the CBA, the NFL began negotiating extensions to its
broadcast contracts. The NFL had contracts with DirecTV, CBS, FOX, NBC,
and ESPN; it also had contracts with Verizon Wireless and Comcast. The
NFL negotiated access to over $4 billion in rights fees in 2011 if it locked out
the players and had no obligation to repay $421 million of that sum to the
broadcasters. The Players argued that the NFL violated the SSA when it
extended and renegotiated its broadcast contracts without satisfying its duty to
maximize total revenues in 2009 and 2010.
On February 1, 2011, the special master proceeding over a trial found that
the NFL violated Article X § 1 (a)(i), but that the NFL did not otherwise
breach the SSA. The Players objected, arguing that the special master erred by
concluding that the NFL did not breach the SSA by finding that the good faith
requirement added nothing to the SSA, by erroneously interpreting “sound
business judgment” and total revenues, and by declining to issue an injunction.
The court first considered the meaning of the words in Article X and
agreed with the special master that “consistent with sound business judgment”
qualified the duties to act in good faith and use best efforts. However, the
court found that the special master erred in his application and analysis of the
language. The court also explained that the special master erred in not
analyzing the SSA’s good faith obligation, which would have shown that the
NFL did not act in good faith when it renegotiated its broadcast contracts.

52. 766 F. Supp. 2d 941 (D. Minn. 2011).
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Similarly, the NFL also did not act in its best effort when it did not seek
revenue modifications to the 2009–2010 broadcast contracts. Therefore, the
court found that the NFL breached Article X § 1(a)(i) in extending or
renegotiating its broadcast contracts, and ordered that a hearing be held
concerning relief to be granted to the Players.
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an international arbitration
body headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland. Through agreement, many
disputes involving the Olympic Movement are submitted first to the CAS; as
such, the CAS represents a forum for various national and international sports
organizations to resolve disputes in a consistent manner, which has allowed
for the CAS decisions to develop a type of precedent known as lex sportiva.
The following CAS decisions represent just some of the many areas that the
CAS is involved in, including anti-doping violations, contractual disputes, and
various disputes surrounding disqualifications and suspensions.
Blanco v. USADA53
This arbitration arose from a decision made by the United States AntiDoping Agency (USADA), the national anti-doping body in the United States,
to suspend Blanco, an American cyclist, for an anti-doping rule violation.
While competing in the Tour of the South China Sea competition, Blanco
provided two urine samples that tested positive for exogenous testosterone, a
prohibited substance. As a result, USADA charged him with an anti-doping
rule violation and sanctioned him with a two-year suspension. On appeal to
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Blanco argued that he should be
exonerated because the laboratory departed from the International Standards
for Laboratories (ISL), and as a result, the laboratory findings were unreliable.
However, the laboratory benefitted from the presumption that World AntiDoping Agency-accredited laboratories comply with the ISL, and the CAS
Panel upheld Blanco’s anti-doping rule violation and suspension.
Bulgarian Boxing Fed’n v. European Boxing Confederation54
In January 2011, the Bulgarian Boxing Federation (BBF), the national
governing body for the sport of boxing in Bulgaria, was awarded the right to

53. CAS 2010/A/2185 (Apr. 1, 2011).
54. CAS 2010/A/2401 (June 7, 2011).
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host the 2011 European Men Championships. However, at that time, there
was a pending International Boxing Association (AIBA) disciplinary
investigation, which could have resulted in the BBF being suspended. As a
result of this uncertainty, the European Boxing Confederation (EUBC)
revoked Bulgaria’s hosting rights and awarded the rights to host the 2011
Championships to Turkey. BBF appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS), arguing that the outcome of the investigation was unknown, and
therefore, EUBC had no legal basis to revoke Bulgaria’s hosting rights. The
sole arbitrator for CAS agreed with BBF. However, because Turkey, the
athletes, spectators, and sponsors had all incurred significant costs in preparing
for the event in Turkey, which was to be held two months from the time this
appeal was filed, reinstating Bulgaria’s hosting rights would have been a
disproportionate remedy. Therefore, Turkey was still allowed to host the 2011
European Men Championships.
Finnish Ski Ass’n & Saarinen v. Int’l Ski Fed’n55
This arbitration arose from a decision made by the International Ski
Federation (FIS), the international governing body for skiing, to disqualify
Saarinen, a Finnish cross-country skier, during a World Cup race. During the
race, Saarinen moved in front of another competitor, causing the other
competitor to fall. As a result, Saarinen was disqualified from the race for
intentionally obstructing the other competitor’s path. After the FIS Court
upheld her disqualification, Saarinen appealed to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS), arguing that the FIS Court was wrong to find her guilty of
intentional obstruction. However, because of the field-of-play doctrine, which
prohibits CAS from reviewing an official’s field-of-play decision except in
exceptional circumstances, the CAS Panel’s review under this appeal was
limited to whether the FIS Court properly followed its own procedures in
rendering its decision. The Panel held that the FIS Court made no procedural
error; therefore, Saarinen’s disqualification was upheld.
General Taweep Jantararoj & Amateur Boxing Fed’n of Thailand v.
Int’l Boxing Ass’n56
General Taweep Jantararoj appealed the International Boxing Association
(AIBA) decision to suspend him as president of the Amateur Boxing

55. CAS 2010/A/2090 (Feb. 7, 2011).
56. CAS 2010/A/2243, CAS 2011/A/2358, CAS 2011/A/2385; CAS 2011/A/2411 (Aug. 3,
2011).
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Association of Thailand (ABAT) after Jantararoj tried to manipulate the AIBA
Congress election procedure. On September 26, 2010, Jantararoj sent an email
to several Asian national boxing associations encouraging the associations to
fill out certain forms for an upcoming election. Jantararoj attached forged
forms to the email. Moreover, some of the associations that received this
email were not qualified to participate in the election based on AIBA criteria.
Determining that this conduct violated the AIBA Ethics and Disciplinary
Codes, AIBA suspended Jantararoj from any AIBA activity for a period of two
years. Jantararoj appealed the suspension to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS), arguing that he did not violate any AIBA rules. On appeal, CAS
reversed the disciplinary action taken against Jantararoj because he could not
be held responsible for the disciplinary infringements for which he was
sanctioned—failure to respect AIBA decisions; disparagement of AIBA’s
reputation and interests; failure to respect AIBA statutes, bylaws and
regulations; and failure to respect the principles of honesty, integrity, and
sportsmanship. The only conduct for which the AIBA could discipline
Jantararoj—failure to behave with respect—was never cited by the AIBA
disciplinary bodies; therefore, the AIBA could not use it to discipline
Jantararoj.
Oriekhov v. Union des Ass’ns Européennes de Football57
The Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), the
governing body for soccer in Europe, decided to ban Oreikhov, a UEFA
referee, for participating in illegal betting and match fixing. In November
2009, German police intercepted multiple phone conversations that indicated
that Oriekhov had been paid to manipulate the results of a soccer match. As a
result, the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body sanctioned Oriekhov with a
lifetime ban for engaging in illegal betting and match-fixing. On appeal to the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Oriekhov argued that he did have
contact with the criminal organization that was involved in the match-fixing,
but that he did not accept the offer to fix the outcome of any matches. The
CAS Panel, however, was sufficiently convinced that Oriekhov was involved
in the match-fixing scandal and upheld his lifetime ban from the soccer.

57. CAS 2010/A/2172 (Jan. 18, 2011).
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Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A.58
This arbitration arose from a dispute regarding the correct compensation
for a soccer player’s breach of contract. Morgan de Sanctis is a professional
soccer player who had three years remaining on his contract with the soccer
club Udinese Calcio S.p.A. (Udinese) for three more years when he signed a
new contract to play for Sevilla FC SAD. Because de Sanctis prematurely
terminated his contract, Udinese filed a complaint with the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA) Dispute Resolution Chamber
(DRC), requesting compensation for the de Sanctis’ breach. The DRC granted
the request and ordered de Sanctis to pay €3,933,134. All parties appealed to
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), contesting the method the DRC used
to calculate damages. The CAS Panel recalculated the damages and ordered
de Sanctis to pay €2,250,055 as compensation. This figure was based on
replacement costs that were incurred as a result of the player’s breach of
contract.
Subirats v. Fed’n Int’l de Natation59
Venezuelan swimmer, Albert Subirats, appealed his sanction for an antidoping rule violation after the Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)
failed to receive his whereabouts form. Pursuant to FINA anti-doping rules,
an athlete must keep FINA informed about where he or she can be located for
unannounced anti-doping testing. Since 2006, Subirats has always submitted
his whereabouts forms to the Venezuelan Swimming Federation (VSF). The
VSF would then forward the whereabouts forms to FINA. However, in 2010
and 2011, the VSF failed to file Subirats’s forms three times. Each time,
FINA attempted to notify Subirats of the filing failure by sending a letter to
the VSF. However, the VSF did not forward the letters to Subirats until after
the third filing failure. Shortly after the third failure, FINA charged Subirats
with an anti-doping rule violation and imposed a one-year suspension.
Subirats appealed the anti-doping violation and the suspension to the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that he did not commit any rule
violations. On appeal, CAS determined that an athlete bears the responsibility
to inform FINA of his whereabouts regardless of whether he delegates such
responsibility to a third party. Therefore, he remains ultimately responsible if
the third party fails to provide FINA with the athlete’s whereabouts.
58. CAS 2010/A/2145; see also Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146; Udinese
Calcio S.p.A. v. de Sanctis & Sevilla FC SAD, CAS 2010A/2147 (Feb. 28, 2011).
59. CAS 2011/A/2499 (Aug. 24, 2011).
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However, because FINA never sent a notice of the filing failures directly to
Subirats, Subirats did not have knowledge of the filing failures; therefore,
there could be no anti-doping rule violation and Subirats’s sanction was
overturned.
Tong v. Int’l Judo Fed’n60
The International Judo Federation (IJF), the international federation
governing Judo, suspended Wen Tong, a Chinese judo athlete, for an antidoping rule violation. In August 2009, while competing at the IJF World Judo
Championships, Tong provided two urine samples for an anti-doping control.
The A-sample tested positive for a prohibited substance. Tong requested that
her B-sample be tested to confirm the presence of the prohibited substance in
her system. The IJF tested the B-sample, but never told Tong. Therefore,
Tong never had an opportunity to be present during the testing, which is
required under IJF rules. Nevertheless, because the B-sample confirmed the
presence of a prohibited substance, the IJF suspended Tong two years for an
anti-doping rule violation. On appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS), the CAS Panel annulled Tong’s suspension because the IJF’s failure to
afford Tong the essential right to be present rendered the B-sample analytical
results invalid. As those results could not be used to confirm the A-sample
analytical results, no doping violation could be established.
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) v.
International Olympic Committee (IOC)61
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) agreed to submit to ordinary arbitration a dispute
regarding the enforceability of the IOC Regulation known as the “Osaka rule.”
The Osaka rule, which the IOC enacted in 2008, bans any athlete who has
been sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months for an anti-doping
rule violation from competing in the next edition of the Olympic Games, even
if the suspension is set to expire before the start of the Olympics. Following
the enactment of this rule, several American Arbitration Association (AAA)
panel decisions suggested that the IOC should not enforce the Osaka Rule in
certain cases because such enforcement would be manifestly unfair and
grossly disproportionate. However, because these AAA decisions had no
binding effect on the IOC, there was still a question concerning the validity
60. CAS 2010/A/2161 (Feb. 23, 2011).
61. CAS 2011/O/2422 (Oct. 6, 2011).
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and enforceability of this rule. As such, the USOC requested the IOC to
submit to ordinary arbitration in the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to
resolve this issue prior to when the National Olympic Committees needed to
submit their nominations for athletes to participate in the 2012 Olympic
Games. The IOC voluntarily agreed to submit the matter to ordinary CAS
arbitration. In the end, the CAS Panel determined that the Osaka Rule was
invalid and unenforceable because it was a disciplinary sanction, rather than a
mere condition of eligibility, since its nature was to punish prior undesirable
behavior. Moreover, because the IOC’s anti-doping rules do not permit the
IOC to impose disciplinary sanctions additional to those already listed in the
WADA Code, the Osaka Rule did not comply with the IOC’s rules, and was
therefore, invalid and unenforceable.
WADA v. Int’l Gymnastics Fed’n & Melnychenko62
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) appealed the International
Gymnastics Federation (FIG) decision to impose a two-month suspension on
the fifteen-year-old gymnast, Anastasiya Melnychenko, after she tested
positive for a prohibited substance. While competing at the European Team
Championships, Melnychenko was selected to provide a sample for an antidoping test. Analysis of her sample revealed the presence of Furosemide, a
prohibited substance. In a hearing before the FIG Disciplinary Commission,
Melnychenko argued that the substance was in her system because she was
taking a prescription medicine. Determining that her degree of fault was
minimal, the FIG Disciplinary Commission imposed a two-month suspension
and invalidated Melnychenko’s results from the competition where she tested
positive. WADA then appealed the sanction to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS), arguing that the FIG Disciplinary Commission should impose
the mandatory two-year period of ineligibility. On appeal, the CAS Panel
acknowledged that an athlete is strictly responsible for the presence of
prohibited substances in her system. However, the sanction for such an
offense should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. Given
Melnychenko’s age and lack of experience, the Panel determined that a
suspension of four months was appropriate for her particular offense.

62. CAS 2011/A/2403 (Aug. 25, 2011).
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WADA v. Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira,
Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) &
Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva de Futebol (STJD)63
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) appealed the Superior Tribunal
de Justiça Desportiva de Futebol (STJD) decision to suspend the football
player Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira for six months despite the fact that
he tested positive for a prohibited substance. After competing in a football
match, the player was selected to provide a urine sample for an anti-doping
control test. Analysis of the sample revealed the presence of cocaine, which is
a prohibited substance. Because of this anti-doping rule violation, the player
was suspended for two years pursuant to anti-doping rules, namely the WADA
Code. The player appealed his suspension to the STJD, the highest sports
court in Brazil, arguing that the two-year suspension was disproportional to his
degree of fault in committing the anti-doping rule violation because he
ingested the cocaine because of peer pressure and he never intended for it to
enhance his performance. Accordingly, the STJD reduced his suspension to
six months because it believed that the reduced sanction was more
proportional to the player’s degree of fault in committing the anti-doping rule
violation. WADA then appealed the player’s reduced suspension to the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that the WADA Code mandates a twoyear period of ineligibility for a first anti-doping rule violation and that no
circumstances existed in this case that would justify a reduction in the
suspension. On appeal, the CAS Panel set aside the STJD decision reducing
the player’s suspension, holding that the player’s degree of fault in committing
the anti-doping rule violation was significant because the player voluntarily
and knowingly ingested the prohibited substance, and the circumstances did
not justify a reduction of his suspension.
CRIMINAL LAW
Although amateur and professional sports often appear to operate separate
from the rest of society, athletes and others involved in the sports industry are
subject to criminal laws just like the rest of society. As the following cases
indicate, criminal laws can touch on issues both on and off the field of play,
and recently, have reached some of Major League Baseball’s most famous
athletes surrounding the ongoing saga involving performance-enhancing
drugs.

63. CAS 2010/A/2307 (Sept. 14, 2011).
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In re Andrew D.64
A minor was playing flag football during high school physical education
class when he collided with another student, physically injuring the student.
The minor was questioned by a police officer and subsequently charged with
assault after the minor told the officer that he tackled the other student on
purpose. On appeal, the minor asserted two arguments: (1) that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of assault; and (2) that the juvenile court
improperly admitted incriminating statements he made to the officer. The
court held that, based upon the minor’s statements to the officer, enough
evidence existed to convict him of assault. The court also held that the
incriminating statements the minor was referring to were said to parties other
than the officer, including during the minor’s testimony, so they were not
improperly admitted. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction.
United States v. Bonds65
Following a jury verdict convicting the defendant, Barry Bonds, on the
count of obstruction of justice, Bonds moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal, and in the alternative, moved for a new trial. The charges in this
case arose from Bonds’s testimony before a California grand jury that was
investigating the distribution of anabolic steroids and other performance
enhancing drugs by the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO). As part
of the investigation into the possession and distribution of illegal substances, it
was necessary to interview several professional athletes about their
involvement with BALCO, including Bonds, who was a professional baseball
player. While testifying under oath before the grand jury, Bonds allegedly
gave testimony that was intentionally evasive, false and misleading. As a
result, Bonds was charged with three counts of perjury and one count of
obstruction of justice for impeding the investigation. The jury disagreed on
the three counts of perjury, but unanimously agreed that Bonds was guilty of
obstruction of justice. Bonds immediately moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal, and in the alternative, moved for a new trial, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. In the end, the court
determined that the verdict should stand because after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements for the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the court held that literally true but evasive answers are
64. No. 1 CA-JV 11-0101, 2011 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1365 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2011).
65. No. CR 07-00732 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96051 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011).
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sufficient to uphold a conviction for obstruction of justice. For these reasons,
the court denied Bonds’s motions for acquittal and a new trial.
United States v. Clemens66
This decision arose out of the criminal case against the defendant Roger
Clemens, a former Major League Baseball (MLB) pitcher, relating to
testimony he provided to the House Committee on oversight and Government
Reform as part of the MLB steroid investigation. Specifically at issue in this
decision was DLA Piper US LLP’s (DLA Piper) motion to quash the
defendant’s subpoena seeking various interview summaries and notes relating
to the steroid investigation. Of note is that Senator Mitchell, who was in
charge of the steroid investigation that culminated with the Mitchell Report,
was a partner at DLA Piper at the time of the investigation and retained DLA
Piper to represent him. Following the defendant’s subpoena and DLA Piper’s
subsequent motion, this court ordered the motion granted in part and denied in
part, finding that some information was barred by the work product doctrine
while the defendant demonstrated a substantial need for other portions of the
requested information.
United States v. Dominguez67
The defendant sports agent Dominguez appealed his conviction for
smuggling five Cuban baseball players into the United States, transporting the
players from Miami to Los Angeles, and harboring them there until they
applied for asylum in violation of immigration laws. Following the trial,
Dominguez moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not
support a conviction; however, the court denied this motion, and a jury
convicted Dominguez on all twenty-one counts and sentenced him to a fiveyear prison term. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Dominguez’s convictions for conspiring to, aiding and abetting the attempt to,
and aiding and abetting the bringing of aliens to the United States for the
purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain. However, the
court reversed the remaining convictions, holding that a reasonable jury could
not have found that the evidence supported those convictions.

66. 793 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2011).
67. 661 F.3d 10510 (11th Cir. 2011).
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DISABILITY LAW
Disability laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, protect those
with certain disabilities and impose various compliance requirements on
various sports organizations and facility owners. These laws protect not only
qualifying disabled athletes, but also disabled spectators at various sporting
events. In 2011, one major issue in this area of law—particularly in cases
involving the National Football League—concerned retirement fund eligibility
requirements based on differing degrees of the former athletes’ disabilities.
The following cases illustrate these fund issues and disability laws as applied
to spectators.
Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan68
The plaintiff Brent Boyd, a former National Football League (NFL)
offensive lineman qualified as a Vested Inactive Player under the Bert
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Retirement Plan, filed suit seeking judicial review of
the defendant’s refusal to reclassify his disability benefits from “Inactive” total
and permanent benefits to “Football Degenerative” total and permanent
benefits. The former is available to any Vested Inactive Player who suffers a
total and permanent disability, whereas the latter is limited to Vested Inactive
Players who suffer from a total and permanent disability arising out of NFL
activities. The plaintiff was eventually approved for the “Inactive” plan, and
both a district court and the Ninth Circuit held that the Retirement Board did
not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff the more comprehensive
“Football Degenerative” plan.
Subsequently, the plaintiff requested
reclassification to the “Football Degenerative” plan and was again denied, the
denial of which is at issue before this court. After determining that the
Retirement Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reclassify the
plaintiff due to a lack of changed circumstances, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.
Daubert v. City of Lindsay69
The plaintiff, Timothy Daubert (Daubert), used a wheelchair for mobility
and resided in the defendant City of Lindsay (the City). The City owns a local
sports facility, which houses basketball courts, laser tag arenas, and indoor
soccer fields, among other amenities. Daubert alleged that the facility violated

68. 796 F. Supp. 2d 682 (D. Md. 2011).
69. No. 1:10-cv-0016 GSA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99949 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
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several sections of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), namely for not
providing wide enough wheelchair ramps and forcing wheelchair users to take
excessively long routes to the second level. The City responded to Daubert’s
complaint and argued that it was in compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG). The ADAAG provides
notice to the public that compliance with the ADAAG will satisfy the
requirements of the ADA. Daubert conceded that the City technically
complied with the ADAAG, but he argued that the City still violated the ADA.
The court found that technical compliance with the ADAAG shielded the City
from liability. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
City and dismissed Daubert’s complaint with prejudice.
Feldman v. Pro Football, Inc.70
The plaintiffs, deaf or hearing-impaired individuals who regularly attend
Washington Redskins games at FedEx Field, sued the defendants, urging that
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires them “to provide
auxiliary access to the content of broadcasts from FedEx Field’s public
address system.”71 The district court agreed, holding that music lyrics are also
included in the content requiring auxiliary access, and granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. After concluding that
the defendants provide football games as well as a general entertainment
experience, the court noted that game-related information, emergency
information, advertisements, and music lyrics are all included in those
experiences. As such, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision,
holding that the ADA requires Defendants to provide auxiliary access to that
aforementioned information.
Grant v. Bell72
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff
appealed a denial of line-of-duty disability benefits. The plaintiff, former
National Football League (NFL) player Willie Grant, applied for disability
benefits under the NFL Player Retirement Plan (the Plan). The plaintiff
sought benefits for multiple injuries sustained during his playing career. After
being evaluated by a physician, his test results revealed that he did not meet
the minimum requirements to be eligible for benefits under the Plan. Thus, the
70. 419 Fed. Appx. 381 (4th Cir. 2011).
71. Id. at 383.
72. No. 1:09-CV-1848-RWS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146401 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2011).
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plaintiff was denied coverage and subsequently appealed. The plaintiff was
then seen by a second physician, and those test results revealed that he did
meet the minimum requirements to be eligible for benefits under the Plan.
However, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s appeal for benefits. The plaintiff
then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). The court noted that the defendant had discretion in applying the
benefits, and remanded the case to the defendant for further consideration.
The plaintiff appealed again to the court, citing that the initial physician’s
analysis was incorrect, and thus, denial of benefits was improper. The
defendant moved for summary judgment, based on the court’s initial finding
that defendant had discretion in applying the benefits. The court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion
for judgment.
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Many state and federal laws work together to protect individuals from
discrimination based on race, gender, age, religion, and disability, to name a
few. Discrimination claims often center on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In the sports context, discrimination issues can affect athletes, coaches, and
referees, alike, as demonstrated by the following cases.
Boyd v. Feather River Cmty. Coll. Dist.73
The plaintiffs, several African-American football players, sued the
defendants, citing that the defendant’s football program created a racially
hostile environment. The plaintiffs complained that the defendant’s coaches
and athletic director cut them from the team, despite the plaintiffs’ eligibility,
both athletically and academically. The plaintiffs also stated that they were
subject to name-calling, harassment, and physical attacks. The plaintiffs
alleged six counts of a racially hostile environment, racial discrimination, and
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court found that each of the six counts against the defendants were well plead
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and subsequently
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on all six counts.

73. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121683 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 20, 2011).
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Bull v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ.74
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for multiple
claims. The plaintiff, a former women’s tennis coach at Ball State University
(BSU) and vocal gender equity advocate, self-reported a possible National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violation to one of BSU’s athletic
directors. The plaintiff was subsequently terminated, and BSU, through its
athletic director and others in the athletic department, made public statements
that the plaintiff was fired for committing multiple NCAA violations.
As a result, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, two BSU athletic
directors, the BSU President, and the Board of Trustees. First, the plaintiff
brought official-capacity claims under § 1983 against all of the defendants.
The court held that these § 1983 claims were barred by sovereign immunity
because these are essentially claims against BSU, and for purposes of § 1983,
BSU is equivalent to the State of Indiana. Second, the plaintiff brought
individual Title IX claims against the defendant athletic directors and BSU
President. The court dismissed these claims because under Title IX, only the
actual recipient of federal fund can be held liable, not individual employees.
Third, the plaintiff brought official-capacity defamation and breach of contract
claims under state law against all the defendants. The court dismissed these
claims, holding that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because
such official-capacity claims are essentially claims against BSU, and the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits a court from adjudicating state-law claims
where, as here, the state agency objects. Finally, the plaintiff brought
individual-capacity breach of contract claims under state law against the
defendant athletic directors and BSU President. The court dismissed these
claims without explanation.
Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc.75
The plaintiff Marvin Dent, an African-American tennis instructor in his
mid-60s employed by the defendants, filed suit alleging various age and race
discrimination claims after he did not receive a coveted promotion to the
National Tennis Center’s Director of Tennis position; a Caucasian man in his
40s was selected instead. In the search to fill the position, the defendants
received approximately ninety applicants for the managerial position, of which
they identified ten top candidates. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff
was not identified as one of these top managerial candidates, but he was still
74. No. 1:10-cv-00878-JMS-TAB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147774 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 2011).
75. No. 08 CV 1533, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8341 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011).
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given a chance to interview allegedly out of respect for his experience as a
senior tennis instructor. In response to the plaintiff’s suit, the defendants
moved for summary judgment, urging that there was no evidence from which
a reasonable juror could conclude that the decision not to promote the plaintiff
was at all motivated by his age or race. The court granted the defendants
motion.
Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of Hazel Park76
The plaintiff was a teacher and athletic coach at the defendant Hazel Park
School District. In October 1999, the plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging it
had discriminated against her because of her gender, in violation of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act,
for failure to hire her as the head coach of the high school boys’ varsity
basketball team. In August 2001, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and
in October 2001, the court ordered that she be instated into this position. For
the next five years, the plaintiff worked as the coach for both the boys’ and the
girls’ varsity basketball teams. Then, on June 1, 2006, the defendant removed
the plaintiff as the coach of the girls’ varsity basketball team. Following her
removal, the plaintiff filed several discrimination and retaliation claims under
Title VII, ELCRA, and Title IX. The essence of the plaintiff’s discrimination
claims was that the defendant treated her differently because of her sex. The
essence of the plaintiff’s retaliation claims was that the defendant’s
mistreatment of her was in retaliation for her current and prior lawsuits and
complaints. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to the
plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims.
The court held that held that the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s gender discrimination and hostile environment
claims because the plaintiff did not provide any evidence suggesting that her
gender had anything to do with the defendant’s decision to remove her as the
girls’ varsity basketball coach or with any of the harassment she allegedly
suffered. Essentially, the plaintiff did not state a prima facie case of gender
discrimination, and thus, she could not sustain her hostile environment claim
because it was based on the gender discrimination claim. For the same
reasons, the court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment
on the plaintiff’s retaliation claims because the plaintiff failed to state a prima
facie case of retaliation.

76. No. 08-CV-11652, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105820 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2011).
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Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs.77
Brooke Heike (Heike) and Beth Brown (Brown) filed a complaint against
the Central Michigan University Board of Trustees (the Board) and Central
Michigan University (CMU) claiming that they were discriminated against
based on their race and sexual preferences when their scholarships were not
renewed. Heike is of Caucasian and Native American descent, and Brown is
of Caucasian descent. The plaintiffs were both members of the CMU
women’s basketball team. They claim they were harassed by the coach while
on the team, and claimed they were not given reasons as to why their
scholarships were not renewed. Heike participated in a hearing before the
appeals committee to have her scholarship reinstated, which was unsuccessful.
Heike also sued in state court regarding the same issue, and the defendants
were granted a motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that Heike’s claims
were barred by res judicata, and further, that the defendants had sovereign
immunity against the claims. The court found that the defendants could not be
considered “persons” for the plaintiffs’ civil rights claims. Therefore, the
court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, the court denied dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Smith v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ.78
The defendant school district moved for summary judgment after softball
coach Smith sued the school district alleging that the defendant had initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him in retaliation for his complaints that there
was a disparity in funding between girls’ and boys’ sports programs at DeWitt
Clinton High School. In 2007, a female student reported to the school that
Smith, who was a coach at DeWitt, told her to sit on his lap and winked at her
several times. Around the same time, two local newspaper articles quoted
Smith complaining that the women’s softball program at DeWitt received
disproportionately less money than the boys’ sports programs. Subsequently,
the school initiated disciplinary proceedings against Smith for his reported
sexual misconduct.
Smith then filed this action against the school district, alleging that the
school retaliated against him in violation of Title IX, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and other state statutes. Following discovery, the defendant
filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted
77. No. 10-11373-BC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71456 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2011).
78. No. 09 Civ. 9256, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125069 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2011).
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the defendant’s motion, holding that the statute of limitations barred all of
Smith’s claims except one, which had already run. Smith’s First Amendment
claim of retaliation, which was not barred, also could not survive the motion
for summary judgment because Smith did not provide any evidence to
establish that his complaints constituted protected speech. Moreover, the court
held that even if Smith’s complaints were protected speech, he could not
demonstrate a causal connection between any protected activity and the
disciplinary proceeding initiated against him.
Wilson v. Lock Haven Univ.79
The plaintiff, the former men’s head basketball coach at Lock Haven
University, filed this action against the defendants, alleging a hostile work
environment and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). At a hearing,
a magistrate judge filed a recommendation that the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment be granted in its entirety; in this subsequent decision, the
court adopted the earlier recommendation.
The plaintiff alleged that he suffered adverse employment actions, such as
unsatisfactory performance reviews, that made him ineligible for a pay raise
and ineligible for an employment contract renewal at the hands of the
defendants based on his race. The plaintiff, however, did not dispute that he
received numerous subpar performance reviews based on the team’s win-loss
record, documented National Collegiate Athletic Association rules violations,
and low grade-point-averages of his team members. The Magistrate Judge
found that the defendants adequately rebutted the presumption of
discrimination with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, whereas the plaintiff
made only conclusory arguments that he was treated differently than nonAfrican-American coaches; this was the basis for the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation regarding summary judgment for the racial discrimination
claims. The Magistrate Judge also found that there was absolutely no
evidence of racially-charged conduct that rose to the level of a hostile work
environment and recommended that summary judgment be granted with
respect to the hostile work environment claim. This court adopted the
recommendation in its entirety.

79. No. 4:09-cv-2566, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39639 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011); see also Wilson
v. Lock Haven Univ., No. 4:09-CV-02566, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41569 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2011).
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Yonan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc.80
Plaintiff Yonan is a lawyer and a soccer referee registered with the
defendant, the governing body for soccer in the United States, who sued,
alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and retaliation after he was informed he would not
be assigned to work Major League Soccer games. The defendant moved for
summary judgment, urging that the ADEA claim could not stand because the
plaintiff is an independent contractor not protected by the ADEA. The court
employed a five-factor test to determine whether the plaintiff qualifies as an
employee or independent contractor. Specifically, the court considered the (1)
control and supervision of Plaintiff’s duties as a referee, (2) occupation and
skill, (3) responsibility for cost of operation, (4) method and form of payment
and benefits, and (5) the length of job commitment. Finding that all of these
factors indicated the plaintiff is an independent contractor, the court granted
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
EDUCATION LAW
Education law, like sports law as a whole, encompasses a wide variety of
issues. In the sports context, the focus is mostly either on challenges to the
various rules and regulations that govern student-athletes or challenges
surrounding a coach’s termination. Schools, athletic associations and
conferences, and the NCAA all impose various rules and regulations that
govern student-athletes. Although these rules and regulations may sometimes
be challenged on constitutional or other grounds, those laws may not apply in
a given situation. Under those circumstances, athletes challenge either the
application of a particular rule in a given situation, or the rule itself, as
arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, public and private schools may face
legal challenges after a decision to remove a particular coach from his or her
coaching duties. The following cases illustrate these and other issues in the
education law context.
Arendas v. N.C. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n81
The plaintiffs, members and coaches of a basketball team, won their state
basketball championship. After their victory, the defendant, a high school
athletic association, conducted an investigation into residency issues and

80. No. 09 C 4280, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66383 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2011).
81. 718 S.E.2d 198 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
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determined that at least two players on the championship team did not reside
in the district during the time they participated on the team. As a result, the
defendant vacated the plaintiffs as champions. The plaintiffs filed a
complaint, alleging negligence and seeking a declaratory judgment to reinstate
the championship. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The trial court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint was properly
dismissed because the members and the coaches lacked standing. The court
stated that the plaintiffs had no justification for judicial intervention because
the plaintiffs had neither a legally protected interest nor a right in the
championship. Rather, the defendant had granted the championship to the
plaintiffs’ school; therefore, when the championship was revoked, it was the
school that sustained the loss rather than the plaintiffs. Therefore, the
judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
Bd. of Dirs. of Jesup Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Wall82
Bruce Wall, head varsity football coach at the Jesup Community School
District, was contacted by the principal in 2006 regarding the football team’s
success or perceived lack thereof. In response to the principal’s concerns,
Wall provided him with proposed changes to increase weightlifting incentives
and improve the football program as a whole. Following the 2008 season,
Wall was again contacted regarding the football program and was asked to
resign as football coach; he refused and was then terminated as football coach.
The school board found that the superintendent satisfied her burden to show
cause for termination.
Pursuing his administrative remedies, Wall sought adjudicatory review,
and the arbitrator found that neither of the reasons cited by the school board as
justifying the termination—alleged ineffective program leadership and alleged
failure to maintain participation in the football program—were supported by
the evidence. As such, the arbitrator ordered that Wall be reinstated and
receive back pay for any time lost.
On judicial review, the district court reversed the adjudicator. Wall
appealed. The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed with the arbitrator’s decision,
noting Wall’s response to the 2006 discussion regarding the football
program’s perceived lack of success. Finding that the real reason for Wall’s
termination was his apparently unacceptable win-loss record, the court

82. 801 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).
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concluded that the board’s decision to terminate Wall was unsupported by the
preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the court vacated the district court’s
decision and remanded for an order affirming the arbitrator’s decision.
H.W. v. E. Sierra Unified Sch. Dist.83
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action against the
school, which was filed after the defendant high school’s assistant football
coach allegedly sexually molested them. The plaintiffs, two minor females,
alleged that the inappropriate sexual conduct occurred because of the
defendant’s failure to train and supervise the assistant football coach. As a
result, the plaintiffs first alleged that the defendant violated Title IX by
subjecting the plaintiffs to discrimination on the basis of sex. The court noted
that under Title IX, an employer can be held liable for a teacher’s misconduct
only if they had actual knowledge of the misconduct and acted with deliberate
indifference. The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently allege that an employee had actual knowledge of coach’s
misconduct and acted with deliberate indifference. Next, the plaintiffs brought
equal protection and substantive due process claims. The court also dismissed
these claims because the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the necessary
elements. Finally, the plaintiffs brought state tort law claims against the
defendants. The court also dismissed these claims as well because they were
barred by the Eleventh Amendment immunity exception.
Neily v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.84
Neily, a high school baseball coach, received notice of termination after
the last day of classes and claimed his classification as a “temporary”
employee was incorrect and that the notice of termination was untimely under
the Education Code. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision, holding that an athletic coach is expressly defined as a
temporary position, and as such, the notice requirement did not apply to Neily.
The court also explained that the school year did not end on the last day of
classes, but rather on statute-specified June 30th. Because of this specific date,
the notice of termination was timely.

83. No. 2:11-cv-0531-GEB-GGH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117709 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011).
84. 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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Or. Sch. Activities Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ.85
The Oregon School Activities Association (OSAA) appealed the State
Board of Education’s (the Board) decision to waive an OSAA eligibility rule.
C. enrolled at Reynolds High School in Portland as a sixteen-year-old
freshman. As a result, when C. started his senior year, he was nineteen.
OSAA, a private organization that exercises authority by delegation from the
Board, had an age requirement rule, barring students who are nineteen or older
at the start of a school year from participating in interscholastic activities. C.
asked for a waiver of the age requirement, and OSAA denied the request. C.
appealed to the Board, which concluded that OSAA’s application of its age
rule, as applied to C., violated the McKinney–Vento Act. OSAA appealed the
Board’s decision, arguing that the Board misapplied the McKinney–Vento
Act. The Board responded that the appeal was moot because C. had already
graduated from high school, and alternatively, that it did not misapply the
McKinney–Vento Act. On appeal, the court held that the appeal was moot,
because OSAA was precluded from imposing any sanctions on Reynolds or C.
for participation in interscholastic activities while ineligible, and because the
Board’s reversal of OSAA’s decision did not have a preclusive effect on
OSAA’s future authority, as required to avoid mootness. Therefore, the court
dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.
S.B. v. Ballard Cnty. Bd. of Educ.86
The plaintiff, a minor and a junior in high school, brought an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and KRS § 158.150 petitioning for a preliminary injunction
compelling her immediate reinstatement at Ballard Memorial High School,
after being placed in the Ballard County Alternative School (Alternative
School). The plaintiff was placed in the Alternative School for ninety days
due to the plaintiff’s purchase of a prescription medication from another
student. During her assignment to the Alternative School, the plaintiff could
not participate in extracurricular activities; she argued that her hope of
receiving a softball scholarship following her senior year will be greatly
hindered by this punishment. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s motion
should be denied because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate three of the four
requirements necessary for a preliminary injunction. The court, in its analysis,
also noted that playing softball is a privilege; the plaintiff does not have a
general constitutional right to participate in extracurricular athletics.
85. 260 P.3d 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
86. 780 F. Supp. 2d 560 (W.D. Ky. 2011).
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employment law is concerned with many aspects of the employment
relationship, such as job security, compensation, benefits, and privacy issues,
to name a few. These laws apply specifically outside the realm of unionized
workplaces, where no collective bargaining agreement governs the
employment relationship. Federal laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FSLA) provide the basis for many employment-related claims. A threshold
issue under the FSLA and most other employment-related claims is the
appropriate status classification of a particular coach. That is, courts must
often decide whether a coach in any given situation qualifies as an “employee”
to bring a claim under a particular employment-related statute and whether a
coach is more properly classified as terminable “at will” or only with just
cause. The following cases demonstrate these classification challenges, as
well as claims under the FSLA, whistleblowing issues, and other employment
law areas.
Clark v. Univ. of Bridgeport87
The University of Bridgeport (UB) appealed a trial court decision to deny
the UB’s motion for summary judgment as to Clark’s claim that her
termination as UB’s head volleyball and softball coach amounted to a breach
of her employment contract. UB employed Clark as its head volleyball and
softball coach. Her contract was renewed in July 2008, but Clark was
terminated in April 2009. UB argued that the renewal letter sent to Clark in
2008 created an “at will” employment. Connecticut is an “at-will” state,
which permits the employer and the employee to end the employment
relationship at any time for any reason, without cause, unless otherwise
agreed. Clark argued that the letter provided a definite term from July 1, 2008
to June 30, 2013. Alternatively, Clark argued that the letter was ambiguous on
the “at-will” issue, and therefore, should be a question for the trier of fact to
decide. The letter was ambiguous because it provided grounds for termination
instituted by both the school and the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
which suggested an intention by the university to create a contract for a
definite term. However, the same letter also stated that the position was “atwill.” Therefore, the court denied UB’s motion for summary judgment
because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether it was the
contract’s intent to create an “at-will” employment or employment for a
definite term.
87. No. CV106010582S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1977 (Conn. Super. July 29, 2011).
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Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco88
The plaintiff, Brent Jaco, while serving as the defendant’s director of
athletics, reported a University Interscholastic League (UIL) parent-residency
rule violation committed by a certain high school football player and his
school. Shortly after he reported the incident, the plaintiff was removed from
his position as director of athletics. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the
Galveston Independent School District alleging violations of the Texas
Whistleblower Act, a law preventing a governmental entity from terminating
an employee who reports violations of law. The plaintiff urged that the UIL’s
rules are “laws” such that the Whistleblower Act would apply. Although the
trial court agreed with the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed,
concluding that a UIL rule is not a “law” as used in the Whistleblower Act.
Garcia v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n89
Jose Garcia (Garcia) worked as a seasonal employee for the New York
Racing Association (NYRA) and claimed he was terminated in violation of his
First Amendment rights after filing a report that implicated his supervisors for
a rules violation. Garcia was terminated shortly after the report was filed with
the NYRA integrity counsel. The NYRA filed a motion to dismiss Garcia’s
claim against it on the basis that Garcia did not plead a violation of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech and because he did not plead that the
NYRA was a state actor. The court assessed whether Garcia made any
demonstrations in his complaint that the NYRA was a state actor under the
“nexus” and “symbiotic relationship” tests. The court concluded that the
NYRA did not meet the nexus test, but was a state actor under the symbiotic
relationship test. However, the court found that the report Garcia filed was in
the scope of his duties and did not raise a matter of public concern, and
therefore, he was not entitled to relief based on a First Amendment retaliation
claim. The court allowed Garcia to proceed with his remaining claims against
the NYRA.
Purdham v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd.90
The plaintiff, a safety and security assistant employed by the Fairfax
County School Board, filed this action, asserting a violation of the Fair Labor

88. 331 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App. 2011).
89. No. 1:10-cv-01092, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96614 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 29, 2011).
90. 637 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Standards Act (FLSA) when the school board failed to pay him overtime
wages for his services as the coach of a high school golf team. The district
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate
court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was properly classified as a volunteer,
rather than an employee, with respect to his services as a golf coach. The
court explained that Congress created an exemption to the FLSA’s coverage,
applicable in the public employment context, stating that where an public
employee engages in services different from those he is normally employed,
i.e., safety and security assistant as compared to golf coach, and receives “no
compensation,” or only a “nominal fee,” such as the stipend that the plaintiff
received for coaching, such work is exempt from the FLSA, and the public
employee is deemed a volunteer.91
Sprochi v. Cleveland State Univ.92
The plaintiff, an assistant men’s baseball coach at Cleveland State
University (CSU), filed an action against the defendant CSU, alleging that
CSU committed a breach of his employment contract and violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The plaintiff was appointed to the part-time
position as assistant coach in 1993, and his appointment was thereafter
renewed annually through 2006. In May 2006, the plaintiff was notified that
the director of athletics had recommended that the plaintiff’s appointment not
be renewed; the plaintiff’s employment contract expired on June 30, 2006.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant’s nonrenewal of his appointment
violated the terms of his contract and the terms and conditions of the
defendant’s policies. After looking at the relevant policies and the actual
language of his employment contract, the court concluded that the defendant’s
nonrenewal of the plaintiff’s appointment was not a violation of either and that
the plaintiff failed to prove his breach of contract claim. In regards to the
FLSA claim, the defendant admitted liability as to the claimed FLSA
violations, and the plaintiff sought compensation for certain unpaid wages.
The plaintiff estimated that he worked at least 1,210.03 hours for which he
was not paid by CSU during a certain time period, as supported by certain
records; the defendant stipulated that the information reflected in those records
had been accurately summarized. Judgment was entered in favor of the
defendant on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, but in favor of the
plaintiff on the FLSA claim in the amount of $70,369.58.

91. See id. at 427.
92. No. 2007-05016, 2011 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 41 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 15, 2011).
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Stewart v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan93
All parties to this case filed motions for summary judgment on Andrew
Stewart’s claim for denial of benefits under the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL
Retirement Plan (the Plan). Stewart alleged the denial of benefits violated the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Plan provides
retirement, disability, and related benefits to eligible National Football League
(NFL) players. The amount of benefits received under the Plan is contingent
upon what causes the player to sustain the pertinent injuries, specifically
whether the injuries arise out of NFL activities or non-NFL activities. Stewart
is a former NFL player, who played in only sixteen NFL games because of
injuries he sustained. After missing the entire 1993 season, Stewart joined the
Canadian Football League (CFL) in 1994, where he stayed until 2000 when he
retired. Stewart also suffered several injuries during his time in the CFL.
After retiring, Stewart tried to find work, but was unsuccessful because his
collective football injuries prevented him from being able to stand for long
periods. In October 2008, Stewart applied to receive benefits from the Plan.
The Plan’s committee awarded Stewart “inactive” benefits because it
determined that Stewart’s disabling conditions did not arise out of NFL
activities. This amount was less than if the committee determined that his
injuries directly arose out of his NFL activities. Stewart appealed the
committee’s decision to the Plan’s Retirement Board (Board), arguing that he
qualified for greater benefits. However, the Board affirmed the decision that
Stewart was eligible only for inactive benefits. Stewart then brought this suit
alleging that the Plan violated ERISA because the committee abused its
discretion in determining that Stewart’s disability did not arise directly from
his NFL football activities. The court denied the parties’ motions for summary
judgment on Stewart’s denial of benefits claim because the issue of whether
the committee abused its discretion presented material issues of fact that could
not be determined on summary judgment.
Williams v. NFL94
This is an appeal stemming from the district court’s denial of permanent
injunctive relief regarding claims under the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the
Workplace Act (DATWA). In 2008, Kevin Williams and Pat Williams, NFL
players playing for the Minnesota Vikings, each gave urine samples for drug
testing as part of their annual physicals and tested positive for bumetanide, a
93. No. WDQ-09-2612, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973 (D. Md. July 20, 2011).
94. 794 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
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banned substance. The NFL notified the players that they would be suspended
for four regular-season games. The plaintiffs challenged the decision through
arbitration, but the decision was upheld. The plaintiffs then filed suit in state
district court, which granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the NFL
from enforcing the suspensions. For the next two years, the case was litigated
in state and federal court.
In May 2010, the district court found that the NFL was a joint employer
with the Vikings and had violated the notice requirements of DATWA when it
did not notify the plaintiffs of their positive test results within three days. The
district court, however, did not find sufficient evidence to prove that the
confidentiality provisions of the DATWA were violated and found that the
Williams’ could not show that the DATWA violations caused them any injury;
the district court declined to enter permanent injunctive relief. The plaintiffs
challenged the district court’s failure to grant the permanent injunctive relief,
arguing that the DATWA mandates injunctive relief for any violation. The
DATWA places limitations on an employer’s ability to require employees to
undergo drug and alcohol testing. Bumetanide is not identified in any of the
schedules. For this reason, the DATWA did not govern the Williams’ positive
test results and there was no basis to grant permanent injunctive relief.
Accordingly, the court did not reach the plaintiffs’ assertion that injunctive
relief be mandatory.
Williams v. Smith95
Defendants University of Minnesota (Minnesota) and coach Orlando
Henry “Tubby” Smith appealed a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff James Williams’ (Williams)
negligent misrepresentation action. In 2007, several people affiliated with
Minnesota contacted Williams about coming to Minnesota to serve as an
assistant coach. Following a conversation with the athletic director, Smith
offered Williams an assistant coach position at Minnesota, which Williams
accepted. Smith and Williams discussed Williams’ salary and his first
recruiting assignment. However, shortly after Williams tendered his letter of
resignation from his former position, Smith informed Williams that Minnesota
refused to hire Williams because Williams had previously committed several
major violations of NCAA bylaws. Following these events, Williams was
unable to find a new position in coaching college basketball.

95. No. A10-1802, A11-567, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 947 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 17,
2011).
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As a result, Williams brought this action against Minnesota and Smith,
asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, equitable
estoppel, intentional interference with contract, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, defamation, vicarious liability, and due process violations of his
property and liberty interests. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district
court granted this motion on all claims except the negligent misrepresentation
claim. That claim was tried before a jury, which found that Smith negligently
misrepresented to Williams that he had final authority to hire assistant
basketball coaches at Minnesota and that Williams’ reasonable reliance on this
misrepresentation caused him harm for $1,237,293. Minnesota and Smith
moved for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial. The
trial court denied both motions. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the
trial court appropriately denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law
because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that there
had been a negligent misrepresentation. Moreover, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Although they do not comprise a major portion of sports law cases,
environmental laws do play a role in the field. Specifically as they relate to
sports facility management, with increasing environmental awareness, these
issues may become more prevalent in the future. The following two cases
illustrate some of the unique challenges that environmental laws pose for those
in charge of running a particular facility or planning a new sports facility.
Citizens for Cmtys. Pres., Inc. v. City of Indus.96
The plaintiffs opposed a redevelopment plan for a 592-acre piece of land.
Originally, the city approved the site for a variety of office and retail uses—an
approval process that included a water supply assessment (WSA) complying
with the Water Code (the Code). However, the newly approved plan, “the
stadium project,” called for development of a National Football League
stadium and related facilities, yet did not include an updated WSA. The
plaintiffs filed an action seeking a writ of mandate, alleging various violations
of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as well as a Code
violation. Subsequently, the California Assembly passed a special bill
exempting the stadium project from complying with CEQA provisions, which
96. No. B223648, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 738 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011).
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resulted in the plaintiffs dismissing the CEQA claims, leaving only the Code
violation as a cause of action. The defendants argued that the claim should be
dismissed given that the Code requires a WSA only when a project is subject
to the CEQA and that the special bill explicitly exempted the project from the
CEQA provisions. The trial court agreed and granted the defendants’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial
court, asserting that the CEQA exemption was to take effect only after
preliminary findings were made, findings the plaintiffs allege were never
made, and that the trial court erred in finding a CEQA claim was necessary to
bring an action for a Code violation. After thoroughly analyzing the language
and intent of the special bill, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Wild Equity Inst. v. City & Cnty. of S.F.97
The plaintiffs filed a motion requesting a preliminary injunction to stop
the operation of a golf course to protect the wildlife that was allegedly harmed
by golf course activities. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the operation
and management of the golf course threatened two endangered species, the
California red-legged frog and the San Francisco garter snake. As a result, the
plaintiffs filed this action seeking a declaration that the defendants were
violating the Endangered Species Act by illegally taking the frog and the
snake without an Incidental Take Permit. The plaintiffs also requested that the
court enjoin the defendants from operating the golf course while this matter
was pending. However, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing
that absent the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the frog and snake species
would suffer irreparable harm. Therefore, the court denied the plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction.
GENDER EQUITY LAW
Title IX has played a significant role in shaping the face of athletics for
women, particularly at the high school and college levels, since its enactment
in 1972. The 1979 Title IX Policy Interpretation and various subsequent
clarifications provide entities that receive federal funding with guidance as far
as how to comply with Title IX’s provisions. Specifically, the 1979 Policy
Interpretation addressed compliance in the sports context in three distinct
areas: financial assistance, program benefits and facilities, and compliance in
meeting the interests and abilities of male and female students. Although
enacted nearly forty years before, these 2011 decisions indicate that Title IX
97. No. C 11-00958 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137355 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2011).

SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/10/2012 10:31 AM

2011 SURVEY

753

compliance continues to be an issue.
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Educ.98
In 2006, James Madison University announced that it planned to cut ten of
its athletic programs to comply with the proportionality prong of the Title IX
three-part test. The plaintiff, Equity in Athletics, Inc. (EIA), was comprised of
opponents to these cuts, including student-athletes on the eliminated teams as
well as female athletes on noneliminated teams at James Madison University.
It sued a number of parties, including the Department of Education and James
Madison University, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief through a direct
challenge to the Title IX guidelines. Alternatively, the plaintiff sought to
require James Madison University to equalize scholarship payments to those
student-athletes affected by the decision. The district court denied the
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first held that the plaintiff
had standing to bring suit given those that comprised the entity. After
conducting an in-depth analysis of each of the plaintiff’s challenges to the
Title IX three-part test, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision.
Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal.99
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, seeking money damages and
declaratory relief, for alleged failure to expand athletic opportunities for
women. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants deprived them of the equal
opportunity to participate in varsity athletics while they were students at UC
Davis, in violation of both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted they were wrongly deprived
of their opportunity to participate in intercollegiate wrestling. The defendants
asserted that at all relevant times, the UC Davis athletic program and each
individual defendant complied with constitutional and federal mandates
regarding gender equity.
Under the Title IX claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants
violated Title IX’s mandate to effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes. The defendants stipulated that during the
time period relevant to the Title IX claim, the ratio of male and female
participants in intercollegiate athletics was not always substantially
98. 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011).
99. 816 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
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proportionate to the ratio of male and female undergraduate enrollment at the
university. UC Davis further stipulated that during that time period, there was
at least one sport for women that was not offered at the intercollegiate level for
which there was (1) an expressed interest in competing at the intercollegiate
level; (2) sufficient ability among interested students to compete at the
intercollegiate level; and (3) arguably sufficient intercollegiate competition for
that sport in the geographic area in which UC Davis usually competes. Thus,
the parties agreed that the defendants bore the burden of proving that the
university was in compliance under the second prong during the relevant time
period. The court held that the defendants failed to demonstrate a continued
practice of program expansion that was demonstrably responsive to the
developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. Rather,
evidence demonstrated that while the plaintiffs were students, the defendants
eliminated more than sixty actual participation opportunities for women. This
indicated program contraction, not expansion. As a result, the court concluded
that the defendants did not have a continued practice of program expansion,
and thus were not Title IX compliant. Thus, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs were entitled to damages under their Title IX claim for the actual
harm they suffered as female students because the defendants failed to
demonstrate a continuing practice of program expansion under Title IX.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual property rights are of significant value in the sports industry.
Trademarks, copyrights, patents, and publicity rights claims all play a
significant role in shaping sports law as we know it today. Primarily through
merchandising and licensing, sports entities are increasingly seeking to exploit
the value of their intellectual property rights and simultaneously protect such
value through adjudicatory processes, if necessary. For trademark disputes
involving Internet domain names, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center serves as an
alternative forum to challenge an alleged trademark infringer. The following
decisions illustrate this wide array of sports-related intellectual property
disputes that challenge courts today and include court and WIPO decisions.
Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC100
Sergio Aguirre (Aguirre), the plaintiff, developed a concept for a golf
swing training product. In September 2005, he applied for a patent with the
100. No. SA-10-CV-702-XR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86207 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2011).
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United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for a “Physical
Conditioning Aid for Golfers.” The USPTO published the application in April
2006 and the patent was issued in June 2008. After spending time marketing
the product online, Aguirre marketed his product, the Zswinger, at a PGA
Merchandise Show, where James Sowerwine, president of Powerchute Sports,
visited the booth. Powerchute was formed to manufacture and market the
Powerchute, a product similar to the Zswinger, while TC Trust was formed to
manufacture the same. Furthermore, Powerchute and Octagon entered into an
agreement for Octagon to assist with the product’s sales and marketing efforts.
Aguirre sued Powerchute, Sowerwine, TC Trust, and Octagon for patent
infringement, violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, common law fraud,
tortious interference with prospective business relations, and unjust
enrichment. All of the defendants moved to dismiss.
In relation to the defendant Octagon, the court granted in part and denied
in part its motion to dismiss count one of the complaint. First, the court denied
Octagon’s motion to dismiss the direct infringement claim because Aguirre
plead all requirements for direct infringement. Alternatively, the court granted
Octagon’s motion to dismiss the indirect infringement claim because Aguirre
failed to allege that Octagon had knowledge that the Powerchute’s purpose
was adapted for use in infringement of Aguirre’s patent. As to the violations
of the Sherman Act, Aguirre argued that the defendants attempted “to
monopolize the market for portable, resistance-based training aids for
golfers”101 by attempting to enforce a patent unenforceable due to fraud. The
court granted the defendants’ motion because Aguirre failed to meet his
burden. Furthermore, Aguirre failed to allege that the defendants engaged in
anti-competitive conduct that had a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power. The court also dismissed Aguirre’s claim for common law
fraud because he failed to allege any reasonable misrepresentation that
intended to influence Aguirre’s conduct in addition to any proof of reliance
upon the nonexistent fraudulent misrepresentation. Next, the court dismissed
Aguirre’s claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations
and economic advantage because he failed to claim that, but for the
defendants’ conduct, he would have entered into a business relationship.
Lastly, Aguirre’s claim for unjust enrichment was also dismissed because he
failed to allege that the defendants benefited from Aguirre in such a way that
would warrant the existence of an implied contract.

101. Id. at *17.
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All Star Championship Racing, Inc. v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc.102
O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.’s (O’Reilly) filed a request for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin All Star Championship Racing, Inc. (All Star)
from using or creating any materials containing O’Reilly trademarks or service
marks. O’Reilly and All Star entered into a contract in which O’Reilly
sponsored All Star’s racing events for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 seasons. The
parties continued their agreement under the contract for the 2010 season.
O’Reilly decided to terminate the agreement for the 2011 season, and All Star
argued that the contract was to continue under the same three-year term of the
previous contract, and therefore, O’Reilly could not terminate. O’Reilly
argued that the parties never made a written renewal of the contract, and
therefore, it was free to cancel at anytime. O’Reilly also requested a
preliminary injunction to stop All Star from using its marks in any future
racing events, citing trademark infringement. The court found that because a
new agreement was not entered into, O’Reilly would likely succeed on the
merits of its claim for trademark infringement. The court also found that All
Star would be unharmed should the court grant the injunction, and further that
the public has an interest in protecting against trademark infringement.
Therefore, the court granted the preliminary injunction in favor of O’Reilly.
Aqua Gear, Inc. v. RareNames, WebReg103
The complainant Aqua Gear filed this trademark infringement action
against the respondent RareNames for registering the domain name
“aquagear.com.” The complainant owns the trademark registration for
“AQUAGEAR,” and argued that the respondent’s domain name was
confusingly similar to its registered trademark. As a result, the complainant
filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
alleging that the respondent was infringing on its trademark. The WIPO Panel
determined that because the domain name was identical to the complainant’s
trademark, it was confusingly similar. Moreover, the respondent had no rights
to or legitimate interests in the AQUAGEAR mark. Finally, because the
respondent registered the domain name to divert Internet users from
complainant’s website, the Panel found that the domain name was registered
in bad faith. For these reasons, the Panel ordered that the respondent transfer
the domain name to the complainant.

102. No. 11-2160, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112349 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011).
103. WIPO Case No. D2011-1366 (2011) (Partridge, Arb.).
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Arenas v. Shed Media US Inc.104
The plaintiff Gilbert Arenas (Arenas), an NBA player, and his ex-fiance
(and codefendant), Laura Govan (Govan), entered into an agreement with
Shed Media (Shed) to appear on the reality television show, Basketball Wives:
Los Angeles. Govan was described on the show’s press releases as the sister
of Gloria Govan (fiancée of Los Angeles Lakers’ Matt Barnes). The press
releases did not mention Arenas. California’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute is a method to be used for
dismissing “meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling expression through costly,
time-consuming litigation.”105 Arenas sought injunctive relief for his
misappropriation of likeness claim and his claim for trademark infringement.
California common law grants a right of publicity that protects the
appropriation of one’s identity. The district court ruled that Arenas would
likely succeed on the merits.
However, the district court also found that Shed had two valid defenses
stemming from the First Amendment. First, the transformative use defense
was successful because Shed offered proof that the show’s value does not
primarily derive from Arenas’ celebrity status. The court was not persuaded
by Arenas’ argument that the show “uses his identity ‘solely to attract
attention to the show’ because the show ‘is not actually related to him’”106
because the fact that Govan appears on the show creates an automatic
connection. Shed also offered a public interest defense. The district court
found this defense persuasive because a cause of action cannot be established
when the public has a right to know certain published matters and the press
has the freedom to tell it. Arenas argued that any discussion of his family life
on the show would not be sufficiently related to his celebrity status to permit
Shed’s use of his identity a matter of public concern. The court also found this
argument unpersuasive because of Arenas’ use of his Twitter account to let his
followers know about his personal life. Arenas also argued that the defense
should fail because Shed acted with actual malice. The court was unconvinced
by this argument because Arenas failed to identify any defamatory or false
statements Govan was likely to make about him on the show, and therefore,
Arenas failed to meet his burden of showing present actual malice. Lastly,
Arenas argued that there was likelihood for irreparable harm if the court did
not grant an injunction because he would suffer harm to his reputation. Shed

104. No. CV 11-05279, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101915 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011).
105. Id. at *4.
106. Id. at *15.
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defended itself by arguing that Arenas caused his own disrepute when he drew
a gun on a teammate in his team’s locker room over a gambling dispute.
Furthermore, Shed presented evidence that Arenas already tweeted about the
show, which the court found to undermine any claim that he would be injured
by an association with the show. Therefore, because the record showed
insubstantial evidence that Arenas’ reputation would be seriously affected by
an association with the show, the court ruled that Arenas failed to show a
likelihood of irreparable harm. The court dismissed Arenas’ right of publicity
claim and his motion for preliminary injunction and granted Shed’s AntiSLAPP motion to strike.
AVS Found. v. Eugene Berry Enter., LLC107
The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in their trademark
infringement action. The plaintiffs, a foundation and the Pittsburgh Steelers,
filed suit for infringement of their “Terrible Towel” trademark after the
defendant produced and sold black and gold tee shirts with the words “The
Terrible T-Shirt A Pittsburgh Original.” Prior to selling the tee shirts, the
defendant brought the design to a tee shirt printing company where an
employee questioned whether the defendant was connected to the plaintiffs.
The defendant subsequently produced a false letter indicating that he was
connected to the plaintiffs and that he had authority to produce and sell the tee
shirts. The tee shirts were printed and the defendant sold them.
The court, in deciding whether the defendant violated the Lanham Act,
addressed three elements for trademark infringement of competing goods: (1)
whether the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) whether the marks are
owned by the plaintiff; and (3) whether the defendant’s use of the mark to
identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of
the goods or services. The court held that the first two prongs were satisfied
because the “Terrible Towel” trademark had been a registered trademark in
continuous use for more than twenty consecutive years and is undisputedly
owned by the plaintiffs.
Under the third prong, the court looked at ten factors commonly
considered when determining if a likelihood of confusion exists. First, the
court found that marks illustrated the characteristics of both a fanciful
distinctive mark and of a famous mark because the “Terrible Towel” does not
describe the popular towel and the “Terrible Towel” is widely recognized by
the general consuming public. The court also took judicial notice of the

107. No. 11 CV 01084, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139827 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011).
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trademark’s fame because the “Terrible Towel” trademark could be readily
and accurately determined. Second, the court found that the tee shirt was very
similar to the “Terrible Towel” trademark because it used the word “Terrible,”
similar colors, and a reference to Pittsburgh, which amounted to an apparent
attempt to create confusion as to the tee shirt’s source. Third, the court found
that actual confusion existed because the printing company’s employee saw
the logo and design and immediately questioned whether the defendant was
connected to the plaintiff. Fourth, the court found that the defendant intended
to use the success and reputation of the plaintiff’s product by creating the
impression that the defendant’s tee shirts contained an authorized version of
the plaintiff’s marks. Fifth, the court found that the defendant’s use of black
and gold, coupled with one of the plaintiff’s marks, would be assumed by the
average consumer to be one of the plaintiffs’ products. Finally, the court
found that the defendant targeted the same customers at the start of the NFL
season. After considering all of the factors, the court held that defendant’s tee
shirts created a likelihood of confusion and thus the third prong was also
satisfied. Therefore, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment.
Barclays Bank, PLC v. Barclaysatpworldtourfinal.com108
This arbitration decision concerned the respondent’s registration of the
domain name, “barclaysatpworldtourfinal.com.” The complainant is a major
global financial services provider engaged in retail banking, credit cards,
corporate and investment banking, wealth management, and investment
management services that owns a number of United Kingdom and European
Union registrations for the trademark “Barclays.”
Additionally, the
complainant owns domain name registrations in conjunction with its official
title sponsorship of the ATP World Tour Tennis Finals, such as
“barclaysatpworldtourfinals.com.” In a complaint filed with the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center,
the complainant alleged: (1) that the respondent’s domain name was identical
and confusingly similar to the trademark Barclays, (2) that the respondent had
no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and (3) that the
respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith. The arbitration
panel agreed with the complainant on all counts. As a result, the panel ordered
the transfer of the respondent’s domain name to the complainant.

108. WIPO Case No. D2010-2152 (2011) (Samuels, Jeffrey, Arb.).
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Beachbody, LLC v. Hauangda109
The complainant Beachbody filed this trademark infringement action
against the respondent Huangda for registering the domain name
“p90xschedule.net.” The complainant is a U.S. company that produces and
sells weight loss and fitness products and services. The complainant owns
several registered trademarks, including the internationally registered mark
“P90X,” which it has owned since 2008. In 2010, the respondent registered
the disputed domain name to allegedly lead Internet users to an online
marketplace where they could purchase counterfeit copies of the
complainant’s products. As a result, the complainant filed a complaint with
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), alleging that the
respondent was infringing on its trademark. The WIPO Panel determined that
because the domain name was identical to the complainant’s trademark, it was
confusingly similar. Moreover, the respondent had no rights to or legitimate
interests in the P90X mark. Finally, because the respondent registered the
domain name to sell counterfeit copies of the complainant’s products, the
Panel found that the respondent registered the domain name in bad faith. For
these reasons, the Panel ordered that the respondent transfer the domain name
to the complainant.
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens L.P.110
The plaintiff, creator of the Flying B drawing used by the defendants
Baltimore Ravens (Ravens) and the National Football League, filed a
complaint to permanently enjoin the defendant from publicly displaying his
logo, which infringed his copyright, in season highlight films, video clips
during home games, and in the Ravens’ corporate lobby. The trial court held
that the defendants made fair use of the copyright and thus had not infringed.
The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the finding of fair use
as to displays in the Ravens’ corporate lobby but reversed with regard to the
displays in films and video clips.
On remand, this court decided whether an injunction was appropriate. The
court stated that although the defendants infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in a
drawing, a permanent injunction should not be issued because providing the
plaintiff with reasonable compensation for use of an infringing logo in football
highlight films would provide an adequate remedy at law. Additionally, the
court held that enjoining the defendants’ use of the films would cause a
109. WIPO Case No. D2011-1386 (2011) (Agmon, Arb.).
110. No. MJG-08-397, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129530 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011).
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hardship that exceeded the hardship that would be suffered by the plaintiff
provided he received reasonable compensation. Finally, the court held that the
public interest in the historical aspect of the films outweighed the public
interest in granting a monopoly to the plaintiff. Therefore, the court denied the
permanent injunction against future use of the plaintiff’s logo in the films at
issue but conditioned this denial on the defendants’ payment of reasonable
compensation to the plaintiff for such use.
Bugoni v. Kappos111
The plaintiff alleged that he had an idea for technology that would allow
for a camera to be placed in a football, for a different game perspective. The
plaintiff filed paperwork with the United States Patent and Trade Office
(USPTO), but was unable to pay the requisite filing fee. He also registered a
domain name known as “ballcam.com” to share a prototype of his invention.
After the filing, an article was published, in which the defendant Kappos
purportedly invented a device similar to the plaintiff’s invention. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin Kappos from using his intellectual property. The court found
that the plaintiff had a claim for relief only if his original application was
accompanied by the requisite filing fee. The court found that because the
plaintiff did not pay the requisite filing fee, his USPTO application was
incomplete, and he did not have grounds for relief.
Cleveland Browns Football Co. LLC v. Dinoia112
This arbitration decision concerned the respondent’s registration of the
domain name, “browns.com.” The complainant owns the Cleveland Browns,
a professional football team, and owns the trademarks, “Cleveland Browns,”
“Browns,” and various additional trademarks incorporating “Browns.” In a
complaint filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Arbitration and Mediation Center, the complainant alleged: (1) that the
respondent’s domain name was identical to the trademark Browns and
confusingly similar to the trademark Cleveland Browns, (2) that the
respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and (3)
that the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith. The
arbitration panel agreed with the complainant on all counts. As a result, the
panel ordered the transfer of the respondent’s domain name to the
complainant.
111. No. 11 1957, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128419 (D.D. C. Nov. 7, 2011).
112. WIPO Case No. D2011-0421 (2011) (Trotman, Clive, Arb.).
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DirectTV, Inc. v. Cory113
The plaintiff owned the exclusive rights to sublicense the broadcast of the
2010 NFL Sunday Ticket Program. The defendant did not purchase a
commercial subscription to exhibit NFL Sunday Ticket at his bar. Instead, he
purchased a residential subscription to save money. Despite not having the
appropriate subscription, the defendant exhibited at least a portion of the
broadcast of NFL Sunday Ticket on October 24, 2010. The defendant
admitted he advertised the exhibition of NFL Sunday Ticket and “willfully
received and exhibited the broadcast” for “direct financial benefit.”114 The
plaintiff filed a copyright infringement suit against the defendant, alleging that
the defendant willfully violated the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §
605. The plaintiff filed this motion seeking summary judgment, and the
defendant did not file a response.
The court stated that to state a claim for a § 605 violation, a plaintiff must
allege that the defendant “intercepted or otherwise unlawfully appropriated
[the plaintiff’s] transmission.”115 The court held that the defendant violated §
605 because he did not respond to the motion and the request for admissions
and was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, the court
noted that under a § 605 violation, if a plaintiff elects to collective statutory
damages, the court has discretion to determine the specific amount of statutory
damages and can increase those statutory damages if the court “finds that the
violation was committed willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private financial gain.”116 Because the defendant
admitted to willfully intercepting and displaying the broadcast for financial
gain, the court held that the defendant violated § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). Therefore,
the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Fancaster, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.117
The plaintiff, Fancaster, is a provider of online video content directed at
sports fans. Fancaster’s sole owner applied to register the trademark in 1989,
and subsequently registered a domain name for a Fancaster website. The
defendant, Comcast, has a large broadcasting market, and started a website for
sports fans called “Fancast.” Comcast lost money on the “Fancast” venture,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

No. EP-11-CV-50-KC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136395 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2011).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
Id.
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147373, 2011 WL 6426292 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011).
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and changed the name of its sports video content website. Before Comcast
changed the website name, Fancaster sued Comcast for trademark violations,
among other charges. Both parties filed for summary judgment. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of Comcast for all infringement-related
claims, and also found that Fancaster was not entitled to corrective advertising
for the money Comcast was paid by its advertisers. The court denied
summary judgment in favor of Comcast as to a cyber-piracy claim, because
Comcast did not respond to the claim in its initial brief. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of Fancaster as to Comcast’s claim of fraud,
finding there was no evidence Fancaster did not intend to use the mark. The
court denied Fancaster’s motion for summary judgment for the cyber-piracy
claim, citing that a finding of bad faith was required. Finally, the court
granted Fancaster’s motions in limine in part, as well as granted Fancaster’s
motion to strike Comcast’s affirmative defenses.
Gilmour v. Parsa118
The complainant Doug Gilmour filed this trademark infringement action
against the respondent Matt Parsa for registering the domain name
“douggilmour.com.” The complainant is a professional hockey player who is
well-known in Canada. The complainant does not have a registered trademark
in his name; however, he claims that he has common law trademark rights in
his name because he is a well-known professional hockey player. The
respondent registered the disputed domain name in 2002 to allegedly attract
the complainant’s fans and consumers who were seeking information about
the complainant under the false impression that the site was sponsored by or
affiliated with the complainant, and then refer them to sponsored links from
which respondent collected a fee. As a result, the complainant filed a
complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), alleging
that the respondent was infringing on his common law trademark rights. The
WIPO Panel determined that the complainant has common law trademark
rights in his name in relation to ice hockey entertainment. Because the domain
name was identical to the complainant’s common law trademark, it was
confusingly similar. Moreover, even though the respondent argued that that he
registered the disputed domain name for use as a fan site to share his
appreciation of the complainant’s talents, the WIPO Panel determined that he
had no rights to or legitimate interests in the mark. Finally, because the
respondent registered the domain name to derive income, the Panel found that

118. WIPO Case No. D2011-1712 (2011) (Carson, Arb.).
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the respondent registered the domain name in bad faith. For these reasons, the
Panel ordered that the respondent transfer the domain name to the
complainant.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.119
The plaintiff Ryan Hart, a former college football player, brought a
putative class action lawsuit against Electronic Arts, the producer of an annual
video game series called NCAA Football. Hart alleged that Electronic Arts
misappropriated his likeness and identity, as well as other college football
players’ likenesses, for a commercial purpose in connection with four of the
defendant’s NCAA Football video games. Electronic Arts filed a motion for
summary judgment, alleging that the First Amendment barred Hart’s claims
under New Jersey law for misappropriation of his likeness. In analyzing this
motion, the court concluded that the NCAA Football video game does not
constitute commercial speech. Next, the court balanced the defendant’s First
Amendment rights against Hart’s right of publicity. Under both tests it
employed, the court found that there were no disputed issues of material fact
that the defendant’s First Amendment right to free expression outweighed
Hart’s right of publicity. Thus, the court held that the First Amendment was a
defense to Hart’s right of publicity claim and granted Electronic Arts’ motion
for summary judgment.
In re L.A. Dodgers LLC120
The debtors, the Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, filed for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11. The debtors have a licensing agreement with
Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. (Fox Group) that extends through the end of
the 2013 Major League Baseball season. Pursuant to their bankruptcy filings,
the debtors filed a Motion for an Order to Approve Market Procedures for the
License of Telecast Rights, which seeks to end its current contract with Fox
Group. The debtors filed the motion to allow any telecast rights to also be
sold with the team, which would improve the team’s market value and
maximize the value of the estate. Fox Group argued that the telecast rights
were not necessary for the estate value, and that the estate could get out of
bankruptcy without those rights. However, the court found that allowing the
estate to maximize its value was a top priority, and that granting Fox Group’s
request to delay negotiations would further hamper the estate. Therefore, the
119. 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011).
120. 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
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court granted the debtors’ motion, and allowed the debtors to negotiate for
better telecast terms.
Internetshopsinc.com v. Six C Consulting, Inc.121
Both parties are in the business of selling golf equipment over the Internet.
At issue in this particular case is the sale and advertising of practice golf mats.
The plaintiff used the trademark “Dura Pro” to advertise its golf mat since
2002, while the defendant began using the same term for its own golf mats in
2008. The plaintiff notified the defendant of its rights, and the defendant took
action to stop use of the term “Dura Pro.” However, the defendant’s efforts
failed, and the plaintiff filed suit alleging a federal trademark infringement
claim under the Lanham Act and a state claim for unfair competition. As the
defendant conceded that it infringed on the plaintiff’s trademark rights by
using “Dura Pro” in its Internet advertising campaign for practice golf mats,
the issues in this case concerned cross-motions for summary judgment related
to damages, costs, attorney’s fees, Defendant’s profits, and permanent
injunctive relief. The court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
as to liability under the Lanham Act, its claim to recover the costs of this
action, and permanent injunctive relief. However, the court denied Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, and thus granted Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment for the claim for damages and attorney’s fees.
J & J Sports Prods., Inc.122
The plaintiff, J&J Productions, Inc., is the exclusive commercial
distributor of the broadcast of certain boxing matches and similar-type events.
As the exclusive commercial distributor of these events, businesses were
required to obtain a license from the plaintiff to transmit the events.
Allegedly, many businesses failed to do so, and the plaintiff, seeking damages,
filed lawsuits against these businesses based on these defendant businesses’
alleged interception and transmission of these events.
Lane No. 1. v. Lane Masters Bowling Inc.123
The plaintiff Lane No. 1 brought this action against the defendant Lane
Masters Bowling Inc., claiming patent infringement after the defendant made
121. No. 1:09-CV-00698-JEC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31222 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2011).
122. See e.g., J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Allen, No. 1:10-cv-4258-WSD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25453 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2011).
123. No. 5:06-CV-0508, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29231 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011).
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two bowling balls with designs that are protected by a patent owned by the
plaintiff. The defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that the
plaintiff’s patent was invalid for obviousness and that there is no infringement
because the defendant’s balls are not covered by the plaintiff’s patent. The
court rejected the obviousness argument because the defendant did not present
clear and convincing evidence to overcome the validity presumption of a
registered patent. After examining prior art and looking into the patent claims,
the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s infringement claim.
Mine O’ Mine, Inc. v. Calmese124
The plaintiff Mine O’ Mine, Inc. (MOM) filed a motion for partial
summary judgment in its action for trademark infringement and other related
claims. Former professional basketball player Shaquille O’Neal (O’Neal),
nicknamed “Shaq,” granted MOM the exclusive right to register and
sublicense his name, image, and likeness. In February 2008, after O’Neal was
traded to the Phoenix Suns, he was dubbed “The Big Cactus” and “The Big
Shaqtus.” While playing for the Suns, O’Neal wore an orange jersey with the
number thirty-two. In March 2008, the defendant, Michael Calmese
(Calmese), registered <Shaqtus.net> as a domain name, and registered
“Shaqtus” as an Arizona trade name. Calmese also created an image of the
Shaqtus, which looked like a cactus with the facial expression of a man
wearing an orange basketball jersey bearing the name “Phoenix Shaqtus” and
the number 32 and bouncing a basketball (Shaqtus Character). In 2009,
counsel for MOM and O’Neal demanded that Calmese cease and desist from
all use of the Shaqtus mark, transfer <Shaqtus.net> to MOM, and cancel his
Arizona trade name registration for Shaqtus. However, Calmese failed to
cancel his “Shaqtus” trade name registration or transfer <Shaqtus.net>.
As a result, MOM sued Calmese and True Fan Logo, asserting six claims:
(1) federal trademark infringement; (2) unfair competition; (3) trademark
dilution; (4) cybersquatting; (5) common law trademark infringement; and (6)
violation of the right of publicity. Calmese asserted three counterclaims: (1)
common law trademark infringement; (2) unfair competition; and (3)
defamation of character. MOM filed a motion for summary judgment on its
first, second, fifth, and sixth claims for trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and violation of the right of publicity and on all of the
counterclaims asserted by Calmese. Calmese sought summary judgment in his

124. No. 2:10-CV-00043-KJD-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75236 (D. Nev. July 12, 2011).
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favor for all of his counterclaims and for all of MOM’s claims. MOM also
sought to strike Calmese’s opposition.
For MOM’s federal trademark infringement claim, MOM claimed
Calmese’s use of Shaqtus caused a likelihood of consumer confusion. The
court considered the eight factors to determine the likelihood of consumer
confusion and determined that there was a high likelihood of confusion.
Therefore, the court granted MOM’s motion for summary for its trademark
infringement claim. For MOM’s unfair competition claims, the court stated
that the test for unfair competition under common and federal law is identical
to the test for trademark infringement. Because the court held that MOM was
entitled to summary judgment on its trademark infringement claim, the court
held that it was also entitled to summary judgment on its unfair competition
claims. For MOM’s violation of right of publicity claim, the court discussed
the transformative use defense. Under this defense, a right to publicity action
is defeated when cartoons depicting real persons are distorted for the purpose
of parody or caricature. The court held that the Shaqtus character is
sufficiently transformative to defeat a right to publicity action. Therefore, the
court denied MOM’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Finally, the court addressed Calmese’s counterclaims. The court held that
MOM was entitled to summary judgment on both counterclaims. First, the
court held that Calmese could not prevail on his trademark infringement and
unfair competition counter claims because Calmese’s use of the Shaqtus name
violated MOM’s rights and he therefore had no rights in the Shaqtus name.
Second, the court held that Calmese could not prevail on his defamation
counterclaim because Calmese acted under a fictitious business name and True
Fan Logo was no longer a valid or existing business entity.
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth.125
The defendant, a state-owned sports and exposition center, responded to
an Open Public Records Act (OPRA) request made by the plaintiff, a
newspaper publisher. The plaintiff sought copies of the defendant’s promoter
licensing agreements. The copies originally provided to plaintiff redacted the
financial information in the agreements. The defendant stated that the
financial information was exempt from the OPRA. The plaintiff filed suit to
require the disclosure of all information related to the agreements. The trial
court found that the defendant did not give examples of how releasing the

125. 31 A.3d 623 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
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unredacted copies of the agreements would cause any specific harm to the
defendant. Therefore, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion requiring
defendant to release the unredacted agreements. The defendant appealed, and
the court held that the agreements in question constituted government records
under the OPRA statute. Therefore, the court found that the defendant could
not deny access to the agreements as authorized by the law. The court also
held that the common law doctrine of nondisclosure did not apply because
nondisclosure was not in the public’s interest, as the defendant claimed.
Therefore, the court affirmed the order of the trial court requiring the
defendant to release unredacted copies of the agreements.
NFL v. EE Nation126
The National Football League (NFL) sued EE Nation alleging trademark
infringement after EE Nation registered the domain name
“superbowlconcierge.com.” The NFL owns several federally registered
trademarks in the United States for the trademark “SUPER BOWL,” which is
the name of the league’s championship game. The NFL has registered the
same trademark in over fifty jurisdictions outside of the United States.
Finally, since 1995, the NFL’s official website for the Super Bowl game has
been located at the registered domain name “www.superbowl.com.” Long
after the NFL had established its rights in the SUPER BOWL mark, EE Nation
registered the domain name superbowlconcierge.com without the NFL’s
authorization. EE Nation’s website prominently displays NFL logos and
pictures of NFL teams. The website also provides links for users to book
rooms at hotels near NFL stadiums and purchase tickets to NFL games. The
NFL sent several cease-and-desist letters to EE Nation, objecting to the
unauthorized use of the NFL’s trademarks; however, EE Nation never
responded to these letters and did not stop using the marks. As a result, the
NFL filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), alleging that EE Nation was infringing on its trademarks.
Particularly, the NFL argued that the superbowlconcierge.com domain name is
confusingly similar to the NFL’s famous SUPER BOWL trademark, that EE
Nation has no rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name, and that EE
Nation registered the domain name in bad faith. The WIPO Panel determined
that because the domain name was identical to the NFL’s trademark, it was
confusingly similar. Moreover, EE Nation had no rights to or legitimate
interests in the SUPER BOWL mark. Finally, because EE Nation registered

126. WIPO Case No. D2011-1228 (2011) (Gibson, Arb.).
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the domain name even though it had no rights to the mark, the Panel found
that EE Nation registered the domain name in bad faith. For these reasons, the
Panel ordered that EE Nation transfer the domain name
“superbowlconcierge.com” to the NFL.
Pac.-10 Conference v. Lee127
This arbitration decision concerned the respondent’s registration of the
domain names, “pac-12network.com,” “pac12network.com,” and “pac12network.org.” The complainant is an unincorporated California business
association that is among the preeminent collegiate athletic conferences in the
United States. Specifically, the complainant is the PAC-10 conference, and
the PAC-10 conference commissioner had recently announced that the
complainant was looking to expand the membership of the conference. The
complainant is the owner of registrations in the family of trademarks “PAC10” and the pending application of the “PAC-12” trademarks. In a complaint
filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration
and Mediation Center, the complainant alleged: (1) that the respondent’s
domain names were confusingly similar to the trademarks, (2) that the
respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names, and (3)
that the respondent registered and used the domain names in bad faith. The
arbitration panel agreed with the complainant on all counts. As a result, the
panel ordered the transfer of the respondent’s domain names to the
complainant.
Rugby World Cup Limited v. Andreas Gyrre128
The complainant Rugby World Cup Limited filed this trademark
infringement action against the respondent Andreas Gyrre for registering the
domain name “worldcup2011.com.” The complainant is owned by the world
governing body for the sport of rugby and has been assigned all rights in the
Rugby World Cup tournament. In 2009, the respondent registered the
disputed domain name to sell tickets to sporting events. Believing that the
colors and fonts used on the respondent’s side were similar to the
complainant’s site, the complainant filed a complaint with the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), alleging that the respondent’s
website was confusing consumers. However, the WIPO Panel determined that
the domain name was not confusingly similar because many sports use the
127. WIPO Case No. D2011-0200 (2011) (Sorkin, David, Arb.).
128. WIPO Case No. D2011-1520 (2011) (Badgley, Arb.).
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phrase “world cup” to refer to their championship tournament. Therefore,
because the word “rugby” was absent in the domain name, there was not a
sufficient connection between the disputed domain name and the Rugby
World Cup to cause confusion. For these reasons, the Panel denied the
complaint.
Russell Brands LLC v. Cognata129
The complainant Russell Brands, LLC filed this trademark infringement
action against the respondent Tony Cognata for registering the domain name
“spalding.net.” The complainant is a U.S. company that manufactures
sporting goods. The complainant owns several registered trademarks,
including the internationally registered mark “SPALDING,” and the domain
name “spalding.com,” which it has owned since 1994. In 1998, the
respondent registered the disputed domain name. As a result, the complainant
filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
alleging that the respondent was infringing on its trademark. The WIPO Panel
determined that because the domain name was identical to the complainant’s
trademark, it was confusingly similar. Moreover, the respondent had no rights
to or legitimate interests in the SPALDING mark. Finally, the respondent did
not contest the fact that it registered the domain name in bad faith. For these
reasons, the Panel ordered that the respondent transfer the domain name to the
complainant.
Silver Dream, LLC v. Yousuf Int’l, Inc.130
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s copyright
infringement suit, arguing that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. The
plaintiff is a designer and marketer of jewelry. In 2009, the plaintiff applied
for and received a copyright for a pendant that it designed in the shape of a
fleur de lis, which included the image of a football, a football stadium, and the
words “WHO DAT,” “NOLA,” and “BELIEVE DAT.” Upon learning that
the defendant was selling similar jewelry pendants, which included the same
shape, images, and words, the plaintiff filed a copyright infringement claim in
Louisiana district court. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the Louisiana district court did not have personal jurisdiction because the
defendant had no contacts with Louisiana. However, the court disagreed,
holding that because the pendant’s design was particular to Louisiana,
129. WIPO Case No. D2011-1394 (Oct. 21, 2011).
130. No. 10-4247, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82916 (E.D. La. July 28, 2011).
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specifically the New Orleans Saints football team, much of the defendant’s
sales were in the Louisiana market; therefore, the defendant should have
reasonably foreseen that it could be haled into court in Louisiana. As such, the
court denied the defendant’s motion to have the case dismissed.
Steele v. Bongiovi131
Samuel Bartley Steele (Steele) brought this action against numerous
defendants from a prior action and their attorneys alleging that they unlawfully
removed a copyright notice from an advertisement in violation of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. In the prior action, the court granted summary
judgment to the defendants on Steele’s copyright infringement claim because
there was no substantial similarity between Steele’s song about the Boston
Red Sox and a song used in the defendants’ advertisements.
In the case at hand, Steele alleged that the defendants intentionally
concealed acts of copyright infringement, altered the TBS Promo logo by
deleting the Major League Baseball Advanced Media copyright notice, and
submitted false evidence to the federal courts in the form of that altered TBS
Promo. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Steele lacks standing
because he does not own the TBS Promo material, he fails to allege sufficient
facts to support his claims, and his claims are precluded because they arise
from the same facts as the prior pending action. By accepting all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Steele’s favor, the court found that Steele was not injured by the alleged acts.
As such, Steele did not have standing to bring an action. Consequently, Steele
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the defendant’s
motion was allowed. The court also held that Steele’s lawsuit was frivolous
and vexatious, as it was an attempt to circumvent the court’s holding in the
prior case; the court will impose sanction if Steele files any future abusive,
frivolous, or vexatious cases in the court.
Syrus v. Bennett132
The plaintiff, Charles Syrus (Syrus), appealed a district court decision to
dismiss his copyright infringement action against the defendant basketball
team, the Oklahoma City Thunder (the Thunder). Syrus wrote a song for the
Thunder and gave copies of the song to the one of the team’s coaches and the
team’s head cheerleader. Although the team never played his song during
131. 784 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Mass. 2011).
132. 455 Fed. Appx. 806 (10th Cir. 2011).

SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE)

772

5/10/2012 10:31 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

Thunder games, Syrus claimed that the Thunder violated the copyright in his
song by having the cheerleaders, mascot, and the crowd chant phrases such as
“Thunder Up,” “Go Thunder,” and “Let’s Go Thunder,” phrases that were
allegedly taken from his song’s lyrics. As a result, Syrus filed this copyright
infringement action to recover compensatory damages. The district court,
however, dismissed Syrus’s claim because he had not established a plausible
claim. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal of Syrus’s complaint. The
court held that the phrases did not reflect the minimal creativity required for a
work to receive copyright protection since these phrases were merely
predictable variations on cheers that are widely used in sports. The fact that
Syrus had obtained a copyright registration for his song did not automatically
create protection for these phrases. Copyright protection extends “only to
those components of a work that are original to the author,” and the allegedly
infringed phrases were not original enough for copyright protection. Because
Syrus did not have a valid copyright in these phrases, the court affirmed the
dismissal of his copyright infringement claims.
Unique Sports Prods. v. Ferrari Imp. Co.133
The plaintiff, a sporting goods manufacturer, filed an action for trademark
infringement against defendant, a sporting goods retailer, for marketing a
similar looking grip tape for use on tennis rackets. Since 1977, the plaintiff
has manufactured and sold Tourna Grip, which is a light blue tape that
provides additional cushioning and moisture absorption on tennis racket grips.
In 2001, the plaintiff federally registered the color light blue used for “grip
tape for sports rackets.” Subsequently, the defendant began marketing and
selling a gauze tape for tennis rackets, which was a light blue-green color. As
a result, the plaintiff filed this action against the defendant for trademark
infringement. The district court determined that the defendant’s light bluegreen gauze tape did not infringe the plaintiff’s trademark light blue grip tape.
Even though both products were used on tennis rackets, there was little
likelihood of confusion between the two products. They were different
products because one was absorbent while the other was not. The packaging
of each of the products was so distinguishable from the other that it made it
virtually impossible to confuse the two products. Finally, there was no
evidence of actual consumer confusion. For these reasons, the court entered
judgment in favor of the defendant.

133. No. 1:09-CV-660-TWT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124801 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2011).
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W. Brand Bobosky v. Adidas AG134
The defendants, Adidas and National Basketball Association player Kevin
Garnett, filed a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff’s trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims. The plaintiff sued the defendants
because of the defendants’ use of the plaintiff’s federally registered trademark:
“We Not Me.” In 2004, the plaintiffs registered its intent to use the phrase
“We Not Me” in connection with men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing. In
2007, Adidas began using the phrase “We Not Me” in its own marketing
campaign. As a result, the plaintiff filed this trademark infringement action
against the defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the plaintiff’s trademark registrations were void ab initio and
because plaintiff procured them through fraud on the Patent and Trademark
Office because the plaintiff failed to use the mark in a trademark manner. The
district court concluded that the plaintiff’s registrations were void ab initio
because the plaintiff lacked a bona fide intention to use the mark in two of the
three categories that it was registered. Therefore, the court granted partial
summary judgment on the issue of trademark validity. However, because
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff acquired
valid and protectable rights in the mark through trademark use, the court could
not grant summary judgment on the unfair competition claim.
Who Dat Yat Chat, LLC v. Who Dat, Inc.135
The defendants, NFL Properties and New Orleans Saints, filed a motion to
compel discovery and for sanctions against the plaintiff, Who Dat Yat Chat,
LLC, in a trademark infringement action. While making plans to open a
coffee shop in Louisiana named “Who Dat Yat Chat,” the plaintiff received a
cease-and-desist letter from the defendants, stating that they were the sole
owner of the trademark phrase “Who Dat.” In response, the plaintiff filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the phrase is a generic
term in the New Orleans metropolitan area, and therefore, no one can own the
phrase.
In preparation for a trial, the defendants sent the plaintiff
interrogatories and requests for documents. After receiving the plaintiff’s
initial responses, the defendants requested more detailed information. Over
the next several months, the plaintiff and defendants exchanged discovery
requests, and in the defendants’ opinion, all of the plaintiff’s responses were
inadequate. Eventually, the defendants filed this motion to compel the
134. No. CV 10-630-PK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149611 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2011).
135. No. 10-1333C/W10-2296, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103692 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2011).
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plaintiff to provide information more responsive to the defendants’ requests.
The defendants also requested that they be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred for bringing this motion. In the end, the court granted the defendants’
motion to compel discovery because the information they were seeking was
non-privileged and relevant. The plaintiff was ordered to immediately
supplement its answers with more responsive information and documents or
state specifically that the pertinent documents or information do not exist. The
court further awarded the defendants with attorneys’ fees and costs incurred
for bringing this motion.
Woltmann v. Arena Football One, LLC136
The defendant, arena football team the Chicago Gridiron (the Gridiron),
filed a motion to dismiss part of the plaintiff photographer’s copyright
infringement action. The plaintiff entered into a contract to be the exclusive
photographer for the arena football team, the Chicago Rush (the Rush). Under
this contract, all ownership rights in the images would revert to the plaintiff if
the Rush filed for bankruptcy or ceased operations. The Rush subsequently
ceased operations. However, the Arena Football League later bequeathed the
trademarks and trade names of the former Rush team to the Gridiron team.
After purchasing the assets of the former Rush team, the Gridiron repeatedly
used the plaintiff’s pictures of the Rush without his authorization. As a result,
the plaintiff brought this action claiming copyright infringement, declaratory
judgment, and unjust enrichment. The Gridiron filed a motion to dismiss the
declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment claims. The parties mutually
agreed that the court should dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because the
copyright claim preempted it. However, the court held that it could not
dismiss the declaratory judgment claim because there were genuine issues of
fact as to whether Gridiron had a basis to use the plaintiff’s images.
World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc. v. Ramos137
The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract action
that the plaintiff filed after defendant failed to pay money that it allegedly
owed under a licensing agreement.
The plaintiff World Wrestling
Entertainment (WWE) and the defendant, J.F. Ramos (Ramos), entered into a
license agreement, granting Ramos a license to manufacture and distribute
products—such as t-shirts, hats, and gloves—bearing WWE trademarks. As
136. No. 11 C 5994, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129470 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2011).
137. No. 3:10-cv-1399, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97038 (D. Conn. Aug. 30, 2011).
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part of the license agreement, Ramos was required to obtain WWE’s
preapproval before Ramos could sell and distribute any licensed products. In
2009, Ramos manufactured certain clothing bearing WWE trademarks, which
WWE claimed Ramos never submitted to it for approval.
After WWE discovered that Ramos had sold the unauthorized clothing to
a French company, WWE sent a cease-and-desist letter to the French
company, informing it that the clothing was counterfeit. Then, after Ramos
produced documents showing that WWE had approved the products, the
French company filed suit in France against the WWE for unfair competition
and unfair commercial practices, seeking over €17 million. Under the
licensing agreement between Ramos and WWE, Ramos would be required to
indemnify WWE for its losses, damages, attorneys’ fees, and similar costs for
any claim against WWE arising from Ramos’s unauthorized use of the
licensed products. However, because the litigation was still pending in
France, Ramos refused to pay WWE. As a result, WWE terminated the
license agreement and brought this action seeking a declaration that Ramos
owed money under the indemnification provisions of the licensing agreement.
In response, Ramos filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that WWE’s claims
were not yet ripe for judicial review because the litigation was still pending in
France. The district court held that any declaration about the extent of
Ramos’s obligations under its licensing agreement would not substantially
clarify who is obligated to pay the French company if it was to prevail in the
French litigation. As such, the court declined to decide the indemnification
issue, and the court dismissed the action.
LABOR LAW
Labor laws govern the relationship between employers and employees in
unionized settings. As the major professional sports leagues are unionized
industries, labor laws play a significant role in shaping the sports world as we
know it. In general, labor law claims center on disputes concerning a
particular sport’s collective bargaining agreement. In 2011, labor laws were at
the forefront of a highly-publicized dispute between the National Football
League (NFL) and NFL players, as illustrated by the Brady v. NFL decisions
that follow.
Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co.138
The defendant Cleveland Browns (Browns) appealed a trial court’s denial
138. 958 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
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of its motion to compel arbitration as per the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) that the plaintiff Bentley agreed to. In 2010, Bentley filed suit against
the Browns claiming fraud and negligent misrepresentation. He alleged that
he contracted a staph infection while in rehabilitation as a result of unsanitary
conditions at the Browns’ facility. Bentley further alleged that the Browns’
head athletic trainer misrepresented the facility as a “world class facility with a
strong track record for successfully rehabilitating other Browns’ players.”139
Based on those representations, Bentley chose the Browns’ facility to
complete his postsurgical rehabilitation. Bentley was not required to choose
the Browns’ facility for his rehabilitation. To determine whether the trial court
improperly denied the Browns’ motion to compel arbitration, the appellate
court had to decide whether the trial court’s order constituted an abuse of
discretion, and more specifically, whether Bentley’s claims of fraud and
negligent misrepresentation were subject to the CBA, which would then
invoke the relevant arbitration clause. Bentley argued that the court cannot
compel him to arbitrate such a dispute when he never agreed that an arbitrator
must hear such claims. The court of appeals held that claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation do not implicate the CBA. Furthermore, it held
that nothing in the CBA required that Bentley use the Browns’ facility for the
post-surgical rehabilitation, which the Browns’ counsel conceded. Because
Bentley’s post-surgical rehabilitation did not disobey any CBA provision (he
could have chosen to go anywhere for his rehabilitation), it would be
unnecessary to subject Bentley’s claims to the CBA. Therefore, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling to deny the Browns’ motion to compel
arbitration.
Brady v. NFL140
The defendant National Football League (NFL) filed an appeal,
challenging the lower court’s granting of a preliminary injunction that
enjoined the NFL owners from locking out the players because it was an
unlawful concerted boycott causing irreparable harm to the players. The
players filed an antitrust suit after they agreed to decertify as a union, which
ended both sides’ protection under the nonstatutory labor exemption that
permits employers to bargain in concert with its employees’ union. At trial,
the NFL argued that the owners were still immune from antitrust liability
under the nonstatutory labor exemption because the decertification of the

139. Id. at 587.
140. 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
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players’ union was effectively a “sham.” The NFL also argued that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Norris-LaGuardia Act
(NLGA) prevents the federal courts’ power to grant injunctions in cases
“involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”141 However, the district court
ruled that the case did not grow out of a labor dispute. The district court also
refused to stay the action until the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
resolved the NFL’s pending unfair labor practices charge against the players
for “unlawful subversion of the collective bargaining process” by having a
“sham” decertification only so the players could file an antitrust lawsuit.142
The Eighth Circuit determined that the NLGA applies to the case. The
court was not persuaded by the players’ contention that the NLGA applied to
disputes specifically involving only organized labor. The court ruled that the
NLGA does apply to cases where the employees are no longer unionized and
that the controversy surrounding this case arose directly out of a labor dispute.
Next, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the NLGA prevented the district court from
granting a preliminary injunction. In its argument, the NFL pointed to Section
4(a) of the NLGA. Section 4(a), the NFL argued, forbids a court to prohibit
the league from using a lockout as a labor weapon. Although the players
counter-argued that Section 4(a) prohibits only injunctions against strikes and
other such injunctions against employees, and not lockouts or the employers,
the court found that such an interpretation would be in complete disregard for
the NLGA’s purpose to keep cases arising out of labor disputes out of the
federal courts. Therefore, because the NLGA prohibits a federal court from
enjoining a party to a labor dispute from using economic weapons permissible
under the NLRA, the court vacated the district court’s order granting a
preliminary injunction to the players.
Brady v. NFL143
As part of the highly-publicized National Football League (NFL) labor
dispute regarding CBA negotiations, in response to the threat of a lockout, the
plaintiffs (Players)—professional football players and prospective players on
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated football players—filed suit
against a party collectively known as “the League,” on March 11, 2011,
alleging that the lockout would violate federal antitrust laws and state contract
and tort laws. The following day, the League did in fact impose a lockout that
141. Id. at 668.
142. Id. at 667.
143. 640 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Brady v. NFL, 638 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2011); Brady
v. NFL, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Minn. 2011); Brady v. NFL, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011).
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generally prohibited Players from entering NFL facilities. However, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the League from continuing the lockout. In an April
25 decision, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, thus enjoining the lockout; the district court denied a stay of its
order pending appeal. The League appealed the district court’s decision on the
merits; on April 29, the Eighth Circuit granted the League’s motion for a
temporary stay of the district court’s order enjoining the lockout. Similarly, in
a decision filed on May 16 after assessing the League’s likelihood of success
on the merits of its appeal, the Eighth Circuit granted the League’s motion for
stay pending the expedited appeal on the merits of the district court’s decision.
Chi. Bears Football Club, Inc. v. Haynes144
The defendants, Michael Haynes (Haynes), Joe Odom (Odom), Cameron
Worrell (Worrell), and National Football League Players’ Association’s
(NFLPA, and collectively the defendants), filed a motion to vacate an
arbitration award. Haynes, Odom, and Worrell were football players,
employed by the Chicago Bears, at the time the dispute arose. Haynes, Odom,
and Worrell filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits with the
California Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). The plaintiff
Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. (the Bears) filed a grievance, arguing that
the players should have filed claims in Illinois, where the Bears franchise is
located. The Bears cited the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the
players’ individual contracts as the source of the grievances. The NFLPA then
initiated arbitration with the Bears on behalf of the players. The arbitrator
upheld the Bears’ grievances, and the players and the NFLPA appealed the
award on the grounds that it violated California public policy. The court
reviewed the award de novo because of the challenge based on public policy
grounds. The court found that the agreement did not need to conform to
California public policy because the agreements were governed under Illinois
law, and the Bears are located in Illinois. The court found that the arbitrator
did not err in applying Illinois law to the decision, and therefore granted the
Bears’ motion to enforce the arbitration award.
Kivisto v. NFL Players Assoc.145
Kivisto appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss Kivisto’s contract
dispute under the National Football League (NFL) Collective Bargaining
144. 816 F. Supp. 2d 534 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
145. 435 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Agreement (CBA). Kivisto, a former NFL agent, claimed he should not be
forced to arbitrate under the CBA’s arbitration agreement after his agent
certification had expired. The trial court dismissed Kivisto’s complaint and
held that the contract dispute was within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration
agreement. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint because in signing his
Application for Certification as an NFLPA Contract Advisor, Kivisto agreed
to abide by the arbitration procedures set forth in the NFLPA Regulations.
Section 5(A)(4) of the NFLPA Regulations requires arbitration to be the
exclusive method for resolving any and all disputes arising out of “any other
activities of a Contract Advisor within the scope of these Regulations.” The
court held that broad scope of section 5(A)(4) covers the revocation of
Kivisto’s agent certification under section 2G. As such, the court affirmed the
trial court’s decision to dismiss Kivisto’s complaint.
PROPERTY LAW
Property law concerns the benefits ands rights associated with an interest
in real property. In the sports law context, the issues generally surround
challenges to a particular use of a given sports facility such as claims
involving zoning or nuisance issues. The following cases illustrate these and
other claims involving real property.
Asphalt Specialists, Inc. v. Steven Anthony Dev. Co.146
Asphalt Specialists, Inc. (ASI), Lakeview Contracting (Lakeview), and
A&R Sealcoating, Inc. (A&R) entered into agreements to provide the service
and materials for various improvements to a golf course. Lakeview’s project
included a number of infrastructure improvements, ASI’s project involved the
construction and asphalt paving of golf cart paths, and A&R’s project involved
asphalt paving, labor, and materials for the course. These three parties were
not fully compensated for their work, which resulted in claims of a lien on the
golf course as well as actions for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
foreclosure on their liens. Eventually, the circuit court entered judgments in
favor of Lakeview, ASI, and A&R, concluding that they had liens on the golf
course that had priority over all other claims regarding the golf course. The
circuit court ordered the foreclosure sale of the golf course in order to satisfy
these three parties’ liens.
On appeal, the central issue was whether the parties’ liens attached to the
146. No. 295182, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 698 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011).

SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE)

780

5/10/2012 10:31 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

entire golf course or merely the improvements—those ancillary portions of the
golf course relating to the parties’ work. Finding that Lakeview, ASI, and
A&R were entitled to construction liens only on the improvements, this court
determined that the circuit court erred in ordering foreclosure of the entire golf
course to satisfy their liens. As such, the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated
the circuit court’s judgments regarding the liens, foreclosure, and attorney fees
and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Carb v. City of Pittsburgh147
The defendant City of Pittsburgh (the City) filed a motion for summary
judgment. The plaintiff, Barry Carb (Carb), owned a piece of property
adjacent to a City-owned baseball field. The plaintiff owned the property
since 1985 and was aware at the time he purchased the property that it was
used for baseball, softball, and kickball. During the plaintiff’s ownership, the
defendant erected two fences along the property line that divided the field and
the plaintiff’s property. The field has no lighting and has a sound system that
does not exceed a reasonable volume. Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that
the field constituted a nuisance. The City moved for summary judgment,
which was granted by the trial court. The court found that summary judgment
was improper as to the nuisance claim regarding the field’s use for little league
baseball. The plaintiff alleged that the crowds, traffic, and other incidental
problems from the baseball games constituted a nuisance. The court found
there were genuine issues of material fact and reversed summary judgment as
to the use of the field for little league baseball. However, the court found that
summary judgment was appropriate regarding plaintiff’s complaint that the
use of the field violated the permits. The court found that failure to enforce
the permits could not constitute a nuisance. Therefore, the court affirmed in
part and reversed in part summary judgment in favor of the City.
Town of Plattekill v. Ace Motocross, Inc.148
Ace Motocross appealed a trial court order, which enjoined them from
operating a commercial racetrack on their property. Ace Motocross has
operated a commercial motocross racetrack on their property in the Town of
Plattekill (the Town) since 1987. In 2005, the Town enacted a law that

147. No. 2440 C.D. 2010, 2011 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 863 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 19,
2011).
148. 87 A.D.3d 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
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prohibits the commercial use of land for the operation of off-road motorized
vehicles. The law, however, included a “grandfather” provision, which
allowed property owners who had a nonconforming preexisting business to
apply to the Town’s Zoning Board to receive authorization to continue such
operations for up to ten years. In 2006, because Ace Motocross never applied
to receive authorization, the Town began issuing citations for Ace Motocross’s
violation of zoning laws. When Ace Motocross did not cease their activity,
the Town sought a permanent injunction prohibiting them from operating the
racetrack. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town,
permanently enjoining Ace Motocross from operating a commercial motocross
track on their property. Ace Motocross appealed. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that “a municipality may enact a
zoning law that eliminates prior nonconforming uses in a ‘reasonable
fashion.’”149 Moreover, the law contained a provision under which Ace
Motocross could have received authorization to continue its prior
nonconforming use for up to ten years. Because Ace Motocross did not avail
themselves of this remedy, they were foreclosed from seeking such relief
through the courts.
TAX LAW
Although tax law has a significant impact on the sports industry as a
whole, particularly in the professional sports arena, this area of law rarely
appears in the sports litigation context. However, the following case
represents an example of a tax issue surrounding the use of a recreational
facility.
The Chapel v. Testa150
The plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, built a church on a portion of its
property and devoted the rest to recreational use by the public. Most of those
who used the recreational facilities were not members of the church
community, but rather members of the community-at-large. The plaintiff
covered the cost of maintaining and developing the recreational portion of its
property; it did not charge the public any fee to offset these costs. In 2002, the
plaintiff filed an application seeking tax exemptions for three portions of its
land. The tax commissioner granted the exemption as to the church as a house
of public worship as well as a charitable-use exemption for a portion of the
149. Id. at 789.
150. 950 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 2011).
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remainder of the property. However, holding that it did not qualify for the
charitable-use exemption, the commissioner denied it as to the recreational
portion of the property. After a failed appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, the
plaintiff appealed to this court asserting that opening its recreational facilities
to the public constitutes a charitable use to qualify it for the tax exemption.
Among other minor issues, the court noted that opening the use of the
recreational facilities to the public was in itself a charitable use and not merely
an ancillary use to the charitable use of public worship. As such, the court
reversed and remanded the decision.
TORT LAW
Tort law represents the most-litigated aspect of sports law. It governs the
duty of care owed to coparticipants in athletic events, spectators, and those
using sports facilities in general. As a general matter, courts typically
distinguish between those risks inherent in sports-related activities when
determining whether to impose liability in a given situation. The cases that
follow represent tort issues involving coparticipants, coaches, athletes, and
spectators. In addition to the analyzing the various duties owed and possible
breaches of those duties, some cases also illustrate the effect of contractual
agreements purportedly waiving an injured party’s ability to successfully sue
for tort liability.
A.K.W. v. Easton-Bell Sports, Inc.151
The plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
The plaintiff, a minor and football player, was injured on a play during a team
practice and was later diagnosed with a carotid artery tear. He is now partially
paralyzed. His mother sued on his behalf, citing that the helmet the plaintiff
was wearing during practice was defectively designed. The defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment in the district court, which was granted. On
appeal, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded the
case, stating that a product liability case in Mississippi has a three-element test
that the plaintiff did not have the opportunity to prove. The court then noted if
the plaintiff cannot prove the three elements, summary judgment at a later time
would be appropriate.

151. 454 Fed. Appx. 244 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Altman v. HO Sports Co.152
The plaintiff Jeffrey Altman, an expert wakeboarder, filed this product
liability suit against the defendant HO Sports Co. following an injury the
plaintiff sustained while wearing wakeboarding boots manufactured by the
defendant. Although the boots in question contained warnings cautioning
riders about the inherent risks of wakeboarding and the possibility that the
attached boots may or may not release during a fall, the plaintiff did not read
these warnings. While wakeboarding and wearing the boots at issue, the
plaintiff suffered severe injuries to his right ankle and subsequently filed suit
against the defendant, alleging defective warning and defective design.
The defendant moved for summary judgment. Notwithstanding any
defective warning, it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not read the
warnings. Noting this lack of causation relating to the plaintiff’s injury, the
court granted summary judgment as to the warning defect cause of action. As
to the design defect cause of action, the court analyzed the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and determined that the defendant’s boot
design increased the risk of inherent injury and substantially contributed to the
plaintiff’s injury. Thus, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to the defective design claim.
Ashburn v. Bowling Green State Univ.153
Aaron Richardson died as a result of a full-blown sickle cell anemia
episode that resulted in cardiac arrest following his participation in intense
physical activity at his first football practice at Bowling Green State
University (BGSU). During the practice, Richardson complained of leg
cramps that eventually progressed into full body cramps that eventually
resulted in a 9-1-1 emergency call. At some point, Richardson stopped
breathing and eventually died. Richardson’s estate sued BGSU arguing that
the defendant had failed to respond appropriately to Richardson’s medical
issues and that an appropriate response would have saved Richardson’s life;
but the trial court entered a verdict in favor of the defendant BGSU.
On appeal, the plaintiff raised several assignments of error. The Ohio
Court of Appeals determined that the central, possibly determinative, issue on
appeal was whether Richardson would have survived had there been no delay
in calling for emergency help. Reviewing a doctor’s testimony a trial, the
court found that it constituted credible evidence that Richardson would not
152. 821 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
153. No. 10AP-716, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1297 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2011).
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have survived even without the delay. As such, the defendant could not be
held liable for his death, and the trial court’s judgment was affirmed.
Baker v. B&K Promotions, Inc.154
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The
plaintiffs were spectators at a race at the Morgan County Speedway. The
plaintiffs entered the pit area, after first signing a release and waiver and
paying an additional fee. While at the race, a car crashed and went into the
spectator area, injuring the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the defendant, the
promoter of the race, for their injuries, citing negligence. The defendant
contended that the release and waiver signed by the plaintiffs was a valid
waiver of claims, and the defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that
summary judgment was inappropriate because their injuries were not
contemplated by the release and waiver, and additionally that the plaintiffs
should be given more time to conduct discovery. The court found that the
plaintiffs’ injuries were almost indistinguishable from those contemplated by
the release and wavier, and that they had ample time before the initial
complaint in the trial court to conduct discovery. Therefore, the court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Beer v. La Crosse Cnty. Agric. Soc’y155
The plaintiffs, Charles Beer and Darin Toot, suffered severe injuries at the
La Crosse county Fairgrounds Speedway when they were struck by an out-ofcontrol racecar while standing in the restricted area in the infield of the track.
As a result, the plaintiffs sued, seeking damages, but the circuit court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on a Speedway Release
form signed by the plaintiffs releasing the defendants from any liability. On
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the waivers they signed were void as against
public policy. Although acknowledging that exculpatory contracts are
disfavored in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that it had
previously held a nearly identical waiver not to be void as against public
policy. Bound by precedent, the court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

154. No. 4-10-0955, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 262 (Ill. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011).
155. 797 N.W.2d 934 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
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Begley v. Harkins156
The defendant appealed an order of the district court granting partial
summary judgment to the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s negligence action. The
plaintiff and the defendant were golfing when the defendant’s cart hit and
injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendant
was negligent. The defendant filed a responsive pleading and raised the issue
of contributory negligence because the plaintiff heard the defendant’s cart
approaching, observed the defendant talking on his cell phone, and observed
that the defendant attempted to push the break but pushed the accelerator
instead. The district court granted a motion for partial summary judgment on
the issue of contributory negligence, finding that the plaintiff’s conduct was,
as a matter of law, not something a jury could find constituted contributory
negligence. On appeal, the court held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence because the record
contained sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could have
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to protect himself from harm.
Additionally, the court also vacated the district court’s ruling on the sanctions
motion. However, the court noted that its opinion should not be read as
expressing the existence or nonexistence of grounds excusing the sanction.
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.
Bowling v. Asylum Extreme, LLC157
The plaintiff Bowling was a patron at the defendant Asylum Extreme’s
paintball center, which she attended with her youth group. Before the
beginning of any paintball games, patrons were required to sign a waiver,
which Bowling did. During the games, Bowling’s protective mask slid down,
and she was shot in the eye, causing permanent injury. Bowling then sued
Asylum Extreme, stating that they did not properly instruct her about how to
adjust her mask, which caused her injury. Asylum Extreme moved for
summary judgment, on the basis that her claim was precluded by the signed
waiver. Bowling argued that the waiver was not sufficiently clear to cover her
injury. The trial court disagreed with Bowling, finding that the waiver was
specific enough to cover her injury. This court agreed, finding that the only
claim Bowling would have is if the conduct was willful or wanton. The court
found that Asylum Extreme’s requirement that Bowling wear a protective
156. No. A-11-204, 2011 Neb. App. LEXIS 193 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2011).
157. No. 2010-CA-001687-MR, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 801 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28,
2011).
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mask and instruction that the mask not be removed was enough to prove that
Asylum Extreme’s conduct was neither willful nor wanton. The court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Asylum Extreme.
Butts v. Whitton158
The plaintiff, a minor, was injured during a snowboarding lesson taught by
the defendant James Whitton. During the snowboarding lesson, the defendant
signaled to the plaintiff to cross a hill; while crossing the hill, the plaintiff was
struck by a reckless skier, a collision that fractured his leg. In the plaintiff’s
negligence suit against the defendant instructor, the trial court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the defendant did not
have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the actions of the third-party skier, nor
did the evidence support a finding of probable cause. Noting that generally
there is no duty to protect against actions of a third party, the Michigan Court
of Appeals determined that no special relationship existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant that would give rise to such a duty. As such, the
decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to the defendant was
affirmed.
Combs v. Georgetown Coll.159
The plaintiff Combs appealed a trial court decision to grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment for a liability claim resulting from
injuries the plaintiff sustained at the defendants’ summer basketball camp.
Combs brought suit against the defendants as a result of injuries sustained
when she tripped on a platform’s “lip” after watching her grandson participate
at a basketball camp. The sole issue decided on review was whether Combs
was an invitee or a licensee. If Combs was an invitee, the defendants owed
her a duty of care to keep the gym in a reasonably safe condition and provide
warnings of any obvious dangers. However, if Combs was a licensee, the
defendants owed her a duty to not willfully or wantonly injure her and to warn
about known dangerous conditions.
In affirming the trial court’s holding, the court of appeals held that Combs
was a licensee because the defendants did not impliedly invite Combs to enter
the gym. Combs argued that she was given an implied invitation because one
defendant admitted that spectators entered the gym during the camp, and
158. No. 296574, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 990 (Mich. Ct. App. May 26, 2011).
159. No. 2010-CA-000846-MR, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 629 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 26,
2011).
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because the participants played organized basketball with unlocked doors,
which together created an implied invitation. However, because Combs
watched from the gym’s second floor, which the defendants never used, they
had no knowledge that the lip would be a danger to potential spectators. The
court affirmed because evidence showed that the gym’s bleachers were not
open for spectators, no advertising for spectators occurred, and spectators did
not have to pay an entrance fee. Therefore, the appeals court affirmed the
lower court’s holding that Combs was a licensee and the defendants only owed
her a duty of warning her of dangers actually known to them.
Davis v. Cumberland Cnty. Bd. of Educ.160
The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment
to the defendant. While attending a high school football game, the plaintiff
fell through the bleachers and was injured on the defendant’s premises. The
plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that it breached its duty to ensure that the
bleachers were reasonably safe and also breached its duty to warn of the risk
and danger associated with the bleachers. The defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment and the trial court entered an order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the court held that the trial
court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant because the
plaintiff presented evidence that its bleachers complied with the North
Carolina Building Code, and that their athletic director was unaware of anyone
having ever fallen through the bleachers or of any other problems with the
bleachers. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff did not show that a
reasonable defendant would have acted differently with respect to bleachers
for a high school athletic field. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment was
affirmed.
DiBartolomeo v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.161
The plaintiff, Thomas DiBartolomeo, suffered injuries from a fall he
suffered as a result of an escalator malfunction when he and many other
football fans exited Meadowlands Stadium. A mechanic had previously
examined the same escalator following a previous malfunction and had
cautioned stadium officials about the dangers of overcrowding on escalators.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit against the stadium’s owner, N.J. Sports

160. 720 S.E.2d 418 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
161. No. A-2716-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16,
2011).
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& Exposition Authority, as well as the escalator maintenance company,
alleging that both parties were negligent. Following the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to both of the defendants, the plaintiff appealed.
Regarding the escalator mechanic, the plaintiff argued that res ipsa
loquitor applied, providing an inference of the mechanic’s negligence. As for
the owner of the property, the plaintiff asserted on appeal that the mechanic’s
warning regarding overcrowding on escalators placed the owner on notice of
the potentially dangerous condition such that summary judgment should not
have been allowed. The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant escalator mechanic, but it reversed and remanded
the trial court’s decision regarding the stadium’s owner.
Ditta v. Nesaquake Middle School162
The plaintiff was allegedly injured while performing a cheerleading
maneuver at the defendant Nesaquake Middle School. The plaintiff sued the
school and the school district, citing negligence in facility to provide proper
mats and recklessly supervising cheerleading practice. The plaintiff alleged
that the coach was improperly supervising because there was no spotter during
the maneuver, and that only one mat was used, although regular practice called
for two mats. The plaintiff fell out of the move, and on to the gym floor, with
no mat beneath her. The defendants filed for summary judgment claiming that
the plaintiff primarily assumed the risk of her injury. The court, however,
found that inefficient supervision and the lack of proper mats raised genuine
issues of triable fact. The court also found that the assumption of risk defense
is improper if the defendants created an unassumed, concealed, or
unreasonably increased risk, and therefore denied summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.
Estate of Newton v. Grandstaff163
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s wrongful death
action. DeShawn Newton (Newton) died after he went into cardiac arrest
while participating in an organized basketball tournament. Emergency
medical personnel were unable help Newton until almost thirty minutes after
he went into cardiac arrest. The representatives of Newton’s estate brought
claims for negligence and wrongful death. The defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to provide sufficient facts from which the court could infer the
162. No. 10-10230, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5090 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2011).
163. No. 3:10-CV-0809-L, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73897 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2011).
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defendants owed a legal duty to Newton.
With respect to the negligence claim, Texas has used three different
standards relating to sports-related injury cases: (1) reckless or intentional, (2)
traditional negligence, and (3) inherent risk. The court found that the
plaintiff’s complaint asserted enough facts that support a plausible claim of
relief under all three standards. First, under the reckless or intentional
standard, the court found that the defendants’ failure to take reasonable
safeguards for a reasonably foreseeable injury was in reckless disregard for the
safety of the participants’ lives. Additionally, the court found that it is
reasonable to have emergency medical personnel on site when running
organized basketball tournaments similar to the defendants’, and the
defendants did not. Second, the court held that the traditional negligence
standard was also met, for the same reasons under the reckless or intentional
standard. Finally, under the inherent risk standard, the court held that
Newton’s injury was not one that is inherent to the sport of basketball.
Therefore, the court found that the defendants would owe Newton an ordinary
negligence duty. In conclusion, because the plaintiffs alleged plausible facts
that could permit a trier of fact to reasonably infer that a legal duty was owed
to Newton, and later breached, the court denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
Faulkner v. Greenwald164
The defendant, as athletic director at Seneca High School in Louisville,
Kentucky, was responsible for the safety and maintenance of the various
athletic facilities at the high school. The plaintiff, a parent of a Seneca High
School student-athlete, was injured when a concession stand door dislodged
and hit her. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging the
defendant was negligent as to the maintenance of the concession stand door.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on
qualified immunity, holding that the maintenance of the concession stand is a
discretionary act. However, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed and
remanded the proceeding, concluding that maintenance of the concession
stand is a ministerial act; thus, qualified immunity does not apply.
Fontaine v. Boyd165
Following a skiing collision between the parties, the plaintiff filed suit,
164. 358 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).
165. No. WC-200-0794, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 27 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2011).
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alleging that the defendant acted negligently while skiing, causing the collision
and the plaintiff’s resulting injuries. The defendant responded, arguing that
the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applied and she owed no duty to
protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of skiing. The plaintiff urged that
skiers owe other skiers the duty to act with reasonable care. The court noted
that this question was a novel one for New Hampshire, but athletes in other
sports do not have a duty to protect others from inherent risks of those sports.
Recognizing that fact and other factors, the court concluded that the defendant
had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent dangers of skiing.
Rather, the duty owed was to simply not act in such a way so as to
unreasonably increase those inherent risks. As the defendant did not breach
that duty, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
French v. MacArthur166
While assisting in a youth-league softball practice, a parent hit a line-drive
that struck the plaintiff’s face. The parent was held to be a coparticipant, and
thus subject to the recreational activities doctrine. Michigan uses a reckless
misconduct standard for a coparticipant to be found liable for injuring another
coparticipant during a recreational activity. The goal for such a standard is to
encourage spirited participation in such activities while continuing to provide
protection from egregious conduct. The trial court held a defendant coach can
still be considered to be a coparticipant. As a result, the court denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court determined
that the only question at issue was whether the defendant informed the players
as to where he was intending to hit the ball on the field, as there was testimony
that he intended to hit the ball to centerfield. However, even if the defendant
had called out where he was intending to hit the ball, the court rejected the
claim that a reasonable juror could find such a mistake as reckless misconduct.
Geeslin v. Bryant167
The plaintiff was a spectator at a professional basketball game between the
Memphis Grizzlies and the Los Angeles Lakers. During the course of the
game, the defendant Kobe Bryant (Bryant) fell into the stands while
attempting a play, and landed on the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that as
Bryant got up, he pushed his elbow into the plaintiff’s chest and caused
damage. A few days after the alleged incident, the plaintiff received medical
166. No. 296526, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 1330 (Mich. Ct. App. July 19, 2011).
167. 453 Fed. Appx. 637 (6th Cir. 2011).
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treatment for a bruised lung cavity. The plaintiff then sued Bryant for assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was cited as a
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s death. The district court granted summary
judgment to Bryant on all counts. On appeal, the court found that the
assumption of risk defense was improper for the intentional torts of assault and
battery. Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment and remanded for
further findings. However, the court found that Bryant’s alleged behavior did
not rise to the level necessary for a finding of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on that count.
Griffin v. Simpson,168
On behalf of their daughter, a minor, the plaintiffs filed a personal injury
action against a number of parties following an incident in which their
daughter was injured falling from a golf-cart at a teammate’s grandparent’s
home during a break from volleyball tournament games. At issue on appeal
was the plaintiffs’ contentions that the trial court erred in granting the
defendant volleyball coach and the defendant Team Indiana Volleyball, Inc.
(TIV)’s motions for summary judgment. Noting a number of circumstances,
such as the fact that the informal gathering was not a team event, the court
held that the defendant volleyball coach had no duty to supervise the injured
player’s golf cart activity, so she was not negligent. As such, TIV was also
not liable under a respondeat superior theory. Thus, the court affirmed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of both the defendant TIV
and the defendant volleyball coach.
Guerra v. Howard Beach Fitness Ctr., Inc.169
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Geraldine Guerra
(Guerra) was on a treadmill at the defendant’s gym when the tread came loose,
causing plaintiff to fall off of the treadmill and sustain an injury. The plaintiff
sued the defendant for failing to keep its equipment in proper working order.
The defendant moved for summary judgment, citing that it had no knowledge
or reason to know that the treadmill was not working properly, and that the
plaintiff assumed the risk of using the treadmill. The court found that the
defendant provided no evidence that the treadmill was inspected to determine
that it was in working order; therefore, the defendant did not prove it was
168. 948 N.E.2d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
169. 934 N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
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entitled to summary judgment. Further, the court found that a malfunctioning
treadmill was not an appreciated or foreseeable risk; therefore, the plaintiff
could not have knowingly assumed the risk. As such, the court also denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the assumption of risk
defense.
Gvillo v. DeCamp Junction, Inc.170
The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in the plaintiff’s negligence action. The
plaintiff, a softball player, suffered fracture and nerve damage after he collided
with one of the defendants during a softball game. The plaintiff alleged that
the organizational defendants set up the softball field in an unreasonably
dangerous manner, thereby causing the collision. The defendants filed
motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff
appealed, arguing that the contact sports exception to ordinary negligence as a
basis for liability did not apply under the facts and circumstances of the case.
On appeal, the court analyzed whether the contact exception applied to the
organizational defendants. Under the contact exception, a participant in a
contact sport is only liable for injuries caused to another participant if the
injuries are caused by intentional or willful and wanton misconduct. The court
held that there was a genuine question remaining as to whether the other
player intentionally caused the collision, and thus summary judgment was
precluded. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Horan v. Reebok Int’l Ltd.171
The defendant filed a motion in limine to include a special jury instruction
in the plaintiff’s products liability action. The plaintiff, a college hockey
player, wore a facemask manufactured by the defendant, Reebok International
Ltd. During a game where the plaintiff was wearing defendant’s mask, the
butt of a hockey stick passed through a gap in the mask and hit his eye,
permanently blinding him in that eye. The plaintiff sued the defendant,
alleging design defect, inadequate warning, and a claim for punitive damages.
The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied.
Both parties subsequently filed motions in limine; however, the court only
addressed the defendant’s motion. The defendant sought to include a jury
170. 959 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
171. No. 3:08cv663, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111220 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2011).
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instruction on the modified consumer expectation text in the pre-charge, rather
than the ordinary consumer expectation test. The court held that the ordinary
consumer expectation test was appropriate, and therefore, denied the
defendant’s motion.
Hyde v. N. Collins Cent. Sch. Dist.172
The plaintiff filed suit following an injury sustained by her daughter when
she slid into second base during a junior-varsity softball game. Although her
daughter was aware that sliding was part of the game and had some experience
playing softball, she claimed that she was not taught how to slide in practice.
After an order denying the defendant’s summary judgment motion based on
the plaintiff’s daughter’s assumption of risk, the defendant appealed. This
court affirmed, holding that “there is a question of fact whether, based on her
experience, plaintiff’s daughter was aware of and appreciated the risks of
sliding.”173
Johnson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD.174
The plaintiff was a passenger on one of the defendant cruise line’s ships.
While aboard the ship, the plaintiff participated on a simulated surfing and
body boarding activity. The plaintiff signed a waiver; however, the instructor
of the activity instructed the plaintiff to stand on a body board that was not
approved for standing activities. The plaintiff suffered a fractured ankle and
sued the cruise line. The district court granted summary judgment, finding
that the waiver signed by the plaintiff immunized the defendant from liability.
On appeal the court found that the instructor was negligent in instructing the
plaintiff to stand on the board. The court further found that the defendant was
unable to force the plaintiff to waive liability for personal injury caused by the
negligence of one of the defendant’s employees. Therefore, the court found
that summary judgment was inappropriate, and remanded the case back to the
district court for further proceedings.
Kim v. L.A. Fitness Int’l, LLC175
Kim appealed a trial court decision to grant L.A. Fitness’ motion for

172.
173.
174.
175.

83 A.D.3d 1557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
Id. at 1558.
449 Fed. Appx. 846 (11th Cir. 2011).
No. G044099, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5497 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2011).

SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE)

794

5/10/2012 10:31 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

summary judgment stemming from Kim’s lawsuit claiming L.A. Fitness was
responsible for injuries suffered as a result of a weightlifting machine breaking
and striking him in the head. Every new member at L.A. Fitness, including
Kim, must sign a waiver that releases L.A. Fitness from liability for, among
other things, a member’s injury caused by active or passive negligence of L.A.
Fitness and its agents. The waiver also addresses that the member assumes
full responsibility of risk of injury involved in using the gym’s facilities and
equipment. Kim used the pulley machine at issue four-to-five times a week.
During one of his workouts, a pulley detached from the machine and hit Kim
in the forehead, which caused him to fall backwards onto the floor. As a
result, Kim injured his head, neck, shoulder, and lower back.
Kim offered numerous arguments to prove L.A. Fitness’ waiver was not
valid, all of which were unpersuasive to the court. First, Kim argued that the
waiver’s language was ambiguous as to injury-producing accidents. However,
the court held that the waiver was not ambiguous because the language
specifically stated release of liability resulting from any injury resulting from
use of L.A. Fitness’ equipment. Furthermore, Kim offered no evidence
showing an alternative interpretation of the release. Second, Kim argued that
his injuries were caused specifically by L.A. Fitness’ negligence in repairing
and maintaining the machine, which was not a risk he assumed when signing
the release. Again, the court was not persuaded by Kim’s argument because a
weightlifting machine breaking is an inherent risk of using the machine. The
court’s decision to grant summary judgment again relied on whether the
release’s language applied to Kim’s claims, which it did. The court referenced
prior case law that suggested that by signing a gym’s waiver, the person could
be found to have waived any liability resulting out of injuries suffered by
malfunctioning exercise equipment. Therefore, because Kim failed to offer
any evidence of more than negligent conduct by L.A. Fitness, the court
granted L.A. Fitness’ motion for summary judgment.
Marshall v. Booster Club of Smithtown, Inc.176
The plaintiff, Michelle Marshall, brought this negligence suit on behalf of
herself and her minor son, Jeffery, against the defendants as a result of injuries
Jeffery sustained while participating in a football camp operated by the
defendants. Jeffery was allegedly injured when, during a practice drill,
another participant disregarded the supervisor’s instructions and hit Jeffery in
the knee with his shoulder pad, lifting Jeffery up and throwing him to the

176. No. 09-1706, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011).
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ground. The other participant was supposed to touch only Jeffery’s shoulder
pads. The other participant was also older, heavier, and more experienced.
Jeffery testified that neither he nor his parents made a complaint during the
first three days of the camp, and that he returned the fourth day even though he
was uncomfortable about how the coaches paired up different-sized players in
the drills. After Jeffery was hit, two coaches helped him get to an ambulance.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent because: (1) they
allowed Jeffery to participate in an excessively dangerous activity, (2) they
failed to provide Jeffery with adequate supervision by putting him against
older, heavier, and more experienced players; and (3) they failed to warn
Jeffery or failed to prevent the foreseeable danger of participating in the
practice drill.
The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case on the
grounds that Jeffery assumed the risk of injury when he chose to participate in
the camp. They also argued that the alleged lack of adequate supervision was
not the proximate cause of Jeffery’s injuries. One coach testified that the drill
in which Jeffery was injured did not require players to tackle each other.
This court applied the reckless standard for nonparticipant liability. The
court stated that the camps are not required to continuously supervise and
control the participants and that they cannot be held liable for every careless
act by one participant against another. Furthermore, the court found that when
an incident, such as this one, occurs in such a short period of time without
notice, and thus, preventing a coach from having a reasonable amount of time
to prevent it, the defendants’ alleged lack of supervision cannot be the
proximate cause of Jeffery’s injuries. Therefore, the court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.
McCarthy v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist.177
The plaintiff, a high-school student, was injured while participating as a
member of the cheerleading team at her school. The plaintiff fractured her left
leg while performing a stunt, and her father sued the school on her behalf,
claiming she was negligently supervised while performing the stunt. The
defendant moved for summary judgment, on the basis that the plaintiff was
aware of and assumed the risks involved with cheerleading. The court found
that the plaintiff was an experienced cheerleader, and the school could only be
liable if the school or the coach created a situation that was above the usual
dangers involved with cheerleading. The court found that the conditions

177. No. 18959-10, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6278 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2011).

SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE)

796

5/10/2012 10:31 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

present at practice contained only the risks generally associated with
cheerleading, and therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.
Montgomery v. Ohio State Univ.178
The plaintiff, a former football player for defendant Ohio State University,
sued the defendant for negligent misrepresentation, medical malpractice, and
defamation. While still a student, the plaintiff was under consideration for
employment by the National Football League (NFL). A team physician
employed by the defendant filled out a form for NFL employment stating that
the plaintiff had high blood pressure and hay fever, even though the plaintiff
contended he did not have either condition. When the plaintiff was employed
by the NFL, his benefits were reduced for another medical condition because
part of his condition was attributed to high blood pressure. The plaintiff also
contacted the current team physician for an explanation of the form. The
physician sent the plaintiff a letter explaining the initial form. The plaintiff
then brought an action against the defendant seeking to recover the reduced
benefits for the improperly filled form and for defamation for the contents of
the explanatory letter. The plaintiff alleges he never authorized the defendant
to release the letter, but that the defendant sent the letter to several of the
plaintiff’s employees, in violation of the plaintiff’s rights. However, the court
found that for a defamation suit to continue, the statements made in the
explanatory letter had to be actionable. The court found that the contents of
the letter were not capable of defaming the plaintiff; therefore, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Ormiston v. Cal. Youth Soccer Ass’n179
Ormiston and her parents sued the Davis Youth Soccer League (DYSL),
the California Youth Soccer Association (CYSA), and the City of Davis for
negligence and premises liability after she injured her knee at a soccer
tournament. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants
based on a release of liability signed by the girl’s mother. Sixteen-year-old
Ormiston was playing in a soccer tournament organized by the defendants
when she fell and landed on a plastic sprinkler head embedded in the grass at
ground level. To participate in the tournament, Ormiston’s mother had signed
a CYSA membership form that contained a release of liability. The plaintiffs
178. 2011 Ohio 6857 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Nov. 8, 2011).
179. No. C064002, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4226 (Cal. Ct. App. June 6, 2011).
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raised two issues on appeal: (1) the scope of the release and (2) the readability
of the release. The court explained that a plaintiff’s injuries are within the
scope of the release if the injuries are reasonably related to the purpose for
which the release was signed. Ormiston was playing soccer when she was
injured; the release was principally directed at playing soccer. She just so
happened to land on a plastic sprinkler head, but this is not outside the realm
of ordinary negligence. The injury was so reasonably related to the release
that there is no room for an alternative, semantically reasonable meaning of
the release. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
Pacquiao v. Mayweather180
Emmanuel Pacquiao, a premier professional boxer, filed a complaint in
federal court for defamation per se against the defendants Floyd Mayweather,
Jr.; Oscar de la Hoya; de la Hoya’s manager, Richard Schaefer; Roger
Mayweather; Floyd Mayweather, Sr.; and Mayweather Promotions, LLC.
Pacquiao alleges that the defendants stated publicly that he has used, and is
using, performance-enhancing drugs, including steroids and human growth
hormone. The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court found that the
defendants’ alleged statements were actionable defamatory statements because
they falsely asserted an objective fact; that Pacquiao had sufficiently pled
malice in the amended complaint; and that Pacquiao’s conspiracy allegations
were sufficiently within the context of the defamation per se claim.
Accordingly, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.181
Hillerich & Bradsby (H&B) appealed the trial court’s decision denying its
motion for summary judgment in a products liability action. An eighteenyear-old pitcher was struck in the head by a ball hit with an aluminum bat, and
he subsequently died from his injuries. The parents of the estate sued H&B
under strict products liability for survivorship and wrongful death damages,
asserting manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn claims. The
district court granted H&B’s motion for summary judgment on the parents’
manufacturing defect claim, but denied summary judgment on the design
defect and failure to warn claims. The district court granted the parents’
motion in limine, excluding H&B’s assumption of the risk defense. A jury
180. 803 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Nev. 2011).
181. 257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011).
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found H&B liable in strict products liability for failing to warn the pitcher and
his parents of the risks associated with the aluminum baseball bat. H&B
appealed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the failure to
warn claim and on its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. On
appeal, the court denied both motions. First, the court held that the district
court properly denied the motion because H&B was subject to liability to all
players for the physical harm caused by its bat’s increased exit speed. Second,
the court held that the district court properly denied the H&B motion for
judgment as a matter of law because there was sufficient evidence to submit
the failure to warn claim to the jury. The jury was permitted to infer that the
player would have heeded the warning had one been given.
Perez v. Nassour182
The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs’
action to recover damages for personal injuries the plaintiff sustained during a
little league baseball practice. On the date in question, the plaintiffs’ ten-yearold son was practicing with his little league baseball team on a rainy day at his
coach’s house when his teammate threw a ball that hit him in the head. As a
result, the plaintiffs’ son suffered several serious injuries. To recover damages
for their son’s personal injuries, the plaintiffs filed this action against the
coach, the player who threw the ball, and the league. The defendants then
moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing that the plaintiffs’
son had assumed the risk of injury. However, the court determined that the
son could not have assumed the risk of injury because he was only ten years
old at the time and participating in organized sports for the first time.
Moreover, the plaintiffs established a material issue of fact as to whether the
defendants’ conduct created an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiffs’
son. For these reasons, the court denied the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action.
Pfenning v. Lineman183
The plaintiff, a minor girl struck by a golf ball at a golf outing, filed an
action for damages against the estate of her grandfather, who brought her to
the event; the golfer that hit the ball that struck her; the tavern that promoted
the event; and the operator of the golf course. The trial court granted summary
judgment for all four of the defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
182. No. 13758/09, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011).
183. 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011).
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plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed summary
judgment for the golfer and the operator of the golf course, but reversed
summary judgment as to the tavern and the grandfather. The court rejected the
concept that a participant in a sporting event owes no duty of care to protect
others from inherent risks of the sport, and instead adopted the view that
summary judgment is proper due to the absence of breach of duty when the
conduct of a sports participant is within the range of ordinary behavior of
participants in the sport and therefore reasonable as a matter of law.
Pugliese v. Grande184
The plaintiff Pugliese, a gym teacher, filed a six-count defamation claim
against the defendants Grande and Maulucci in relation to four alleged
instances where defamatory statements were made by the defendants.
Pugliese was attending his son’s baseball practice where he allegedly had a
conversation with another player from his son’s team, Maulucci’s son, after
the practice, which left Maulucci’s son feeling frightened and threatened by
Pugliese. Maulucci reported the incident to Grande, the assistant principal of
the school and discussed the matter through email, letter, and phone
conversations; these communications were the basis of Pugliese’s claims. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, stating that a federal rule prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
actual malice. The court found that Pugliese, as a public school teacher, was a
public official and that the conduct in question was sufficiently related to his
role as a public official. The court also found that Pugliese did not put forth
clear and convincing evidence that the defendants’ statements were made with
actual malice. The court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Ramsey v. Gamber185
The plaintiff Austin Chaz Ramsey (Ramsey), a former football player at
Auburn University, suffered a back injury while lifting weights. Dr. Goodlett
was the primary coordinator for Ramsey’s rehabilitation. The defendant
Arnold Gamber (Gamber) was the head athletic trainer for Auburn’s football
team and was required to follow Goodlett’s medical instructions regarding
athlete patients. Ramsey charged that Gamber failed to supervise his
rehabilitation properly, in violation of state law, and that failure caused a
184. No. CV085003753S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 473 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011).
185. No. 3:09cv919-MHT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11893 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2011).
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second corrective surgery, disqualification of his athletic scholarship, and
deprivation of a career as a professional football player. Ramsey asserted
three claims under Alabama law: negligence, wantonness, and interference
with the physician-patient relationship. Gamber moved for summary
judgment, and the court granted the motion. The court explained that
Ramsey’s negligence and wantonness claims failed because Gamber was not
liable for the actions of the weight-room staff that supervised Ramsey. The
court also explained that neither Alabama law nor the Restatement of Torts
recognizes a claim for interference with a physician-patient relationship.
Reilly v. Leasure186
The plaintiff claimed she was severely injured when the defendant
Leasure’s horse kicked her. At that time, the defendant and her horse were
participating in the Wilton Pony Club Horse Trials, an event sponsored by the
defendants, The Wilton Pony Club and The United States Pony Club (USPC).
The event was held on Millstone Farm in Wilton, a property owned by the
defendant Millstone Properties, LLC. The plaintiff filed a four-count
complaint alleging that defendants Wilton Pony Club, USPC, and Millstone
Properties were negligent. The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that the recreational equestrian activity assumption of risk
statute barred the plaintiff’s action. The court held that the defendants
established that no issue of material fact existed with respect to some of the
allegations of negligence, but failed to address the remainder of the
allegations. Therefore, with regard to the claims that the defendants asserted,
the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The defendant Millstone Properties claimed that the recreational use
immunity statute protects it because it opened its property to the public
without charge for the purpose of attending, participating in, and assisting at
the Horse Trials. The court held that evidence established that the plaintiff
entered defendant Millstone Properties’ land to partake in recreational
activities, namely watching an equestrian event and grooming. Furthermore, it
is undisputed that Millstone Properties offered the land to the public free of
charge. Thus, the court found that Millstone Properties has no liability to the
plaintiff. Therefore, the court granted the defendant Millstone Properties’
motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Finally, the defendant USPC claimed that it had no meaningful
relationship to the Horse Trials that the plaintiff attended on the day of her

186. No. FSTCV085009675S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1758 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 2011).
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injuries. The court held that no genuine issue of fact existed as to the lack of
connection between the USPC and the Horse Trials because the defendants
offered sufficient proof indicating such absence. Because the court found no
connection, the court held that no duty could exist. Therefore, the court
granted USPC’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Rochford v. Woodloch Pines, Inc.187
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in the plaintiff’s
negligence action. The plaintiff, a patron at the defendant’s golf course, was
injured after he slipped and fell on stairs while playing golf during a rainstorm.
The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the defendant negligently
maintained the stairs and failed to properly train and supervise its staff in
proper maintenance of the grounds. The defendant subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s alleged assumption of
an open, obvious, and avoidable risk. In analyzing this motion, the court first
found that both New York and Pennsylvania recognized the primary
assumption of risk doctrine. Second, the court found that the plaintiff, as an
experienced golfer, assumed the risks inherent in the game of golf. As a
result, the court held that the plaintiff knew it was raining and that the steps
appeared to be wet; thus, the plaintiff was, or should have been, aware of the
risk of slipping. Furthermore, the court noted the fact that the stairs did not
have a handrail was an open and obvious condition. For these reasons, the
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Rodriguez v. L.A. Fitness Int’l, LLC188
The plaintiff was playing basketball at the health club when he slipped and
fell in a puddle of water that had leaked onto the gymnasium floor. The
plaintiff sustained severe fractures to his right leg, which required surgery.
Consequently, he filed this action against the health club, alleging that the
health club’s negligence caused his injuries because the health club did not
warn him of the dangerous condition, it did not remedy the dangerous
condition, and it failed to make reasonable inspections to discover the
dangerous condition. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff and awarded him both economic and noneconomic damages.
Subsequently, the health club filed motions to set aside the verdict, order
remittitur, and enter judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict. The
187. No. 10-CV-3190, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96113 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2011).
188. No. CV096001289S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3139 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2011).
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court, however, found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude that the health club had constructive notice of the accumulated water,
which caused the plaintiff’s fall and injury. Moreover, the evidence supported
the jury’s finding that the health club failed to inspect the court within a
reasonable amount of time to discover and remedy this dangerous condition.
As such, the court denied the health club’s motions to set aside the verdict and
order judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Finally, the court concluded that
while the jury’s award of damages was generous, it was within the range of
just compensation. Therefore, the court also denied the health club’s motion
to order remittitur.
Rosado v. Doe189
The defendants, baseball player and baseball league, filed motions to
dismiss the plaintiff spectator’s action for negligence, which the plaintiff filed
after being injured while attending a middle-school baseball game. During the
game, the player was taking practice swings with a weighted bat when the bat
flew out of his hands and into the seating area where it hit the spectator in the
face. Subsequently, the spectator filed this action against the player and the
baseball league to recover damages for his personal injuries. Both the player
and the baseball league moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.
The court found that a reasonable fact-finder could find that the player had
been negligent. For example, the location where he chose to take his warm-up
swings may be unreasonable and negligent. As such, he was not entitled to
summary judgment. As for the baseball league, because the league was a
voluntary unincorporated association, a fact-finder cannot consider it a
separate legal entity that the plaintiff could sue. Therefore, the league was
entitled to summary judgment dismissing the action against it.
Rubbo v. Guilford Bd. of Educ.190
The defendants filed a motion to strike three counts from the plaintiff’s
negligence action, which was filed after the plaintiff’s daughter was injured
during gym class. On the date in question, the daughter was participating in
an indoor hockey game when the defendants’ son struck her in the face with a
hockey stick, which resulted in serious injuries. The plaintiff brought suit,
alleging that the defendants’ son was negligent when he forcibly swung the
hockey stick in the plaintiff’s daughter’s immediate vicinity. The defendants
189. No. WOCV2010-01056, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 175 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2011).
190. No. CV116017699S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1811 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2011).
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filed a motion to strike the negligence counts against them, arguing that
Connecticut law does not recognize negligence as a cause of action for injuries
sustained while participating in a contact sport. After examining prior case
law, the court determined that participants in contact sports have a legal duty
to refrain from reckless or intentional conduct, but that mere negligence is
insufficient to create liability. As such, the court granted the defendants’
motion to strike the negligence counts against the defendants’ son.
Sherry v. E. Suburban Football League191
Renee Sherry, mother of cheerleader Jessica Sherry, appeals from an order
granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants. Jessica was injured
while performing a stunt at a camp for cheerleaders of the East Suburban
Football League. Jessica claimed her injuries occurred as a result of the
defendants’ negligence and gross negligence in failing to properly train and
supervise the cheerleaders. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, stating that the ordinary negligence principles apply, rather than the
reckless misconduct standard of care that the trial court applied, and genuine
issues of material fact remain regarding whether defendants acted negligently
in the supervision of Jessica. Reasonable minds could differ regarding
whether an individual exercising ordinary care would foresee that a young girl
without proper supervision or training would become injured in an attempt to
execute an advanced cheerleading stunt with a group of high school girls on a
grass football field and whether it is foreseeable that unsupervised, high school
girls assisting in the execution of difficult cheerleading stunts will become
inattentive to the point of creating a risk of harm.
Stirgus v. St. John the Baptist Parish Sch. Bd.192
The plaintiffs sued the defendants following injuries the plaintiff Armand
Stirgus suffered when he fell during a portion of a football practice that had
been moved indoors following an outdoor portion in the rain. The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that
holding an indoor football practice while some players were still wearing wet
clothing following an outdoor portion in the rain did not create an
unreasonable risk of harm and the plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a
significant amount of water on the floor that would have created an
unreasonably dangerous situation. Before this court was the plaintiffs’ appeal
191. 807 N.W.2d 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
192. 71 So.3d 976 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
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regarding the trial court’s conclusions and grant of summary judgment.
Finding that reasonable minds could differ as to the reasonableness of the
coaches’ actions, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment.
Strauss v. Plainedge High Sch.193
Strauss commenced this action against Plainedge High School and Valley
Stream North High School after slipping on water and falling while officiating
a basketball game between the two schools. Strauss alleged that the schools
were negligent in the ownership, operation, management, supervision, use, and
control of the premises. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the
ground that they did not create the alleged condition, nor did they have actual
or constructive notice of the alleged condition. They also asserted that the
plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk associated with officiating. Strauss and
another official had inspected the basketball court prior to the game and had
deemed the court safe to play. Strauss fell within the first couple of minutes of
the game; he was backpedaling after a sudden change of possession and fell
while turning to run forward. Each coach stated that neither of them had
observed any water or liquid at or about the location of the accident and had
not seen anyone mop up at or around the location where Strauss fell. Finding
insufficient evidence that a dangerous or defective condition existed or that the
defendants either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of
it, the court granted the defendants’ motion.
Stoughtenger v. Hannibal Cent. School Dist.194
The plaintiff student and the defendant school district both appealed a trial
court decision denying the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment
in the plaintiffs’ suit for damages for injuries he sustained while participating
in a wrestling unit in gym class. The plaintiff, who weighed approximately
125 pounds at the time of this incident, was wrestling with another student
who weighed approximately 220 pounds. The defendants moved for summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk. The
plaintiff also filed for summary judgment and filed to strike the defendant’s
affirmative defense. The trial court denied each of the motions in their
entirety. On appeal, however, the court determined that the trial court erred in
denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defense of primary
193. No. 6587/09, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3561 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 20, 2011).
194. 90 A.D. 2d 1696 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
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assumption of risk, because this complete bar to liability applies only to
voluntary participation in sporting activities. In this case, the plaintiff was
injured while participating in a compulsory physical education class, and his
participation in the wrestling unit was mandatory. As such, it was proper for
the trial court do deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on
that affirmative defense. Finally, the trial court did not err in denying the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability because there were
triable issues of fact with respect to the plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim.
Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Garcia195
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UT Health) filed
this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying sovereign
immunity to UT Health after Ricardo Garcia (Garcia) sued the center for
injuries he sustained while playing on UT Health’s outdoor sand volleyball
court. In April 2008, Garcia was playing in an informal volleyball tournament
at UT Health’s Recreation Center when his big toe allegedly got caught on a
piece of tarp that became exposed from beneath the sand on the court, causing
him to trip and severely injure his toe. Garcia sued UT Health to recover
damages for his injuries, alleging that UT Health knew or should have known
of the unreasonable risk of injury. UT Health filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that UT Health was immune from liability based on the Texas
Recreational Use Statute. The trial court denied UT Health’s motion, and UT
Health filed for an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the Appellate Court
reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the Recreational Use Statute did
apply and that Garcia’s pleadings were not sufficient to establish that UT
Health’s actions were so grossly negligent as to create liability under the
statute. However, because Garcia’s pleadings did not affirmatively negate the
possibility that UT Health’s actions constituted gross negligence, the court
remanded the case to give Garcia an opportunity to amend his pleadings.
Walker v. Iverson196
The defendant National Basketball Association (NBA) player, Allen
Iverson (Iverson), moved for summary judgment in the plaintiff’s action to
recover damages for physical and emotional injuries following an altercation
at a Detroit nightclub. On the night in question, the plaintiff and his friends
were trying to take pictures of Iverson at the nightclub. One of Iverson’s
195. 346 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App. 2011).
196. No. 10-10428, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131563 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 2011).
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bodyguards told them to stop trying to photograph Iverson. Following an
exchange of unpleasant comments between the plaintiff and the bodyguard,
the bodyguard punched the plaintiff in the face, causing severe injuries.
Subsequently, the plaintiff brought this action against Iverson, alleging that
Iverson was directly liable for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress because the bodyguard was acting as Iverson’s agent at the
time. Iverson moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was not
vicariously liable for the intentional torts of his bodyguard. The court agreed
with Iverson, noting that in this case there was no evidence that Iverson had
directed his bodyguard to commit the assault; therefore, the court found that
Iverson was not liable for his agent’s intentional torts and dismissed the claims
against Iverson.
Williams v. Richland Sch. Dist. No. 400197
The plaintiff Williams was struck in the mouth by a line drive foul ball
while attending her daughter’s softball game at a school operated by the
defendant. She filed a complaint, alleging that the defendant negligently failed
to provide a safe spectator area. The defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Williams assumed the risk of injury. The trial court
granted the motion; the plaintiff then appealed. Williams first argued that the
school district waived its ability to assert the assumption of risk defense
because the defense was not timely pleaded. The court explained that even
though the defendant did not assert the defense in an answer, because
Williams addressed the merits of the defense in her summary judgment
response, she implicitly consented to trying the defense. As to assumption of
risk, Williams stated that she knew foul balls could enter the spectator area,
had seen foul balls enter the spectator injury, and knew that a spectator could
be hit by a foul ball. Williams also voluntarily chose to sit in an unscreened
area of the field. As such, the court of appeals found that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment, and it affirmed.
UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
The United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) addresses positive drug
tests for Olympic athletes and imposes sanctions on those athletes according to
specified procedures for those anti-doping violations. The following decisions
exemplify the type of anti-doping situations in which USADA is involved.

197. No. 28982-6-III, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 1332 (Wash. Ct. App. June 7 2011).
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Graham v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency198
The plaintiff, Trevor Graham, was sanctioned by the United States AntiDoping Agency (USADA) based on allegations that he willingly provided
performance-enhancing drugs to athletes. Subsequently, he filed suit, alleging
a variety of state law and constitutional claims. As part of its analysis, the
court noted the exclusive jurisdiction and other authority granted to the United
States Olympic Committee under the Amateur Sports Act for issues regarding
the United States’ involvement in the Olympic games. The court went on to
hold that all of the plaintiff’s state law and constitutional claims were merely
labeled as such. That is, the claims all surrounded the sanctions imposed by
USADA disallowing his participation as a coach to amateur Olympic athletes.
Given the exclusive jurisdiction granted by the Amateur Sports Act, the court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Block199
This arbitration decision concerned anti-doping violations against Mark
Block, a track and field coach and agent. The United States Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA) brought anti-doping charges against Block, and the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) panel decided the case. The charges
against Block stemmed from evidence connected to the Bay Area Laboratory
Cooperative (BALCO) drug conspiracy, in which prohibited doping
substances and techniques were distributed and used. USADA accused Block
of assisting and inciting others to use prohibited substances or prohibited
techniques, as well as trading, trafficking, and distributing various prohibited
substances. Specifically, Block was accused of distributing prohibited
substances to his wife, Zhanna Block, an IAAF track and field athlete.
Additionally, USADA accused Block of covering up his violations during the
proceedings and thereby violating additional rules. The panel agreed with
USADA and found that Block committed anti-doping violations. As a result,
the panel declared Block ineligible to participate in track-related activities for
ten years.
UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) serves as the National
Olympic Committee for the United States and exists to protect and develop the

198. No. 5:10-CV-194-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34637 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011).
199. AAA No. 771900015410 (Mar. 17, 2011).
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Olympic Movement within the United States. The following American
Arbitration Association decisions represent some of the issues related to the
significant responsibilities and authority of the USOC.
Barry v. USA Boxing, Inc.200
This arbitration decision stemmed from the respondent and national
governing body, USA Boxing, implementing new procedures for the
qualification and selection of all gendered participants in the 2011 PanAmerican Games. With the new procedures in place, only athletes who won
in the 2010 National Championship were eligible to compete at the PanAmerican Games. The claimant, a female boxer, on behalf of herself and
other athletes who had not won at the 2010 National Championships,
challenged the new procedures as a violation of the right to participate in
amateur athletic competitions pursuant to the Ted Stevens Olympic and
Amateur Sports Act (ASA) and the U.S. Olympic Committee’s (USOC)
Bylaws. On March 3, 2011, upon analyzing the USOC Bylaws, the arbitrator
ruled that winners of the contested National Championship weight classes,
Box-Off-qualifying athletes, and all athletes qualified to enter preliminary or
qualifying events for the Pan-American Games should be informed of the
arbitration proceeding and given the right to be heard. The arbitrator
proceeded to hear the matter on its merits, and on March 8, found for the
claimant, holding that the new procedures were null and void. The arbitrator
then ordered USA Boxing to host a single-elimination boxing tournamentin
compliance with the ASA, USOC Bylaws, and USA Boxing’s governing
documentsto select athletes to represent the United States at the American
Boxing Confederation’s qualifying competition series to further qualify for the
2011 Pan-American Games.
Craig v. USA Taekwondo201
Charlotte Craig, a U.S. taekwondo athlete, appealed USA Taekwondo’s
decision to select one weight class over another to participate in the selection
process to nominate US athletes to compete at the 2012 Olympic Games.
Under the rules of the international federation for the sport of taekwondo, only
two men and two women may represent each country at the 2012 Olympic
Games, even though there are four weight classes for each gender. According

200. AAA No. 77190E0004911JENF (Mar. 8, 2011) (Alperstein, Donald, Arb.); see also Barry
v. USA Boxing, INC., AAA No. 77 190 E00049 11 JENF (Mar. 3, 2011) (Alperstein, Donald, Arb.).
201. AAA 77 190E 00144 11 (Aug. 21, 2011) (Benz, Jeffrey G., Arb.).
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to the USA Taekwondo Athlete Selection Procedures for the Olympic Games,
if two men and two women do not qualify for nomination based on certain
objective criteria, then USA Taekwondo is to set up a Discretionary Selection
Committee, which will determine the weight class from which it will choose
one of the remaining nominees through a fight-off. The Selection Committee
in this case held a fight-off in the women’s Light/Welter weight division,
which effectively ended Craig’s chances of being nominated because she was
in the women’s Fin/Fly weight division. Craig appealed this decision to the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), arguing that one of the members of
the Selection Committee had a direct conflict of interest because he had
coached one of the athletes in the weight class the Selection Committee
selected for the fight-off. Ultimately, the AAA Arbitrator held that the
coach’s interest was not a “direct” conflict of interest as described in the
Selection Procedures. Further, because USA Taekwondo properly followed its
Selection Procedures, its decision to select the women’s Light/Welter weight
division to participate in the fight-off was valid and denied Craig’s appeal.
Harrington v. U.S. Collegiate Archery Ass’n202
The complainants challenged a new procedural rule enacted by the
respondents. In 2011, the United States Collegiate Archery Association
(USCAA) adopted a new procedural rule to qualify for the 2011 World
University Games-Team Trials (WUG Trials). Under the new procedures,
athletes were required to turn in certain documents, forms and deposits before
the qualifying tournament. The previous rule allowed athletes to submit the
required documents after the qualifying tournament. Failure to comply with
the new procedure would void an athlete’s opportunity to be on the team. The
procedure did not allow for any exceptions. Each of the three claimants
performed well at the trials, finishing in one of the top three places in their
respective divisions and qualifying for the WUG. However, after the trials it
was discovered that each of the athletes had not provided one or more of the
required documents before the WUG Trials. As a result, the athletes were not
placed on the WUG team. The athletes then appealed to the American
Arbitration Association, arguing that the USCAA should have given them an
extension to provide the documents, which would have been consistent with
past practice. With respect to two of the athletes, who each failed to provide
the necessary academic eligibility forms, the arbitrator denied their requests
for extensions because they did not attempt to comply with the document

202. AAA No. 77 190 E 00318 10 (2011) (Campbell, Arb.).
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requirement. However, as to the third athlete, who failed to present a passport
that would be valid through the specified date, the arbitrator granted an
extension for her to present a valid passport. The extension was warranted
because the athlete provided a receipt indicating that she renewed her passport
prior to the deadline, which the USCAA led her to believe would be sufficient.
It would have been unfair to enforce the policy against her when she made
every effort to comply with the policy.
SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL
The Swiss Federal Tribunal represents a forum whereby CAS decisions
can be challenged under Swiss law. However, as illustrated in the following
Swiss Federal Tribunal decisions, the scope of review is very limited and
highly deferential.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]203
This Swiss Federal Tribunal decision involved the appellant, a sportsDVD production and distribution company that had entered into several
agreements in 2008 with the respondent, the International Olympic Committee
(IOC), for the production and sale of DVDs containing footage from the 2008
Olympic games in Beijing, China. Each agreement contained a choice of law
provision, which provided that all disputes shall be governed under Swiss law
and that exclusive jurisdiction was held by the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS). In September 2009, the IOC sought an arbitration ruling from CAS,
alleging that the appellant had failed to perform its financial obligations
pursuant to the agreements. The arbitrator found for the IOC, and the
appellant subsequently appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal on the matter of
jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issues on appeal were whether the agreements
were invalid because the appellant never received an IOC-signed copy and
whether the IOC tacitly renounced the arbitral clauses. The appellant also
raised the issue of whether the CAS award violated public policy. Ultimately,
the Tribunal held that the appellant and the IOC fulfilled part of their
respective obligations under the agreement; thus, the appellant could not
contest the validity of the agreements or arbitral clauses, nor did the IOC
tacitly renounce the arbitral clauses. Moreover, the Tribunal dismissed the
appellant’s argument that the CAS award violated public policy.

203. Jan. 11, 2011, 4A_579/2010 (Switz.).
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Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]204
This Swiss Federal Tribunal decision involved the appellant, a Swiss
nonprofit, professional soccer club associated with the Swiss Football
Association (SFA), and the respondents, the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) and Al-Ahly Sporting Club (Al-Ahly), a
professional soccer club belonging to the Egyptian Football Federation (EFF),
which is a member of FIFA. In 2007, a professional Egyptian soccer player,
Essam El Hadary, signed an employment contract with Al-Ahly through the
end of the 2009–2010 season. In 2008, El Hadary then entered into an
employment contract with the appellant through the end of the 2010–2011
season. The EFF refused to issue an international transfer certificate to the
SFA, which was necessary to complete El Hadary’s move to the Appellant.
Soon after, the FIFA Players’ Status Committee provisionally authorized the
SFA to register El Hadary as a player for the Appellant. As part of the ensuing
dispute, CAS issued a final award, which resulted in El Hadary owing nearly
$800,000 to Al-Ahly and being banned for four months following the 2010–
2011 season. The appellant subsequently appealed the CAS award to the
Swiss Federal Tribunal, seeking an annulment of the award. However, the
Tribunal rejected the appellant’s arguments and concluded that the matter
itself was incapable of appeal.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]205
The Turkish football Club X. appealed the Court of Arbitration of Sport
(CAS) award, which ordered that the professional football player A. did not
owe Club X. any compensation for his refusal to rejoin the club after he was
injured. In July 2005, Player A. signed an employment contract with Club X.,
which was to expire on May 31, 2009. In January 2007, while playing in a
match, Player A. suffered a knee injury, which required surgery. Shortly after
returning to competitive activity after his injury, Player A. was diagnosed with
asthma, acute femoral thrombosis, and a pulmonary embolism. Because of
these diagnoses, Club X. requested that Player A. return to Istanbul in order to
continue his medical treatment and rehabilitation under the supervision of the
club’s medical staff. When Player A. refused to return to Istanbul, Club X.
initiated proceedings with the Fédération Internationale de Football
Associations (FIFA) Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC), requesting that
Player A. compensate the club €12 million, and that the DRC suspend him
204. Jan. 12, 2011, 4A_392/2010 (Switz.).
205. Feb. 17, 2011, 4A_402/2010 (Switz.).
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from competition for six months. The DRC awarded Club X. compensation of
€2,281,915. Club X. then appealed the DRC decision to CAS, arguing that the
compensation award should be greater. Player A. also appealed to CAS,
arguing that he should not be liable to pay any compensation because he had
terminated his employment contract for just cause. In the end, CAS upheld
Player A.’s appeal and ordered that Player A. was not liable to pay any
compensation because Club X. had saved money due to the early termination
of the player’s employment contract. Club X. then appealed the CAS award to
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that the award should be annulled because
CAS violated Club X.’s right to be heard when it failed to address Club X.’s
claims for restitution of salaries and the payment of a disciplinary fine. The
Federal Tribunal ultimately rejected this argument, stating that CAS’s failure
to address such arguments in its award did not infringe on Club X.’s right to
be heard. As such, the Swiss Federal Tribunal upheld the CAS award.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]206
The appellant, a professional football trainer, appealed a Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) award increasing his ban for violating anti-doping
rules from two years to four years. The Cyprus Football Association (CFA)
initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant after two athletes on
the appellant’s team tested positive for the same prohibited substance. After
determining that the appellant gave the prohibited substances to the athletes,
the Judicial Committee of the CFA found the appellant guilty of an antidoping rule violation, but reduced the otherwise applicable four-year ban to a
two-year ban in light of the fact that the appellant cooperated with the
investigation. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) appealed this sanction to CAS.
CAS determined that there were no grounds to reduce the appellant’s sanction,
and increased the appellant’s ban to four years. Subsequently, the appellant
filed this appeal with the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that the CAS Panel
did not have jurisdiction to alter the CFA decision because the CFA Statutes
did not provide for a right to appeal the decisions of the Judicial Committee to
CAS. However, the CFA Statutes explicitly refer to the FIFA Statutes, which
provide for CAS jurisdiction of appeals against doping decisions of national
football federations. As such, CAS had jurisdiction, and the Swiss Federal
Tribunal rejected the appellant’s appeal.

206. Apr. 18, 2011, 4A_640/2010 (Switz.).
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Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]207
Soccer player, Omar Riza, appealed a Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) decision dismissing the appeal of his sanction for illegally terminating
his contract with the soccer club Trabzonspor Kulubu Demegi (the Club). In
2006, Riza signed a three-year employment contract with the Club. However,
two years into the contract, Riza terminated the relationship due to the Club’s
alleged breach of contractual obligations. Riza then filed a breach of contract
claim with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC). The DRC rejected Riza’s claim, ordered
him to pay damages to the Club, and suspended him for four months for
illegally terminating his employment contract. Riza appealed the decision to
CAS; however, the CAS Panel dismissed the appeal, holding that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Subsequently, Riza appealed this decision
to the Swiss Federal Tribunal. After examining Riza’s employment contract,
the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that the CAS Panel correctly determined that
it did not have jurisdiction over Riza’s appeal because Riza’s employment
contract did not contain an arbitration clause providing for CAS jurisdiction.
As such, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected Riza’s appeal.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]208
The petitioner football club requested revision of a Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS) award of training compensation to respondent football club.
After playing for the respondent for eight seasons, the player signed a contract
to play for Club V. A year later, the player was transferred to the petitioner.
Subsequently, the respondent requested that the petitioner pay training
compensation for the player. However, the petitioner refused to pay. The
issue was submitted to the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC). The DRC ordered the petitioner
to pay €480,000 to the respondent as training compensation. The petitioner
appealed this decision to CAS, but CAS confirmed the DRC decision. A year
later, the petitioner requested the Swiss Federal Tribunal to revise the arbitral
award because new facts came to light. However, under Federal Tribunal
rules, a petitioner must file a request for a revision within ninety days after the
petitioner discovers the ground for revision. In this case, the petitioner did not
file its request within this ninety-day time limit; therefore, the petitioner
forfeited the remedy.
207. Apr. 19, 2011, 4A_404/2010 (Switz.).
208. Aug. 22, 2022, 4A_222/2011 (Switz.).
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Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]209
The athlete appealed a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) award
confirming her lifetime ban for a second anti-doping rule violation. The
athlete was selected for an unannounced out-of-competition doping control.
However, according to the agents who conducted the test, the athlete
attempted to distort the test at the time the agents took the sample, and threw
the cup containing her sample into the sink. As a result, the Hearing
Commission of the athlete’s national federation sanctioned the athlete for
refusing to submit to an anti-doping test, failure to appear for such a test or
attempting to tamper with the results. Because this was her second antidoping offense, the Hearing Commission imposed a lifetime ban. The athlete
appealed the sanction to CAS, which confirmed the lifetime ban. The athlete
then appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that the Federal Tribunal
should set aside the CAS Award because the athlete’s right to be heard was
violated during the arbitration proceedings. However, the athlete did not raise
this issue immediately during the arbitration proceedings. Because she did not
act timely, the Federal Tribunal considered the issue forfeited, and she was no
longer entitled to raise the alleged procedural violation.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
As professional athletes generally fall under the category of employees,
injured athletes may be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. Under a
workers’ compensation scheme, a tradeoff occurs whereby athletes are eligible
for benefits without the need to prove general tort requirements such as breach
of duty; however, in exchange, the athletes give up their rights to sue under a
tort theory of liability for an injury that occurs as a result of employment as a
professional athlete. The following cases illustrate workers’ compensation
issues such as eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits and the
appropriate calculation of such benefits.
Hoffman v. New Orleans Saints210
The plaintiff, a former professional football player for the New Orleans
Saints (Saints), was injured during the course and scope of his employment
with the Saints and was thus eligible for workers’ compensation benefits as a
result. At issue in this case is the plaintiff’s disagreement with the workers’

209. Oct. 3, 2011, 4A_530/2011 (Switz.).
210. 56 So. 3d 466 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
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compensation court’s judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the
court erred in determining his average weekly wage, which also affected his
supplemental earnings benefits, and erred in declining to award attorney fees
and penalties for the Saints’ failure to pay compensation while the matter was
in dispute. As for the average weekly wage calculation, the court agreed with
the workers’ compensation court and held that “the players’ average weekly
wage must be based on the amount actually earned at the time of the injury,”
regardless of any salary amount subsequently paid. However, the court
amended the judgment concerning attorneys’ fees and penalties. The
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that even though the dispute over the benefits
had not been conclusively resolved, given that the plaintiff was clearly entitled
to workers’ compensation benefits, the Saints were obligated to pay him
something. The court held that the Saints’ decision not to pay the plaintiff
anything was arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the court amended the judgment
to award the plaintiff compensation in the form of attorneys’ fees and penalties
and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council211
The NFL Players Association (NFLPA) moved to enforce a judgment
resolving a dispute between the players and the NFL Management Council
concerning the meaning of Paragraph 10 of the NFL Players Contract, which
defines the “offset” that NFL clubs are permitted to take from injured NFL
players’ state workers’ compensation awards. A 2009 arbitration award
provided that Paragraph 10 provides only for a time offset and not for a dollarfor-dollar offset. The NFLPA argued that despite this judgment, management
and several clubs continued to insist that the dollar-for-dollar offset applied.
The NFLPA moved for a permanent injunction against the Management
Council and all Clubs that would prevent them from seeking or obtaining this
dollar-for-dollar offset. The court found that the NFLPA met their burden for
an injunction, and enforced the judgment.
Nittel v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.212
Adam Nittel (Nittel), a former hockey player for the National Hockey
League’s (NHL) San Jose Sharks, suffered a multitude of injuries during his
tenure with the team from 1997 to 2002, and as relevant to this decision,
missed some work time during 2001. At issue is whether, for purposes of
211. No. 08 Civ. 3658, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37268 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011).
212. No. G044580, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4704 (Cal. Ct. App. June 22, 2011).
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workers’ compensation benefits, the 2005 revised permanent disability rating
schedule applies or whether his case fell under an exception such that the 1997
rating schedule would apply. Although Nittel spent time in 2001 on the
injured reserve, the WCJ found that he received salary continuation while he
was injured, which required the Sharks to provide notice according to the
relevant exception to the 2005 rating schedule. As such, the WCJ determined
the 1997 rating schedule should apply to Nittel’s case. The Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) amended the WCJ decision, finding
that the 2005 rating schedule applied. Upon review of the Board’s decision,
the California Court of Appeals annulled the decision and remanded the case
to award Nittel workers’ compensation benefits according to the WCJ’s
original decision.
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa213
The appellants Pro-Football, Inc., a Maryland corporation that operates the
Washington Redskins (Redskins), and Ace American Insurance Co. sought
reversal of a workers’ compensation award granted to Thomas Tupa (Tupa),
Redskins punter from 2004–2006, for an injury sustained while employed as a
professional athlete in the NFL. The appellants presented two issues for
review: Whether the circuit erred in (1) determining that Maryland has
jurisdiction over the appellee’s claims and (2) affirming the Maryland
Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that the appellee sustained an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The
appellate court found that Tupa was regularly employed in Maryland because
he had an ongoing relationship with his Maryland-corporation employer for
the purpose of playing in football game. The court also found that the
evidence presented was more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
Tupa suffered an accidental injury. The judgment of the circuit court was
affirmed.
MISCELLANEOUS
The following cases represent decisions that do not fall in any particular
area of law. The highlights include decisions made by private associations,
the value of broadcast rights for sports events, procedural issues, and a unique
case surrounding the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship.

213. 14 A.3d 678 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).
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Fédération Internationale de
Football Association v. European Comm’n214
This case came in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) after the
Secretary of State for Culture, Media, and Sports of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the Secretary) drew up a list of events of
major importance for the United Kingdom. The final list included all matches
at the World Cup, an event that is organized by and has its television rights
sold by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). The
inclusion of the World Cup on the Secretary’s list meant that FIFA could not
broadcast the event on an exclusive basis, effectively lowering the value of the
broadcast.
FIFA subsequently challenged the new measures, bringing an action with
the ECJ to annul the decision insofar as it concerned the World Cup. FIFA
specifically argued that the entities involved in making the decision: (1) failed
to provide reasons as to why its decision broadly encompassed all World Cup
matches; (2) infringed on FIFA’s rights pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Directive
89/552; (3) infringed on FIFA’s right to property; (4) infringed on FIFA’s
freedom to provide services pursuant to the European Community Treaty; (5)
infringed on FIFA’s freedom of establishment pursuant to the European
Community Treaty; and (6) infringed on the European Community Treaty on
competition. FIFA also requested that the ECJ adopt the measures of
organization of procedure to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to
justify including all World Cup matches on the list of events of major
importance to the United Kingdom society, and whether it was justified in
restricting fundamental freedoms, the right to property, and competition law.
For various reasons, the ECJ rejected all of FIFA’s arguments and its request;
thus, the Court dismissed FIFA’s action and upheld the decision.
George v. NCAA215
The plaintiffs challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
(NCAA) ticket-distribution system for the 2009 NCAA Men’s Final Four
basketball tournament. The system provided that all those wishing to purchase
tickets would first submit payment and a handling fee for the tickets. If
demand for the tickets exceeded the supply, a random selection process was
used to allocate the tickets. If an applicant was not randomly selected, the
handling fee was lost, but the rest of the payment was refunded to that
214. Case T-68/08, 2011 ECJ EUR-LEX LEXIS 41 (Feb. 17, 2011).
215. 945 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2011).
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applicant. The plaintiffs sued, alleging a number of claims. The Seventh
Circuit, on appeal, held that the NCAA’s ticket-distribution system was an
illegal lottery under Indiana law. However, the Seventh Circuit certified three
questions to the Indiana Supreme Court, including the determinative question
as to whether the system constituted an illegal lottery under Indiana law. The
Supreme Court concluded that the system does not constitute an illegal lottery
under Indiana law because there was no prize given to those who were
randomly selected. That is, those selected paid the face value price for the
tickets.
Lidle v. Cirrus Design Corp.216
The defendant Cirrus filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of
Corey Lidle’s former teammates. The plaintiff Melanie Lidle, the personal
representative on behalf of the estate of Cory Lidle, sought to call five former
teammates of Cory Lidle and his former manager to testify and provide
evidence in regards to Cory Lidle’s character, skills as a Major League pitcher,
training regimen, and future career. The plaintiff sought these witnesses for
the purpose of assessing damages if Cirrus is found liable for Cory Lidle’s
death. However, the court opined that the proposed witnesses could offer
firsthand perceptions on Cory Lidle, but could not be permitted to testify about
Cory Lidle’s future earning potential, which was a key inquiry. The court
granted the defendant’s motion in limine.
Tex. Racing Comm’n v. Marquez217
The Texas Racing Commission (the Commission) appealed a district court
decision, which overturned the Commission Director’s decision to disqualify
Javier Marquez’s (Marquez) horses from a race. Marquez owned two
racehorses that ran in the same race. One of the horses finished in second
place. However, both horses were later disqualified, and the race purse was
redistributed when it was discovered that the horses were inadvertently
wearing each other’s saddle-cloth numbers in violation of commission rules.
Marquez appealed the stewards’ decision to disqualify the horses.
After the Commission refused to consider the appeal, Marquez filed this
suit against the Commission and the Commission Director, arguing that
pursuant to Texas law, he had a right to an administrative appeal. The trial
court declared that the Commission Director acted in excess of her statutory
216. No. 08 Cv. 1253, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46315 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2011).
217. No. 03-09-00635-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6653 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011).
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authority by refusing to allow Marquez to appeal the stewards’ decision and
ordered that the second place purse be distributed to Marquez. The
Commission appealed the trial court ruling, arguing that the court lacked
jurisdiction over Marquez’s claims because the Commission and its Director
were immune under sovereign immunity.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider whether the Director exceeded her authority by
denying Marquez an appeal because that claim fell within the ultra vires
exception to sovereign immunity. However, the court held that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling on the merits because Marquez had
not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, the trial court’s
order that the second place purse be distributed to Marquez was reversed, and
the case was remanded for further proceedings.
State ex rel. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activity
Comm’n v. Webster218
The West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC)
imposed a one-game suspension on four high school football players for
unsportsmanlike conduct after they were involved in a fight during a game; the
game that the players were to miss was the AAA semifinal game that would
lead to the 2010 Class AAA state football championship game. In response to
the suspension, the players sought a temporary restraining order from the
circuit court, arguing that the WVSSAC ruling was arbitrary and capricious
and in violation of statutory authority. The circuit court granted that order on
November 23, 2010; the WVSSAC filed a motion to dissolve on November
26; and the football players played in and won the AAA semi-final game on
November 27. On November 29, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing
and concluded that that the officials violated the WVSSAC rules during the
game, and the court granted a preliminary injunction.
On December 2, the WVSSAC filed a petition with the Supreme Court of
Appeals seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the
preliminary injunction. The WVSSAC contended that the trial court acted in
excess of its authority when it issued a temporary restraining order and later
when it issued the preliminary injunction. On December 7, the Supreme Court
of Appeals issued the WVSSAC’s writ on prohibition after determining that
both of the trial court’s rulings were an improper exercise of authority. The
court explained that nothing in the jurisprudence of the court supported the

218. 717 S.E. 2d 859 (W.Va. 2011).
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trial court’s foundational premise that courts are permitted to second-guess the
manner in which the WVSSAC applies its rules. As a result of the improper
exercise of jurisdiction, the WVSSAC was entitled to a writ of prohibition.
CONCLUSION
The cases decided by courts and arbitral bodies in 2011 are sure to have a
strong impact in developing sports law and the sports industry as a whole.
This survey does not include every sports-related case decided in 2011; rather,
it includes brief summaries of some of the most interesting 2011 sports law
decisions and attempts to provide insight into the broad reach of sports as it
relates to the law. The most significant highlights from 2011 include the
highly-publicized labor law issues in the National Football League as well as
bankruptcy issues surrounding two Major League Baseball teams. The sports
law field grows and becomes more intriguing each year, and like 2011, the
interplay between law and sports will continue to develop in 2012.
Sarah Padove, Managing and Survey Editor (2011–2012)
with contributions from Carolina Dutriz, Elise Harris,
Cassandra Jones, Lindsay Ruch, and Ariel Sliffman

